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Abstract 
 
This thesis applies an ethnographic, qualitative research approach to a central 
question: In what ways does the presence of cognitive biases impact negatively 
on project management decision-making in the film industry? Are there ways 
that biases can best be avoided or at least reduced? This thesis cites evidence 
that managers are consistently unable to devise ways of effectively escaping 
the impact of cognitive bias, and that the majority are unaware of potential 
negative bias. My study explores whether and in what ways a deep knowledge 
of cognitive bias helps surmount the apparent limitations it imposes. My 
findings suggest that strategies involving cognitive behavioural theory provide 
researchers with significant insights into our understanding of creative 
management strategies to manage projects. Building on an extensive body of 
literature focused on biases in decision-making and their impact on 
forecasting, implementation and strategy, my thesis explores the concept that 
deep-seated cognitive habits have a direct impact on entrepreneurs͛ ability to 
manage creative projects successfully. Drawing on my ethnographic and 
participant observer data over two decades of film industry research and 
practitioner-derived experience, I examine how useful cognitive bias theory is 
Formatted: Line spacing:  Double
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from a practical perspective. The film industry provides a rich seam of research 
and an intriguing case site. It provides a relevant environment to interrogate 
because film companies are essentially organised around projects. I cite 
evidence that suggests that managers capable of ͚sǁitĐhiŶg geaƌs͛ aŶd who 
openly acknowledge and embrace the role cognition plays in the leadership 
process gain both a creative and a competitive advantage. By testing this 
concept through the lens of the value chain model, we can begin to develop a 
cognitive methodology that inspires practical tools capable of navigating 
uncertainty and capturing value and knowledge. 
 
 
Key words: Cognitive biases, value chain, value creation and capture, project 
management, local decision-making, knowledge learning.  
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SECTION 1. Introduction 
 
This thesis applies a theoretical approach to a central question: how does the 
presence of cognitive biases impact on project management decision-making? 
How can cognitive-orientated strategies be developed and shaped in order to 
help mitigate such disabling behaviour, and what wider conclusions can we 
drawn from the evidence available?  
Cognitive bias theory inspires an intriguing field of academic study and 
research. What role do mental models and biases play in value creation and 
learning? Could leaders build stronger and more enduring organisations by 
plaĐiŶg ͚ĐogŶitiǀe ďias͛ theoƌǇ ;Makƌidakis, ϭϵϵϬͿ [ϭ]Ϳ at the ĐeŶtƌe of theiƌ 
approach to project management? Project entrepreneurs who produce and 
traffic in film goods exist and operate in uncertain conditions [REFERENCE DE 
VANY], in part due to the difficulty of forecasting [Ibid]. They face considerable 
challenges, yet their deep-seated ͚haďits͛ (Louis and Sutton, 1991) [2] appear 
to handicap their performance. Their ability to foƌŵ ͚Đollaďoƌatiǀe 
ƌelatioŶships͛ ;Fjeldstad, et al, 1998) [3] and their reliance on self-organization 
and local decision making in the development and delivery of complex creative 
pƌojeĐts ŵeaŶs that theǇ ŵust ďe aďle to ideŶtifǇ aŶd ŵaŶage theiƌ ͚ĐoŵŵoŶ 
ƌesouƌĐes aŶd goals͛ ;Ostƌoŵ, ϭϵϵϬͿ [ϰ]. But what makes something a resource 
that both captures value and promotes learning and yet cannot be copied by 
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competitors? (Miller and Shamsie, 1996) [5]. And could existing cognitive 
biases lead them to regard as resources what are in effect liabilities and vice 
versa?  
My literature review suggests a consistent theme: managers appear 
consistently unable to devise ways of effectively escaping the impact of 
cognitive bias, and many leaders remain unaware of even its existence, which 
in turn impacts on their ability to discover and exploit opportunities (Mitchell 
et al, 2002) [6]. My thesis suggests that strategies and active management 
practices involving cognitive behavioural theory offer a potentially leading role 
to play in our understanding of creative management strategies and capturing 
value from project management. In order to contribute to the debatefollowing 
this discussion, it is logical to delve further to contribute to the debate I delve 
further and question which strategies, cognitive resources and practitioner 
testimonial insights can most effectively offer project entrepreneurs 
meaningful support in their quest to create value and widen their 
opportunities to capture knowledge. 
To explore the above questions I focus on the film industry – a project 
orientated creative goods sector. The film industry is an interesting field for the 
study of cognitive bias given that its specific culture and structure are arguably 
key factors in the decision-making process. Filmmaking and project managers 
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outside the Hollywood Studios face additional challenges, which include;ing 
decentralization, fragmentation and less clearly identified property-based and 
knowledge-based resources when compared to the Studios [5]. When 
combined, these factors make centralized learning even harder to put into 
practice.  I explore the gap between status quo biases regarding the existing 
mental model and the ever-changing challenge of navigating an uncertain 
environment.  Given this challenging landscape what role do cognitive biases 
play and how can they best be overcome? [1]. The film industry offers a strong 
example of a heavily project-based industry given that films are discrete, 
individual goods (Finney, 2008, 2010) [6,7]. Given this project-driven 
environment, we might expect that film professionals have produced 
knowledge on project management, and that value capture and knowledge 
transference occurs at a significant level. The evidence, however, does not 
support that expectation.  
Part of the challenge facing researchers in this uncertain terrain is how to 
Ŷaǀigate aŶd ƌise aďoǀe ͚the aŵďiguous Ŷatuƌe of iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͛ ;“haŵsie, in 
Lampel, Shamsie and Lant, 2006) [8].  For example, cultural industry observers 
and researchers have identified that industry-formed assumptions and 
decision-making are based on a ͚conflicting set of realities.͛  In turn, such 
ambiguity has a direct impact on learning, and ͚the ability of managers to make 
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well informed decisions, [while also promoting] the value of insight and 
intuition to a degree that is rarely seen in other industƌies͛ [Ibid, 8].  
Researchers and scholars have attributed considerable value to insight and 
intuition, along with tacit knowledge, in the quest to understand film industry 
project management processes. Hence it can be suggested that cognitive 
behavioural trends demand further research and analysis.  It is also important 
to acknowledge that cognitive bias is one of multiple elements that can shape 
project management and risk perception. Cognitive bias clearly interacts with a 
range of other contextual factors that shape the environment and the 
ŵaŶageƌ͛s behaviour within that site. Given the context of an uncertain and 
volatile industry [11], it can be suggested that the film industry also attracts 
individuals who are risk takers, innovators and entrepreneurs and/or who 
accept risk as part of the business because of the potential rewards. Some 
individuals may be less aware of the downside, while a few are operating from 
a position of blindness. Collaborative relationships [3], talent networks and 
team dynamics also play a key part in shaping project management in the film 
industry. Indeed, as the Literature Review (Section 2) explores, the above areas 
of research have been well researched, while we see that cognitive bias has 
arguably been undervalued and less interrogated. The revieǁ͛s fiŶdiŶgs fuƌtheƌ 
emphasise the contribution to the existing knowledge offered by this thesis. 
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Cognitive biases in future orientated decisions [1], including elements of 
overconfidence, optimism, illusion of control and the belief in the law of small 
numbers, (Simon, Houghton, Aquino 1999) [9] arguably play a central role in 
shaping project management and risk perception in the film industry.  How we 
define and approach the concept of risk (and risk management) is exemplified 
by the findings of Rimscha (2009) [10], Finney (2008, 2010) [6, 7] and De Vany 
(2004) [11]. Historically, the two key fields of risk in the film industry are 
identified as (1) production and (2) consumption, alongside two further factors 
noted and added by Rimscha, namely (3) reputation to a producer resulting 
from project failure, and (4) the failure to move from development to a Green 
Light decision and enter production [Ibid p.5]. As I evidence in the case site 
(Section 4), all four factors play a critical role in testing the ability of a project 
manager and his/her collaborative relationships [3] to manage risk in their 
search to capture value.  
Moving beyond De VaŶǇ͛s research and quantitative modelling on the 
Hollywood Studio system, which has foĐused oŶ ͚how extreme uncertainty 
shapes the film iŶdustƌǇ,͛ my thesis suggests that the role of mental models 
and cognitive behaviour can help provide valuable iŶsights ďeǇoŶd De VaŶǇ͛s 
conclusion that ͚Nobody knows anythiŶg͛ [11]. In a discussion around 
uncertainty and the challenge of forecasting, De Vany ƌefeƌs to the ͚NoďodǇ 
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KŶoǁs͛ pƌiŶĐipal ;as does “haŵsie [Ibid]) citing screenwriter Williaŵ GoldŵaŶ͛s 
dictum stated in his book Adventures in the Screen Trade (1983) [11, 12]. For 
outsiders, GoldŵaŶ͛s iƌoŶiĐ stateŵeŶt of conventional wisdom confirms the 
perception that the film industry is an area where dreams, aspirations and 
inspirations substitute for solid business knowledge (Finney 2008) [6]. 
Outsiders, however, do have an important point to make: the film industry, 
supported by extensive quantitative data gathered by a range of industry 
bodies over the past century [7], is unarguably an uncertain and high-risk 
business. Such a site demands further investigation, but my research 
methodology deserves some background explanation and examination before 
we delve into specific questions and themes.  My approach has been shaped 
by academic work produced by the Cognition School of Strategy (Mintzberg, et 
al) [13], including the dominant role of cognitive bias, which I apply through 
the lens of the value chain model, in this case the film industry model.  
Film industry research has been dominated by a quantitative approach. 
Qualitative research that seeks to connect and understand cognitive bias and 
project management behaviour has yet to be approached in detail. Part of the 
challenge facing researchers studying the film industry is how to gain 
transparent access to the real-life context within which events occur and how 
to capture the essence of unfolding and unplanned events (See Section 2: 
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Literature Review). My thesis͛ methodology is structured accordingly to 
address that gap. The study therefore makes a further contribution to research 
and findings related to cognitive bias and methods of avoiding or reducing bias 
[1] in relation to project management, creative management and the lessons 
that can be learnt through the fusion of this thesis͛s chosen theoretical 
approach to the industry case site [6, 7]. My own personal experience as a 
senior executive running an integrated2 film company has directly informed my 
research on cognitive bias and its impact on project management, and I have 
therefore witnessed first hand how difficult bias is to overcome. Hence, I will 
focus on my practitioner experience, detailed case site research and my prior 
publications on the film industry (See Appendix). The evidence and associated 
findings draw on in-depth film project analysis and industry processes across 
the value chain. There is, of course, a danger that my own experience, memory 
and recollections are also vulnerable to cognitive bias and dissonance, raising 
questions about the reliability of the approach and value of the research. 
However, my previously published work on the film industry spans a period of 
twenty-one years, while six years of that period was comprised of operational 
practitioner
3
 experience. Furthermore, my role in each project was as a 
financial collaborator, rather than lead project manager (e.g. ͚pƌoduĐeƌ͛Ϳ, 
                                                             
2 E.g.: development, financing, production and sales to market.  
3 I was appointed co-Managing Director of Renaissance Films in 1999, and went on to 
executive produce and finance/sell more than 20 films up to 2005. 
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placing me away from the centre of the project management process, but 
enabling me to bear witness to such processes and hence tƌaĐk eaĐh pƌojeĐt͛s 
journey.     
De VaŶǇ͛s ƌeseaƌĐh, ǁhile doŵiŶated by a quantitative approach [11] also 
embraces cognitive bias issues, including for example HollǇǁood͛s ͚Ŷaƌƌoǁ 
casting and sure thing͛ behaviour. He depicts this theme with reference to the 
domination of ͚laƌge͛ pƌojeĐts, aŶd the poteŶtial lost ǀalue Đaptuƌe as a diƌeĐt 
ƌesult of the HollǇǁood “tudios͛ ĐolleĐtiǀe aŶd Đoŵpetitiǀe oďsessioŶ ǁith 
blockbusters, alleged star power and scale: ͚Consequently, smaller movies are 
uŶdeƌǀalued͛ [Ibid, p.270]. My thesis concentrates on a range of smaller to 
medium film projects (ranging from the smallest at $8m to the largest at 
$60m). The research site seeks to make a contribution to the cognitive bias 
debate around factors of perception and behaviour, and the associated 
barriers to learning and value capture.  
Collecting and sharing knowledge and experience in this uncertain and 
unstable environment is an anathema to the majority of film practitioners. 
When it does take place on occasion, the trend is towards subjective, informal 
raconteur-orientated hand-downs and memoirs [6,7]. Meanwhile, practical 
business experience is often regarded by creative talent (Finney, 2010) [7] as 
secondary to more opaque factors such as imagination, intuition and creative 
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inspiration [Ibid]. But also, as Goldman notes (and re-enforced by Shamsie and 
De VaŶǇ͛s ƌeseaƌĐh aŶd fiŶdiŶgs), there are no reliable rules or clear models on 
how to make successful films, let alone forecast [1] and prediĐt a Ŷeǁ pƌojeĐt͛s 
success with a reliable degree of accuracy. My thesis seeks to specifically 
addƌess the ͚sŵalleƌ͛ film production sector4, with associated themes of self-
organisation, local decision-making and collaborative (or otherwise in certain 
cases) relationships [3].    
What the film industry case site offers is a mixture of professional, intuitive 
and incidental knowledge that is strongly rooted in individual behaviour and 
personal experience (Ferriani, et al) [39 and 6, 7]. Each project entrepreneur 
(including producer, executive producer, and financier and on occasion the 
writer/producer/director)
5
 comes to the film business with a mental model of 
how film projects ought to be managed, produced and best exploited.  Their 
assumptions and often overly ͚optimistic͛ [ϭ] expectations exist within a film 
value chain model
6
 that requires strategic navigation if a project is to be 
successfully developed, produced and distributed, and ultimately reach the 
market place for consumption [10]. Furtheƌŵoƌe, as De VaŶǇ ĐoŶĐludes, ͚there 
really is nothing that is predictable, not costs, not performance value and 
                                                             
4 Defined by the case site͛s film subjects whichthat ranges inin budgets from $8m to $60m. 
5 “ee “eĐtioŶ ϯ͛s disĐussioŶ aŶd defiŶitioŶ of a ͚pƌoduĐeƌ͛ etĐ. 
6 “ee “eĐtioŶ Ϯ͛s ƌeǀieǁ aŶd aŶalǇsis of the Filŵ Value ChaiŶ. 
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ĐeƌtaiŶlǇ Ŷot ƌeǀeŶue͛ [11]. The film project management process depends on 
effective collaborative relationships [3, 14], and the role and behaviour of the 
individual producer demands further exploration and analysis. ͚‘esouƌĐes that 
have proven value are usually embedded in individuals and groups over which 
the ĐoƌpoƌatioŶ has ŵuĐh ŵoƌe liŵited ĐoŶtƌol͛. (Lampel et al, 2006) [8].    
Indeed, we can playfully adapt GoldŵaŶ aŶd test the ŶotioŶ that ͚eǀeƌǇďodǇ 
thinks they know everythiŶg,͛ but the evidence obviously suggests they do not.  
By studying and evidencing the cognition modes of overconfidence and 
underestimating uncertainty [1] we can help to reveal the traps players set 
themselves, often subconsciously [9, 11]. Such habits [2] have direct 
implications for the success rate of film projects and associated value and 
knowledge capture. 
Producers, like all project managers, develop cognitive mental models that 
shape their expectations of how a film should be made, and also of the 
competitive environment aƌouŶd theŵ. ͚Such cognitive representations 
condition managerial decisions and actions, which are consequently often 
driven by simplified representations based on iŵpliĐit theoƌies of the ǁoƌld͛ 
(Hadida and Paris, 2013) [15]. However, it can be suggested that simplified 
theories and certain kinds of cognitive bias may in certain instances possibly 
benefit the project manager rather than hinder them [9]. If so, how and in 
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what ways? Awareness alone of cognitive bias is a strong start, as noted by 
Piǆaƌ͛s long standing President Ed Catmull in his book, Creativity Inc. (2014) 
[16], but also supported by his previous talks and academic writing [17]. 
Catŵull͛s patieŶt, searching enquiry into individual behaviour, team dynamics, 
cognitive biases and what he calls the ͚hiddeŶ͛ faĐtoƌs that need to be brought 
out into the open when managing creative people are discussed in the 
concluding sections of my thesis.  A central question governing these findings is 
hoǁ Piǆaƌ͛s leadership methods might function as a potential resource for 
managers and entrepreneurs facing uncertainty and bias in the creative 
industries and beyond. How has the management discovered and dealt with 
cognitive bias, and how key has that discovery been in the compaŶǇ͛s jouƌŶeǇ 
to creative credibility and global success? 
EǀideŶĐe fƌoŵ the authoƌ͛s pƌeǀiously published research, including a range of 
case studies [6, 7, 18, 19, 20] go some way to suggest that the film industry – 
driven by self-organised individuals dependent on collaborative relationships - 
is built around Makƌidakis͛s asseƌtioŶ of ͚unfounded beliefs and conventional 
wisdom(s),͛ [1] making it a ripe case site for exploring the impact of cognitive 
bias on decision-making and project management. What exists is a gap in 
knowledge and research that specifically links and explores cognitive 
frameworks through the value chain model. ͚CoŶǀeŶtioŶal ǁisdoŵs,͛ as 
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evidenced throughout the case studies, clearly play a central role in the way 
film industry project managers perceive risk, undertake decisions and how they 
manage their preferred (or at times inflicted) collaborative relationships.  
Testing those wisdoms is unusual behaviour in manager of a film company, yet 
the ƌesults ǁheŶ a leadeƌ ͚sǁitĐhes geaƌs͛ [Ϯ] aƌe iŶstructive if the Pixar 
method is analysed and further considered (see Section 5).  
This thesis is structured as follows: The next section (Section 2: Literature 
review) reviews the managerial cognition literature and explores the general 
management concept of the value chain as a mental model. The literature 
review specifically explores and ties the ͚oďjeĐtiǀe ǀisioŶ͛ ĐogŶitiǀe sĐhool of 
theory, including Simon (1947,1957), March and Simon (1958), Tversky and 
Kahneman, (1979), and Makridakis, (1990)) [1, 21, 22, 23, 24] to the film 
industry research site. I then analyse the PƌojeĐt MaŶageƌ͛s eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌial 
role that operates within the framework of the film value chain (Finney, 2010, 
2014) [7, 20].  
The value chain model, and its application to the film industry is discussed, 
while emphasising the lack of previous work that links the value chain model to 
cognitive frameworks. The third section (Section 3: Industry context) defines 
the project/entrepreneur – which in this Đase is the ͚pƌoduĐeƌ͛ and the 
collaborative relations and network required to make a film project. This 
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section also explains project management in the film industry and analyses film 
production management (or in some Đases ͚ŵisŵaŶagement͛Ϳ. The authoƌ͛s 
work on the film value chain is also included, providing a framework for the 
theoretical approach.  
The fourth section (Section 4: The case site) proceeds to draw on the film 
industry as a critical case site to examine a gap in the field of cognitive strategy 
ƌeseaƌĐh: Hoǁ do iŶĐuŵďeŶt eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌs͛ haďits aŶd assuŵptioŶs iŵpaiƌ 
their ability to manage risk?  Are all habits and bias automatically negative, and 
in what circumstances can they aid the manager?  Some scholars suggest that 
individuals take ͚risky͛ actions – actions that have a high possibility of failure – 
because they perceive less risk than most (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993) [25]. 
If that is the case, how can incumbents potentially re-learn and adjust to 
significant industry challenges? And what specific changes iŶ pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageƌs͛ 
eǆistiŶg ͚ŵeŶtal ŵodels͛ ŵight eŶaďle theŵ to Đƌeate aŶd Đaptuƌe ǀalue? 
This thesis draws on the authoƌs͛ ethŶogƌaphiĐal, pƌaĐtitioŶeƌ eǆpeƌieŶĐe aŶd 
field research, and applies a qualitative approach to the case site. Such an 
approach, linking cognitive bias with in-depth case studies, through the lens of 
the value chain model, offers a complimentary yet additional perspective on 
the international film business and creative industries, when seen next to De 
Vany, [11] Shamsie and Miller (1996), [53] and Lampel, et al (2006) et al [8]. As 
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such, the findings in this research contribute to the Cognitive School of 
Strategy͛s field of ƌeseaƌĐh. IŶ paƌtiĐular my findings go towards providing 
further evidence and guidance for those managers facing the challenge of 
sustainability in uncertain business environments. 
Another key theme concerns the fragmented architecture and decentralisation 
- hence demanding effective self-organisation. Its structure appears to prevent 
project managers from creating beneficial company cultures and sustainable 
business models. Positive learning models and constructive feedback loops 
that overcome or at least help navigate the obstacles presented by cognitive 
bias appear difficult to evidence.  
In the case study section (Section 4), I examine five different film projects, 
which were all developed and produced by Renaissance Films, a UK-based, 
integrated film company that had previously enjoyed commercial and critical 
success before re-financing and re-structuring in 1999
7
. Yet despite 
Renaissance attracting a wealth of creative talent over the next five years, 
many of the subsequent films did not receive a green light eventually, failed in 
the production process and sunk at the box office. The resulting study, 
therefore, of what project managers and their collaborators did, why, and to 
                                                             
7  All Renaissance cases in Section 4 took place in the years 2000-2005, and involved a range of high profile 
directors, actors and filmmakers, including Terry Gilliam, Glenn Close, Neil LaBute, Willem Dafoe, Paul Bettany, 
Charles Roven (Batman franchise, Scooby Doo), Johnny Depp, Robin Williams, Kirsten Dunst, Patricia Clarkson, 
Sandra Bullock, Ralph Fiennes, Killian Murphy, Laura Dern, Naomi Watts, Mark Ruffalo and Peter Cattaneo 
(The Full Monty), to name a high-profile sample.   
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what effect, offers potentially unique insights towards the study of cognitive 
biases. To be clear, Renaissance is hardly alone in its bid to try to traverse the 
US film industry from an UK/European base, and its ultimate failure joins a host 
of film company corpses, including Goldcrest, Palace Pictures (about which the 
author wrote a book) [58], and, most significantly, PolyGram Filmed 
Entertainment (Finney, 1996) [27, 7]. 
The ‘eŶaissaŶĐe Filŵs͛ cases are:   
 Green Lighting at Renaissance Films: The Reckoning (aka Morality Play) 
prior to production (4.2). This case examines risk management 
mistakes and project management failure as a direct result of the 
firŵ͛s internal culture and poor decision-making process.  
  Delusions of Success: Project management issues on Pobby & Dingan 
(aka Opal Dream after production) (4.3). This case explores the gap 
between projected project value and the limits of forecasting once a 
project is completed.  
  Creative management in crisis: how Vapor never made it to the screen 
(4.4). The case examines the curse of excessive optimism and the 
search for supportive evidence when little actually existed in the 
project.   
  The illusion of control: the global release strategy for The Safety of 
Objects (4.5). The case examines and evidences hoǁ oŶe keǇ partŶer͛s 
selective perception damaged the value of a project, further 
compounded by an opposite key partner suffering from conservatism.  
  Underestimating uncertainty: the search for a Studio deal for Good 
Omens (4.6). This case evidences the role that cognitive bias played in 
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preventing a project that was heading for production from reaching 
completion.  
 
 
To guard against danger of subjective cases, the research site concludes with a 
study that draws on research and material beyond the authoƌ͛s oǁŶ 
practitioner experience (although he has written and taught on it). The analysis 
of See-Saw Filŵs͛ project management approach and its involvement in the 
development and production of The King’s Speech [7] is set out below: 
 
 Risk management lessons: The KiŶg͛s “peech͛s jourŶeǇ froŵ sĐript to 
success (4.7). The case examines how a former Renaissance Films 
executive overcame extensive risk management challenges as a result 
of his creative and cognitive project management skills.    
 
The final case and focus on Pixar Animation Studios (Section 5), when viewed 
in the light of the Renaissance case site (which is dominated by repeated 
project management failure), is designed to examine what positive cognitive 
behaviour traits can be gleaned from successful film projects and film 
companies. To what extent can we evidence and identify such themes? And 
critically, what role has cognition awareness and the application of bias theory 
played in the overriding and enduring success of the Pixar creative 
management track record and company culture?  [16,17]. Does the Pixar 
experience simply complement existing research, or is there a case to be made 
that the evidence cited not only contradicts the literature to date, but that its 
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findings will play a central role in the Cognitive School of Strategy in years to 
come?  
These are central questions that I discuss in my sixth and final section. This 
section then bears down on the core research question: how do cognitive 
biases in project management decision-making affect value creation and 
learning?. Through the anlysis of By studying the presence and influence of 
cognitive biases in a series of critical case studies rooted in film project 
management, my thesis arguesconcludes by arguing that cognitive biases and 
pre-set mental models deeply restrain incumbent entrepreneurs. Unchecked 
biases also severely impacts on their ability to transfer knowledge and thus 
hinders learning. However, from the evidence cited in the last two studies, in 
particular the Pixar experience, it appears that Catŵull͛s ĐogŶitiǀe appƌoaĐh 
and detailed evidence improves our understanding of the field. The wider 
iŵpliĐatioŶs aŶd lessoŶs of this thesis͛s findings – in particular how Pixar 
overcame cognitive barriers during its initial decade of business - are then 
discussed in relation to other creative industries, such as the music,  and 
television industries and other art formsfurther fields.  
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SECTION 2.  Literature review 
 
2.1 The Cognitive School of Strategy: the mental model and bias  
 
Attention and interest in human cognition and in the iŶflueŶĐe of ŵaŶageƌs͛ 
aŶd leadeƌs͛ perceptions on decision-making has been an area of expanding 
research over the past 20 years. The ͚ĐogŶitiǀe sĐhool͛, as outliŶed aŶd 
summarised by Mintzberg, et al (2009)  [13], forms a body of work that is less a 
͚tight school of thought as a loose collection of research͛, which seems, 
nonetheless, to be growing into such a school. If it can deliver on its intentions, 
it could very well transform the teaching and practice of strategy as we know it 
todaǇ.͟ [Iďid].  The authors suggest that the school deals with strategy 
formation as a mental process that is derived mainly through direct 
experience. Personal experience determines what that manager knows, which 
in turn influences what they do, and which shapes their subsequent 
experience. This combative reflexive ͚interplay of reflection and action plays a 
central role in the cognitive school, giving rise to two rather different 
wings.͛[Ibid].  
One wing is described as the ͚oďjeĐtiǀe sĐhool,͛ the otheƌ as the ͚suďjeĐtiǀe.͛  
The objective position approaches the acts of processing and structuring of 
knowledge as a way of re-creating the world: as a kind of objective vision with 
the challenge of distortion always close at hand. The opposing wing sees the 
positivistic ͚oďjeĐtiǀe͛ ŵeŶtal ŵodel as suďjeĐtiǀe, ŵeaŶiŶg that it sees 
stƌategǇ as aŶ iŶteƌpƌetatioŶ of the ǁoƌld. The ŵiŶd has a ͚take͛ oŶ all the 
elements out there in the world, and it believes that cognition creates the 
world, as opposed to re-create [Ibid].  
Comment [D1]: The second half of this 
paragraph could be said to conflict with the 
second. Strategy formed from personal 
experience would be less inclined to grow 
into a tight school of thought. 
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Does the researcher need to make a choice between the two different 
approaches, and if so, why? As an evolving school of thought on strategy 
formation, critics point out that we are still some way to understanding how 
concepts form in the mind of the strategist [Iďid]. Both the ͚oďjeĐtiǀe͛ aŶd 
͚suďjeĐtiǀe͛ positioŶs offeƌ iŶteƌestiŶg positioŶs to ĐoŶsideƌ, ďut the ͚oďjeĐtiǀe͛ 
wing seems to relate more clearly to strategy as formed by the individual 
rather than strategy formed through a collective process. However, it could be 
suggested that the relationship between the leader as an individual and their 
impact on teams, projects and collaborative relationships have a reflexive 
relationship to one another rather than existing in mutual exclusion. Hence my 
thesis has chosen to draw on both sides of the School, and look at both the 
role of the individual and the collective process rather than be limited to one 
perspective and approach.  
 
2.2 The complexity of human behaviour and its impact on judgments 
 
Research into how individuals process and act on information to make 
decisions, in particular under the influence of cognitive biases and dictated by 
mental models, is rooted in the work by the political scientist Herbert Simon 
[12-14]. Simon described ͚Human beings, viewed as behaving systems, [as] 
quite simple. The apparent complexity of our behaviour over time is largely a 
reflection of the complexity of the environment in which we find 
ouƌselǀes,͛ [18]. In his book Administrative Behaviour (1947, 1957) [12-13], 
Simon introduced the notion that the world is complex and very large, when 
compared to the limited human mind, and its relative information-processing 
capacities. His work on behaviour examined value and fact in the decision 
making process, arguing that a ͚great deal of behaviour . . . is purposive - 
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oriented toward goals or objectives͛ [Ibid]. Simon goes on to explain that, ͚each 
decision involves the selection of a goal, and a behaviour relevant to it; this 
goal may in turn be mediate to a somewhat more distant goal; and so on, until 
a relatively final aim is reached. In so far as decisions lead toward the selection 
of final goals, they will be called "value judgments"; so far as they involve the 
implementation of such goals they will be called "factual judgments."͛ 
Unfortunately, problems do not come to the administrator carefully wrapped 
in bundles with the value elements and the factual elements neatly sorted 
[Ibid].  
The above research can be directly linked to the challenge facing the project 
manager: their goal is to: identify an opportunity, develop and produce that 
project, and ensure it reaches the market. As such, value judgments play a 
central role in the research and development process, while factual judgments 
arguably dominate the production and marketing phases. 
Simon later went on to explore the role of intuition and emotion in the 
management decision-making process. Human processes, in particular the 
essence of intuition, judgmeŶt aŶd ĐƌeatiǀitǇ, aƌe siŵplǇ ͚analyses frozen into 
habit and into the capacity for rapid response through recognition͛ [19]. Habits 
however, are formed over time, and are shaped by the wider assumptions, 
conventional wisdoms and may even be grounded in unfounded beliefs in the 
view of Makridakis [1]. And what if the project manager constantly recognises 
the wrong or less important problem or challenge, in part because their ability 
to see is distorted by their destructive habits?    
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2.3 Risks, high level mistakes and taking responsibility 
 
FolloǁiŶg “iŵoŶ͛s earlier work [12,13], a considerable amount of research 
literature on judgmental biases and cognitive behaviour has been undertaken. 
Work carried out by psychologists Tversky and Kahneman (1974) [24] is 
generally referred to as ͚pƌospect theory͛. Their research explored in particular 
the relationship between risk, mental models and decision-making. In addition 
to looking at hypotheses around risk aversion that start with the assumption 
that ͚most people aƌe geŶeƌallǇ ƌisk aǀeƌse͛, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) [26] 
also introduced two other causes: the ͚certainty effect͛ and ͚loss aversion͛, 
concluding that the latteƌ ͚strongly faǀouƌs the aǀoidaŶĐe of ƌisk.͛  
The authors also raised the issues set by near-proportionality, the costs of 
isolation, unrealistic optimism and narrow framing, but considered each aspect 
from the an ͚inside vieǁ͛ aŶd thean ͚outside ǀieǁ͛ [Ibid]. Their focus on a 
mechanism: the adoption of an inside view of problems, which leads to 
͚anchoring͛ [1] on plans and on the most available scenarios. And they counter 
that such erroƌs of iŶtuitiǀe pƌediĐtioŶ ĐaŶ ͚sometimes be reduced by adopting 
an outside view, which forecasts the outcome without attempting to forecast 
its history͛ [15].  
Their observations and ideas regarding risk suggest that decision makers tend 
to deal with choices one at a time, and that their attitudes to risk exhibit risk-
aversion and near-proportionality. AŶd giǀeŶ the high Đosts of ŵistakes, ͞the 
reluctance to take explicit responsibility foƌ possiďle losses is poǁeƌful͟ [ϮϬ]. 
These concepts and findings can be helpfully placed within the work of the 
project manager, where the optimistic bias of investment projects is a familiar 
fact of life.: Tthe typical project finishes late, comes in over budget when it is 
finally completed, and fails to achieve its initial goals. Highly ͚optimistic͛ errors 
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of judgeŵeŶt aŶd ͚delusioŶs of suĐĐess͛ [Ϯϱ] appear to be especially likely if 
the project involves new technology or otherwise places the firm in unfamiliar 
territory͟ [Ibid]. As we shall see evidenced in the case site, the inability to take 
responsibility, both when looking forwards and when looking back (see below), 
alongside optimistic errors when project managers are working in unfamiliar 
territories are common and re-occurring themes throughout my thesis.  
 
2.4 Seeing is believing 
 
Building on Tversky and KahŶeŵaŶŶ͛s ͚iŶside͛ aŶd ͚outside͛ ǀieǁs, ǁhiĐh has 
contributed to the status of cognitive representations and influences in 
managerial action [15], the ĐoŶĐept of hoǁ the ŵaŶageƌ ͚sees͛ folloǁs oŶe of 
two cognitive logics: In the experiential logic, action leads to learning from 
doing (referred to as backward-looking wisdom), and experience influences the 
formation of sense-making cognitive frameworks (Gavetti, et al, 2000; Weick, 
1995) [28, 29]. The seĐoŶd peƌspeĐtiǀe is the ͚ĐogŶitiǀe logiĐ,͛ ǁheƌe aĐtioŶ 
derives from a model (forward-looking wisdom). Hence the cognitive logic 
forms the focus of the managerial cognition approach [Ibid].  
Fuƌtheƌ ƌeseaƌĐh oŶ ŵaŶageƌial ĐogŶitioŶ eǆaŵiŶed ŵaŶageƌs͛ peƌĐeptioŶs of 
͚stƌategiĐ gƌoups͛ (Kaplan, 2011, Porac, et al, 1989, 2011) [30, 31-32]. Such 
gƌoups, iŶ tuƌŶ, ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŶŶeĐted to the iŵpoƌtaŶĐe of ͚Đollaďoƌatiǀe 
ƌelatioŶships͛ [ϯ].  The role played by managerial cognition in shaping 
strategies was highlighted in Porac, Thomas and Baden-Fulleƌ͛s ;ϭϵϴϵͿ aƌtiĐle, 
Competitive Groups as Cognitive Communities: The Case of Scottish Knitwear 
Manufacturers, which the authors later revisited in 2011 [Ibid]. The cited 
authoƌs͛ ƌeseaƌĐh eǆaŵiŶed hoǁ a stƌategiĐ gƌoup ĐaŶ ͚see͛ theiƌ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt, 
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the wider industry, and their perceived competition and accordingly develop 
stƌategies to Ŷaǀigate theŵ, guided ďǇ the ŵaŶageƌ͛s ĐolleĐtiǀe suďjeĐtiǀe 
perceptions. The heart of strategic groups is essentially cognitive according to 
the conclusions of the authors. The challenge for industry competitors is how 
to legitimise their existence by adjusting and conforming to the accepted 
norms and established categories to which they belong, while being able to 
innovate and differentiate themselves from competitors in order to be noticed, 
let alone gain a unique status [13].  
Subsequent further research by two of the above authors examined how 
mental models shared a focus on competition between rivals, who develop 
their approaches within a pre-set, hierarchical industry structure. This work by 
Porac and Thomas (1990) [33] examined established competitors performing in 
mature, stable or declining industries and did not look at the existence of 
managerial cognition or outsiders or entrepreneurs in uncertain and disrupted 
industries. Certain cognitive research, however, did examine more uncertain, 
rapidly changing case sites, acknowledging how managerial cognition connects 
͚actions to a changing environment by influencing what is noticed, how this 
information is interpreted and why certain choices are made,͛ (Kaplan, 2008) 
[34]. The ƌeseaƌĐh eǆploƌed hoǁ ͚cognition can compensate when 
organizational-leǀel faĐtoƌs aƌe laĐkiŶg,͛ ďut that managers often find it hard to 
change their views, particularly if such views are derived from highly tacit 
accumulated knowledge that underpins the activities of the firm. The other 
aspect suggested is that change may require a break in the links of a deeply 
embedded organizational architecture that ties together cognition, capabilities 
and incentives [Ibid]. 
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Researchers in entrepreneurial cognition, grounded in cognitive science, define 
ĐogŶitioŶ as: ͚All processes by which sensory input is transformed, reduced, 
elaborated, stored, recovered and used͛ (Neisser, 1967) [35].  The challenge for 
the individual leader is to be conscious of all that sensory activity taking place 
and what it might mean to them and others, while concurrently spending their 
waking hours managing resources, people and projects under significant 
pressure and expectations. IŶdeed, aĐhieǀiŶg ͚ďalaŶĐe͛ is a key goal, as pointed 
out by Catmull [16].  
 
2.5 Working in the dark: mental perceptions of risk 
 
Entrepreneurial ĐogŶitioŶ studies foĐus oŶ ͚knowledge structures that people 
use to make assessments, judgments or decisions involving opportunity, 
evaluation and venture creation and growth͛ (Mitchell et al, 2002) [36]. By 
aiming to better understand how entrepreneurs think, this line of research is 
keenly linked to how the mental process works [Ibid]. However, 
entrepreneurial cognition has yet to explore mental models and cognitive 
frameworks in relation to new markets, ventures and unstable and disrupted 
industrial environments and value chains [15].  
The closest work to new ventures in this area is by Simon M., Houghton and 
Aquino [9], which explored hoǁ iŶdiǀidual eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌs ͚cope with the risks 
inherent in their decisioŶs [to staƌt a Ŷeǁ ǀeŶtuƌe],͛ with findings that 
suggested that they may not perceive said risksiness. The authors examined 
three cognitive biases that previous research has suggested may lower risk 
perception: overconfidence, the illusion of control, and the law of small 
numbers [Ibid]. 
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 Cognitive Biases    Perception   Decision 
 Overconfidence  
  
 
Illusion of Control          Risk Perception         Decision to start a Venture 
         
 
 
 Belief in the Law of Small Numbers 
 
Table 1: Model of the decision to start a new venture. Simon, Houghton, Aquino, 1999 
 
The first cited bias, overconfidence, refers to the failure to know and 
acknowledge the liŵits of oŶe͛s own knowledge. The second tested by the 
authors is the illusion of control, which occurs when individuals overemphasize 
the extent to which their skill can increase performance in situations where 
chance plays a large part, and skill is not necessarily the deciding factor. 
Because the individuals believe that they can control largely uncontrollable 
events, they also think they can accurately predict the outcome of the events. 
Finally, the third bias, is the belief in the law that small numbers occurs when 
an individual uses a limited number of informational inputs (a small sample of 
information) to draw firm conclusions [9]. 
 
 
 
 33 
2.6 Cognitive bias in decision-making 
 
In the project management context, operating within a value chain model, the 
iŶflueŶĐe of the oďjeĐtiǀe sĐhool͛s ͚doŵiŶaŶt logiĐ͛ appƌoaĐh is ĐoŶsideƌaďle. 
ApplǇiŶg Makƌidakis͛s [1] collective summary of cognitive ͚biases in decision 
making,͛ we see the difference ďetǁeeŶ ŵeŵoƌǇ aŶd judgeŵeŶt: ͚while we 
aĐĐept the defiĐieŶĐies aŶd liŵitatioŶs of ouƌ ŵeŵoƌǇ… we rarely do anything to 
remedy the deficiencies of our judgment, mainly because we are unaware or 
unwilling to accept that our judgment can be faulty or biased. Because they are 
almost never presumed to exist, it is extremely important to expose judgmental 
biases͛. Makridakis͛s empirical evidence demonstrates their existence and their 
negative, damaging consequences. Research however also indicates that 
judgmental biases do not mean stupidity [Ibid], for their existence is clearly 
discernable among highly intelligent people. Rather, they result from the way 
the mind operates and reflect ͚its endeavours to achieve the optimal 
reconciliation of conflicting objectives͛ [Ibid]. Makridakis͛s list of common biases 
and proposed solutions is mapped below in Table 2: 
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Common	Biases	in	Future-Orientated	Decisions	and	Proposed		
Ways	of	Avoiding	or	Reducing	Their	Negative	Impact	
	____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________	
	
Type	of	Bias																										Description	of	Bias	 Ways	of	Avoiding	or	Reducing	the	
Negative	Impact	of	Bias	
	
	
Search	for	supportive	evidence:	 	 Willingness	to	gather	facts,	which	lead	toward	certain		 	 	 Induce	disconfirming	evidence	
conclusions,	and	to	disregard	other	facts	that	threaten	them	 	 Introduce	role	of	devil’s	advocate	
	
Inconsistency:	 	 	 	 Inability	to	apply	the	same	decision	criteria	in	similar	situations	 	 Formalize	the	decision	making	process	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Create	decision-making	rules	to	be	followed		
	
Conservatism:	 	 	 	 Failure	to	change	(or	changing	slowly)	one’s	own	mind	in		 	 Monitor	for	changes	in	the	environment	and	
light	of	new	information	or	evidence	 build	procedures	to	take	actions	when	such	
changes	are	identified	
	
Recency:		 	 	 	 The	most	recent	events	dominate	those	in	the	less	recent			 	 Realize	that	cycles	exist	and	that	not	all	ups	
past,	which	are	downgraded	or	ignored	 	 	 	 	 or	downs	are	permanent	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Consider	the	fundamental	factors	that	affect	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 the	event	of	interest	
	
	
Availability:		 	 	 	 Reliance	on	specific	events	easily	recalled	from	memory,	 	 	 Present	complete	information	
to	the	exclusion	of	other	pertinent	information	 	 	 	 Present	information	in	a	way	that	points	out	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 all	sides	of	the	situation	being	considered	
Anchoring:		 	 	 	 Predictions	are	unduly	influenced	by	initial	information,		
which	is	given	more	weight	in	the	forecasting	process	
	
	
Illusory	correlations:	 	 	 Belief	that	patterns	are	evident	and/or	two	variables	are		 	 	 Verify	statistical	significance	of	patterns	
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Illusory	correlations:	 	 	 Belief	that	patterns	are	evident	and/or	two	variables	are		 	 	 Verify	statistical	significance	of	patterns	
causally	related	when	they	are	not	 Model	relationships,	if	possible,	in	terms	of	
changes	
Selective	perception	 	 	 People	tend	to	see	problems	in	terms	of	their	 	 	 	 Ask	people	with	difference	backgrounds	
	 	 	 	 	 own	background	and	experience		 	 	 	 	 and	experience	to	independently	suggest	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 solutions	
	
Regression	effects	 	 	 Random	decreases	and	increases,	which	impact	reflexively		 	 Explain	that	when	errors	are	random	the		
chances	of	a	negative	error	increases	when	
several	positive	ones	have	occurred	
	
	
Attribution	of	success	and	failure		 Success	is	attributed	to	one’s	skills	while	failure	to	bad	luck,	 	 Do	not	punish	mistakes,	instead	encourage	
or	someone	else’s	error.	This	inhibits	learning	as	it	does	not		 	 people	to	accept	their	mistakes	and	make	
allow	recognition	of	one’s	mistakes	 	 	 	 	 them	public	so	they	and	others	can	learn	to	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 avoid	similar	mistakes	in	the	future	(This	is		
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 how	Japanese	companies	deal	with	mistakes)	
	
	
Optimism,	wishful	thinking		 	 People’s	preferences	for	future	outcomes	affect	their	 	 	 Have	the	forecasts	made	by	a	disinterested		
forecast	of	such	outcomes	 	 	 	 	 	 third	party	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 Have	more	than	one	person	independently	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 make	the	forecasts	
	
Underestimating	uncertainty	 	 Excessive	optimism,	illusory	correlation,	and	the	 	 	 	 Estimate	uncertainty	objectively.	Consider		
	 	 	 	 	 need	to	reduce	anxiety	result	in	underestimating		 	 	 many	possible	future	events	by	asking	
	 	 	 	 	 future	uncertainty	 	 	 	 	 	 	 different	people	to	come	up	with	un-	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 predictable	situations/events	
	
FIGURE	2:	Makridakis,	1999,	Chapter	2,	pages	36-37	
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Table 2: Makridakis, S. 1990, Chapter 2, pages 36-37 
Creative industries are not aloŶe iŶ ĐƌeatiŶg aŶd ƌelǇiŶg oŶ ͚unfounded beliefs 
or ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal ǁisdoŵs͛ but my thesis suggests that they form a critical role 
in the challenge of value capture and knowledge capture. The case site is 
comprised of a detailed collection of narrative driven project management 
experiences that offer a compelling testing ground for Makridakis͛s table and 
associated proposals designed to mitigate the impact of bias. The academic 
posits:  
͚We have grown up in a culture where we accept certain statements as 
true, though they may not be: For instance, we believe that the more 
information we have, the more accurate our decisions will be. Empirical 
evidence does not support such a belief. Instead, more information 
merely seems to increase our confidence that we are right without 
ŶeĐessaƌilǇ iŵpƌoǀiŶg the aĐĐuƌaĐǇ of ouƌ deĐisioŶs… In reality, the 
information found is usually redundant and provides little additional 
ǀalue͛ [Ibid]. 
Certain researchers have explored some of the above perplexing subjects in 
detail. Regarding the problem of managers operating under the illusion of 
control, some ͚decision makers may overestimate the extent to which the 
outcomes of an acquisition (aka ͚pƌojeĐt͛Ϳ aƌe uŶdeƌ theiƌ peƌsoŶal ĐoŶtƌol aŶd 
may assume that they can make the business suĐĐeed should pƌoďleŵs aƌise.͛ 
(Duhaime and Schwenk, 1985) [37]. Additional issues suƌƌouŶdiŶg ͚escalating 
commitment͛, ǁhiĐh ͚involves continued and increasing investment in the face 
of poor and declining outcomes of performance,͛ a notion that has been 
applied from international conflicts escalating into war [13], through to 
blockbuster movies being allowed to expand in budget to the point that they 
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threaten a HollǇǁood studio͛s futuƌe eǆisteŶĐe ;BaĐh, ϭϵϴϲͿ [38]. Throughout 
the case site, I examine a range of film projects, some of which rose in cost 
even after high levels of investment and resources had already been 
committed. Initial time and investment at the research and development stage 
of a project presents the manager with a dilemma: when do they pull the plug 
or when do they pull the trigger?  The pressure to green light a project is more 
intense the further the management has historically invested, and offers a 
Đleaƌ iŶdiĐatioŶ of ͚esĐalatioŶ͛ iŶ ŵotioŶ [ϭ]. 
  
2.7 ͚“ǁitĐhiŶg ĐogŶitiǀe gears͛: the three ŵiŶd shifts  
 
Given the cognitive challenge at hand, what positive modes of thinking could 
mitigate the seemingly inherent dangers of bias? Research into the a 
ŵaŶageƌ͛s ability to shift between cognitive modes, from automatic processing 
to conscious engagement (oƌ ͚ŵiŶdfulŶess͛) [13] and back again was explored 
in Louis aŶd “uttoŶ͛s 1991 paper, Switching Cognitive Gears: From Habits of 
Mind to Active Thinking [2]. The authors develop a perspective on the switch 
from automatic to active thinking and the conditions that provoke it. 
Effectiveness may be as much a function of a pƌiŶĐipal͛s capacity to sense 
when a switch is appropriate, as to process in one or another mode. The 
authors suggest that there are three kinds of situations in which principals are 
likely to become consciously engaged: 
 
͚First, switching to a conscious mode is provoked when one experiences 
a situation that is unusual or novel – ǁheŶ soŵethiŶg ͚staŶds out of the 
oƌdiŶaƌǇ,͛ ͚is uŶiƋue,͛ oƌ ǁheŶ the ͚uŶfaŵiliaƌ͛ oƌ ͚pƌeǀiouslǇ uŶkŶoǁŶ͛ is 
experienced. Second, switching is provoked by discrepancy – ǁheŶ ͚aĐts 
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aƌe iŶ soŵe ǁaǇ fƌustƌated,͛ ǁheŶ theƌe is ͚aŶ uŶeǆpeĐted failuƌe,͛ ͚a 
disƌuptioŶ,͛ ͚a tƌouďlesoŵe…situatioŶ,͛ ǁheŶ theƌe is ͚a sigŶifiĐaŶt 
difference between expectations and reality. A third condition consists 
of deliberate initiative, usually in response to an internal or external 
request for a increased level of conscious attention – as when people are 
͚asked to thiŶk͛ oƌ ͚eǆpliĐitlǇ ƋuestioŶed͛ oƌ ǁheŶ theǇ Đhoose to ͚tƌǇ 
something new͛ [Ibid].   
 
This last mode of switching gears (and ditching habits) offers the most relevant 
connection to my case site oŶ Piǆaƌ͛s ŵaŶageŵeŶt. Project managers in the 
first set of case studies demonstrated no evidence of a search beyond the 
obvious. No post mortems on Green Lighting were held by the company, and 
the in-house producers rushed forwards to their next film projects rather than 
pause and take stock of what had just occurred and garner what they could 
learn from the experience [7] (See Section 4). The case study (The King’s 
Speech) and “eĐtioŶ ϱ͛s foĐus oŶ Pixar, however, bear evidence that the 
presence of increased levels of conscious attention throughout their respective 
project management processes helped capture value from both their film 
projects per se and for their oǀeƌall ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s ƌeputatioŶ aŶd fiŶaŶĐial ƌesults 
(See Sections 4, 5 and 6).     
 
Louis and Sutton [2] detected further research to develop a framework for 
understanding the switch from automatic to active thinking and back to 
automatic thinking. But what if the actor is stuck, unable to shift gears? What if 
their mental model cannot adapt to new demands, or that they cannot bring 
their team of actors/creative players in their package with them, even if they 
know they need to shift? And to what extent does a preconceived, industry 
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value chain model prevent project managers/project entrepreneurs hold them 
back? Such questions direct us to the concept of the value chain model and 
hoǁ its pƌedoŵiŶaŶĐe as a ŵeŶtal ŵodel iŵpaĐts oŶ ŵaŶageƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌ, 
both individually and in terms of third party collaborations [14, 15, 30, 39].  
However, the dominant mental model provided by the value chain is not 
necessarily automatically negative. The ŵodel͛s fƌagŵeŶted aƌĐhiteĐtuƌe 
serves to make the producer aware that they need to shift from one part of 
the chain to the next if the production is going to reach the market. 
Researchers also need to consider the value chain construct in relation to 
digital and social media-driven disruption, and what is its relation to cognitive 
bias. The rate of change and restructuring taking place in the digital age means 
that managers need to disrupt existing practices in production and distribution 
to survive [7, 15, 19].  
 
2.8 The value chain model as a mental model 
 
The 'value chain' (Porter, 1985) [40] is a model that describes a series of value-
adding activities connecting a company's or business sector's typical supply 
side (e.g. materials, logistics, production processes) with its demand side (e.g. 
marketing, distribution and sales). By examining the different stages and links 
of a sector's value chain, managers have been able to refine and/or redesign 
their internal and external processes to improve efficiency and effectiveness 
(Rayport and Viokla, 1996) [41]. While considerable academic research and 
study has focused on value chain analysis, as noted previously, less attention 
has been concentrated on value chain restructuring and the impact of 
uncertainty and disƌuptioŶ oŶ the ǀaƌious stages of aŶ iŶdustƌǇ͛s liŶks in the 
chain.  
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The  ͚ǀalue ĐhaiŶ͛ model was formalised in 1985 by Michael Porter, in his book 
Competitive Advantage: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance [Ibid]. 
Porter subsequently summarised the value chaiŶ as ͚the set of activities 
through which a product or service is created and delivered to customers.͛ The 
value chain is used to help analyse that company's competitive advantage and 
strategy within the marketplace. In a later article about the Internet (2001) 
[42] Porter summarised the value chain as follows: ͚When a company 
competes in any industry, it performs a number of discrete but interconnected 
value-creating activities, such as operating a sales force, fabricating a 
component, or delivering products, and these activities have points of 
connection with the activities of suppliers, channels, and customers. The value 
chain is a framework for identifying all these activities and analysing how they 
affect both a company's costs and the value delivered to buyeƌs͛ [Ibid].   
 
However, many products are not created and delivered to the end user by a 
single company. Notably, the case site being addressed in this thesis offers up 
a complex multi-player and multi-company/organization(s) landscape. The 
majority of practitioners, for example, working in the film sector are freelance, 
moving from project to project rather remaining in the same 
company/organisation. Hence, the corporation and/or Studio/large company  
model is not necessarily a firm and relevant fit for the non-Hollywood film 
industry's architecture. Individual players (producers, talent, etc.) play key 
roles in creating and capturing value, and SMEs contract and expand according 
to the level of production activity at any given point in time.  
 
In a bid to accommodate this wider challenge presented by fragmented 
industry sectors, Porteƌ Đƌeated the ĐoŶĐept of the ͚ǀalue sǇsteŵ͛, which 
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includes the individual value chains of all the separate companies or players 
who are co-operating within an industry to deliver a final product. Porter has 
also subsequently observed the effects on the value chain of information 
technology and the Internet. He cited the integration of the entire value 
system, merging supply chain management and customer relationship 
management, and stimulating ͚͚end-to-end applications involving customers, 
channels, and suppliers link orders to, for example, manufacturing, 
procurement, and service delivery. Soon to be integrated is product 
development, which has been largely separate͛͛ [Ibid]. 
 
Perhaps reflecting that argument for perceived integration, writers and 
academics in the media sector have gradually dispensed with the distinction 
between the value chain and the value system, and refer to them both as the 
value chain (encompassing all the separate stages of value addition, whether 
within one company or several).  Lucy Küng (2008) [43] suggested "the value 
chain has been a tool of preference for analysing convergence in the media 
industry for practitioners, consultants and academics. However in the majority 
of eǆaŵples it is Ŷot used iŶ the ͚puƌe foƌŵ͛ described above - where individual 
firm activities are disaggregated and analysed - but rather at industry level as a 
short hand means of depicting graphically the various stages by which media 
products are created and delivered to the end consumer [Ibid].  
 
Considering the value chain as a ŵeŶtal ŵodel, as eŶshƌiŶed iŶ the ͚gƌaphiĐ 
depiĐtioŶ͛ of the linear journey a product takes from inception to 
consumption, is generally taken at face value. It has been ͚used as a blueprint 
of conceptual categorisation . . . and is deeply embedded in managerial 
thinking and action across organisations, strategic groups and industries͛ [15, 
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31-32].  The advent of the Internet and the proliferation of a vast array of new 
digital consumer devices have prompted a re-examination of the value chain 
model and its utility.  Some have focused heavily on digital technology and the 
changing geographical impact of the Internet, including 'Virtual' Value Chain 
and Systems research (Rayport and Sviokla, 1996) [41], Value Creation in E-
business (Amit and Zott, 2001) [44] and new Digital Business Models (Rappa, 
2008) [45].  Others have elected to research specific industries 
Value Chain 'Envy' in the music industry (Mol, et al, 2005) [46], 'Mobile 
Commerce Value Chain' analysis (Barnes 2002) [47] and ͚Media CoŶǀeƌgeŶĐe 
and the Evolving Media Business Model: An Overview and Strategic 
OppoƌtuŶities,͛ ;McPhilllips and Merlo, 2008) [48].  
 
Certain key themes are prevalent and recurring, including the exploration of 
how to create and exploit digital assets, and how existing business axioms and 
incumbent-driven models are increasingly redundant. Digital-driven factors are 
coupled with rapid advent of social media and changing behaviour. The huge 
expansion and choice of goods available has in turn meant consumers engaged 
in finding information and 'experiential' value, rather than just being focused 
on the technology as the sole end destination. Hence it can be suggested that 
the linear, vertical route (and associated components) of the Porter-conceived 
and often- followed value chain is no longer asso predictable and stable given 
the impact of the global Internet.  
 
BuildiŶg oŶ Poƌteƌ͛s value chain framework, Stabell and Fjeldstad (1998) [49] 
proposed two further alternative value configurations as a foundation for a 
theory of ͚value configuring͛ for competitive advantage. The authors further 
developed the value chain configuration model by building frameworks for 
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value shops and value networks.  Rather than limiting their analysis to 
competition, they stress the need for cooperative relationships and common 
standards to create and capture value: ͚The simultaneous, co-producing nature 
of a system value of networks requires ĐoŵŵoŶ staŶdaƌds.͛ Common 
standards raise the question of which participants are with whom, and how 
effective their partnerships are?  
 
The question of the role and importance of ͚collaboration͛ in value creation 
was further explored by Fjeldstad et al. (2012) [50]. The authors suggested that 
that new organization designs are required to help firms that are facing 
͚competitive pressures related to rapid and continuous adaptation to a 
complex, dynamic and highly inteƌĐoŶŶeĐted gloďal eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt.͛ They 
proposed a new actor-orientated architectural scheme that is composed of 
thƌee ŵaiŶ eleŵeŶts: ͚(1) actors who have the capabilities and values to self-
organise; (2) commons where the actors accumulate and share resources; and 
(3) protocols, processes and infrastructures that enable multi-actor 
collaboration͛ [Ibid (p.724)]. Effective self-organising depends, however, on 
͞ĐoŵpeteŶt aĐtoƌs ǁho haǀe kŶoǁledge, iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, tools, aŶd ǀalues,͟ [Iďid 
(p.739)] and are able to set goals and assess the consequences of potential 
aĐtioŶs foƌ aĐhieǀeŵeŶt of those goals.͟  
 
In conclusion, Fjeldstad, et al [Ibid] argued that theiƌ ͚aĐtoƌ oƌieŶtated sĐheŵe͛ 
could be applied universally. The scheme, in their view, was particularly 
ƌeleǀaŶt aŶd ͞ǁell suited͟ to the desigŶ of oƌgaŶizatioŶs taĐkliŶg ill-structured 
or unstructured problems. These are characterized by uncertainty about both 
ends and means such that a high degree of mutual adjustment among 
changing sets of actors is needed in order to, (1) anticipate the shape of an 
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unknown future, (2) generate alternatives for operating effectively in dynamic 
and uncertain environments, and (3) implement chosen strategies rapidly and 
efficiently. In their conclusions, the authoƌ͛s expect that total value creation 
will be greater and faster in organisations that create value collaboratively, and 
that multiparty collaboration is critical to the effective solution of complex 
problems and continuous adaptation to changing environmeŶts. ͚Further, new 
organization designs demand changes in managerial attitudes and abilities that 
historically have taken decades to gain widespread acceptance and 
implementation͛ [Ibid (p.747)].   
 
Achieving high levels of collaboration would also help to address current issues 
around managing change throughout the creative industries. Indeed, it might 
addƌess Makƌidakis͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶ that ͚we cannot envision that things can be done 
in radical and differentce ways through brand new technologies, probably 
because we do not wish to consider the threats implied by the changes that 
these technologies aƌe Đapaďle of ďƌiŶgiŶg.͛ (1996) [43 (p.24)]. While it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to delve into the impact of disruption and its 
impact on film and creative industry project managers and companies 
(although future researchers will not doubt approach the issue), it can be 
aƌgued that ĐogŶitiǀe ďias is likelǇ to plaǇ a sigŶifiĐaŶt ƌole iŶ pƌoduĐeƌs͛ aďilitǇ 
to adapt, aŶd ͚sǁitĐh geaƌs͛ [2] fast when still stuck in an outmoded mental 
model [15]. This line of argument was clearly posited by Hadida and Paris in 
their recent research on the digital music industry [Ibid]. 
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2.9 Project management, teams and collaborative relationships 
 
The marketplace and role of networks and teams in relation to project-
entrepreneurship has been explored in relation to the Hollywood film industry, 
and the research offers intriguing fiŶdiŶgs aďout the ĐoŵpositioŶ of a pƌojeĐt͛s 
actors (Ferriani et al, 2008) [14]. The authors argue that project-eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌs͛ 
performance is related to their degree of centrality within the social network, 
and their familiarity with the selected project-team as captured by the 
distƌiďutioŶ of ties aŵoŶg the teaŵ ŵeŵďeƌs. Teaŵs that asseŵďle ͞old-
tiŵeƌs aŶd ŶeǁĐoŵeƌs͟ seƌǀe the pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageƌ ďest. OŶe of the papeƌ͛s 
intriguing further questions question whetheƌ ͚increasingly central project-
entrepreneurs in the social network have a higher propensity towards 
embarking in risky-ventures thus resulting in significant inordinate profits or 
losses?͛ [Ibid. (p.1557)]. The question raised also implies a direct link between 
the pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageƌ͛s state of ŵiŶd and their mental model when approaching 
an uncertain industry, such as the film business. It is a question that this 
thesis͛s Đase site seeks to addƌess iŶ greater detail through specific analysis of 
a range of unmade, failed and successful film projects, and in conclusion, 
successful sustainable companies.  
 
2.9.1 Film industry value chain modelling 
 
Over the past 15 years, researchers have referred to the importance and 
dominance of value chain model construct when considering the film industry. 
They include Eliashberg et al. (2006) [52], which examined current research 
aŶd Ŷeǁ ƌeseaƌĐh diƌeĐtioŶs thƌough the filŵ ǀalue ĐhaiŶ ŵodel; ǁhile Vogel͛s 
eĐoŶoŵiĐ appƌoaĐh to HollǇǁood͛s iŶdustƌǇ fuŶĐtioŶs ƌeŵaiŶs an important 
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academic text book (2007) [53].  In addition, there is a series of writers 
concentrating on the Hollywood film business (Lampel et al. (2006) [6]; Miller 
and Shamsie [26], Vickery and Hawkins (2008) [47]; Küng (2008) [43], and 
Rimscha (2009) [10]), and there is a wide level of research on national and 
transnational filŵ studies, iŶĐludiŶg this authoƌ͛s eaƌlieƌ published work on the 
UK and European film industries (see Appendix). Bloore (2009, 2013) [55, 56] 
and Finney [6, 7, 19, 20] have analysed the non-Hollywood industry through 
the lens of the film value chain. Bloore has focused in detail on how creative 
management plays a central role in the research and development stages of 
project management. His work specifically compliments the level of focus 
Catmull and Pixar give to storytelling and the development process, and the 
creative management complexities that arise accordingly [16,17].     
Together, the above body of literature has generally focused on the company 
and the wider industry activity rather than individual behavioural patterns and 
their impact on project management.  With the notable exception of De Vany8 
[11] and Catmull [16, 17], none of the film-specific research and dedicated 
literature has directly linked the film value chain model to cognitive 
management theory and the existence of bias. My thesis seeks to undertake 
precisely that exercise, and  evidence specific and wider related findings based 
on direct ethnographic experiential evidence and further cases beyond the 
authoƌ͛s direct practitioner experience.  
Since 2010 and the authoƌ͛s publication of The International Film Business – A 
Market Guide Beyond Hollywood (Finney, 2010, First Eed.) [5], two publications 
have further explored the film value chain and its current restructuring. They 
include Bloore's The Screenplay Business: Managing Creativity and Script 
                                                             
8
 It should be noted that De Vany predominantly applies quantitative methodology to his Hollywood case site, 
next to a significantly less qualitative approach overall  
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Development in the Film Industry (2012) [Ibid], and Iordanova and 
CuŶŶiŶghaŵ͛s Digital Disruption - Cinema Moves On-Line (Eds. 2012) [57]. Both 
texts explore the film value chain and current restructuring with reference to 
this authoƌ͛s pƌioƌ puďliĐatioŶ, The International Film Business: A Market Guide 
Beyond Hollywood (2010) [7].  Of particular relevance is Michael Franklin's 
essay, Internet-enabled Dissemination: Managing Uncertainty in the Film Value 
Chain [Ibid, (pp. 101-116)].  
Franklin suggests that the Film Value Chain model depends on conventions, 
ǁheƌe aĐtioŶ is ͚only rational between certain practitioners and is enabled 
through the use of evaluative frameworks that coordinate action and enable 
filmmakers to operate uŶdeƌ uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ.͛  A range of evaluative tools and 
resources are applied, including budgets, finance plans, recoupment charts and 
sales estimates. These conventions are perceived by actors both inside and 
outside the value chain, such as financiers, as rational tools to assist in the 
capture of value and the management of risk and uncertainty. However, given 
the complexity of the film industry, are such perceived resources subject to 
significant bias and misinterpretation? And do they provide a false sense of 
comfort to the project manager rather than assistance? How does the role of 
cognitive bias impact on the project-eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌ͛s peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe, aŶd ǁhat is 
required to overcome such potential disadvantages in an uncertain world?    
In light of the above literature review, my thesis sits clearly within the research 
stream of managerial cognition. It explores and expands managerial cognition 
research to the study of mental models and cognitive frameworks through the 
lens of the value chain model. It builds oŶ Makƌidakis͛s ;ϭϵϵϬͿ [ϭ] aŶalǇsis of 
biases in decision-making and their effect on forecasting, planning and 
strategy, and explores the idea that deep-seated cognitive habits (Louis and 
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“uttoŶ, ϭϵϵϭͿ [Ϯ] haǀe a diƌeĐt iŵpaĐt oŶ eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌs͛ aďilitǇ to ŵaŶage 
projects successfully. It explores and provides evidence regarding, what roles 
existing mental models and biases play in value creation and value capture?  
Their uncertain and ever-changing economic environment consistently 
challenges entrepreneurs engaged with the process of producing creative 
goods.  The study of mental models and cognitive frameworks underpinning 
the pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageƌ͛s aĐtioŶs aŶd deĐisioŶs iŶ aŶ uŶĐeƌtaiŶ aŶd ĐhalleŶgiŶg 
industry is one that can make a contribution to the existing literature in the 
Cognitive School of Strategy (Mintzberg, et al 2009) [13].   
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SSECTION 3. The Industry Setting and Context 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This section defines the film entrepreneur – which in this case is the producer. 
The producer is seen as the lead project manager, but they will need to work 
alongside their key collaborative relationships including financiers, sales 
companies and distributors.  ͚Project entrepreneur͛ when used as an academic 
description that reduces the manager to a sole individual is not always precise 
and accurate within the film industry, as ͚pƌoduĐeƌ paƌtŶeƌships,͛ ͚teaŵs͛, 
͚Đollaďoƌatiǀe ƌelatioŶships͛ aŶd ͚Ŷetǁoƌks͛ play critical roles in the film 
iŶdustƌǇ͛s pƌojeĐt management architecture [3, 4, 39, 52], as my thesis͛s Đase 
site explores and evidences.   
Project management takes place in the film industry through the framework of 
the film value chain model, as I have established in my introduction (Section 1). 
Therefore, it is helpful to further examine and define the model as it forms a 
key framework for the produĐeƌ͛s ŵeŶtal ŵodel, ͚haďits͛ aŶd ͚ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal 
ǁisdoŵs͛, and arguably shapes the environment where local decision-making 
occurs (Finney, see Appendix). Producers are acutely aware of the need to 
maintain momentum, and shift their projects from development to a package, 
through attracting financing and into production, and from delivery to 
distribution, and finally reach an audience.    
For clarity of reference, my previous work cited above on the non-Hollywood 
filŵ ǀalue ĐhaiŶ has iŶĐluded a seƋueŶtial ͚ŵodel͛ to help ideŶtifǇ eaĐh stage a 
project manager needs to navigate.  
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FILM VALUE CHAIN MODEL (NON-HOLLYWOOD MODEL, BY ACTIVITY) 
Element Players Support 
Consumer First time product is seen by end-user, and where true value can 
be assessed and realized. Time and money have been sunk at 
high level before this final contact with the consumer 
marketplace. 
Media spend, press 
and publicity, social 
networking + 
traditional marketing 
tools 
Exploitation Exhibition/cinema release, DVD sales/rental, VHS, Sales/rental, 
pay-tv, Video on demand, Internet, Download, Free-TV, 
Syndication Library rights: on-going exploitation opportunities 
for producer, financier; distƌiďutoƌ͛s liĐeŶĐe ǁiŶdoǁ. ‘eŵake, 
prequel, sequel rights + library sales 
Marketing by territory 
(distributor and 
separately by 
exhibitor) 
 
Distributor IŶteƌŶatioŶal sales ageŶt; pƌoduĐeƌ͛s ƌep; pƌoduĐeƌ, MaƌketiŶg 
and selling distribution rights and in return receiving 
commission. 
Marketing 
By sales agent and 
international markets 
Shoot/Post Production company/Producer, Director, Cast, Crew, Studio 
Locations, Labs, Support services, Post Production, supervision, 
facilities. (Director, producer and financiers normally involved in 
final cut and sign-off of product) 
Marketing 
use of PR on shoot 
Financing Producer(s); Production company; package (including the script, 
director, cast, national and international pre-sales (if available), 
sales estimates, co-production, co-finance. Funds/partners, 
national subsidy finance, national broadcaster. Finance, equity, 
bank, gap finance, tax financing. Executive, Associate and Co-
producers. Talent agent, talent manager, lawyers. Completion 
Bond. Insurance. 
Lawyers, talent agents 
Development Concept, idea, underlying material producer (creative), Writer, 
development executive, script editor, development financier, 
agent, director (as developer with writer or as writer/director). 
Private equity rare at this stage. 
Regional and national 
subsidy support 
and/or broadcaster 
support. 
Table 3: Finney, A. (2010, 2014) The International Film Business: A Market Guide Beyond 
Hollywood  
 
3.2 Project management 
 
To further understand project management in the film industry, it is helpful to 
start at the stage that the basic elements of how films are set up and managed. 
My participant observer data and ethnographic-orientated experience has 
shaped my findings on how films can be effectively managed and navigate the 
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value chain. However, the project manager will need to inspire and manage all 
key collaborators ;the ͚iŶside͛ of the pƌojeĐtͿ [9]. They will also need to deal 
with the ͚uŶĐeƌtaiŶ͛ [11, 15] ͚outside͛ and generally unpredictable [1] 
environment. Contrary to industries where conventional forms of exchange 
dominate, film industry project entrepreneurs typically face two further key 
challenges: the interruption of project-based relationships by shorter or longer 
latent time periods, and the subjectively-ǀieǁed ͚uŶiƋueŶess aŶd ŶoǀeltǇ͛ of a 
particular project (Manning and Sydow, 2011) [59].  
We then turn our attention to first-hand experience; to the things that go 
awry, and lessons that one can potentially takes away from the experience if 
mindful of the importance of a reflective approach. Lessons form elements of 
the professional ͚knowledge-based learning͛ and the ͚knowledge capture͛ 
process (Mintzberg, et al. 2009) [13] should ultimately help both existing and 
emerging practitioners, and assist in project managers from avoiding similar 
traps and pitfalls in the future. Knowledge-based resources (Miller and 
Shamsie, 1996) [5] play a key role often underestimated or taken for granted 
ďǇ pƌaĐtitioŶeƌs. ͚KŶoǁledge-based resources often take the form of particular 
skills: teĐhŶiĐal, Đƌeatiǀe, aŶd Đollaďoƌatiǀe…[soŵe] ŵaǇ haǀe the Đollaďoƌatiǀe 
or integrative skills that help experts to work and learn together very 
effectively [Ibid, p.522]. For that to take place within the film project 
manageŵeŶt eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt, ͚haďits͛ [2] will need to be challenged and broken 
down, aŶd ͚ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶal ǁisdoŵs͛ eŵpiƌiĐallǇ ĐhalleŶged, as Catmull 
emphatically reminds us [16, 17, see Section 5].  Further analysis of how and 
ǁhǇ ͚leaƌŶiŶg͛ [17] does not take place within the film industry to a significant 
and tangible extent is covered in Sections 4 and 5. 
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3.3 Project management in the film industry 
 
Project management is a central pillar within the film business: each film is a 
project in itself. Professionals eǀeŶ ƌefeƌ to filŵs as ͚͚pƌojeĐts͛͛ peƌ se oŶ a dailǇ 
basis [6,7]. The key project manager, from start to completion, is the film 
producer. The pƌoduĐeƌ͛s ƌole aŶd ƌespoŶsiďilities aƌe ǁide-ranging and cover 
10 key areas, which rely on a high degree of self-organization, local decision-
making, networks and collaborative relationships [3, 4]: 
 
 
The produĐer͛s projeĐt ŵaŶageŵeŶt role: respoŶsiďilities throughout the filŵ 
value chain 
1. The pƌoduĐtioŶ ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s eŶtiƌe slate of pƌojeĐts  
2. The pƌojeĐt͛s iŶĐeptioŶ, research and development  
3. Creative development and attachments (to achieve a script and ͚͚paĐkage͛͛Ϳ 
4. The package required includes the building of 5 key elements: a) script, b) 
producer, c) director, d) budget, e) leading cast  
5. Collaborating with financing parties and execution of contracts  
6. Building a team of additional executives (executive producers, co-producers, 
associate producers, etc.)  
7. Drawing on third party resources, including lawyers, agents, accountants  
8. Budget, locations, schedule, logistics etc.  
9. Production crew and extras 
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10.Post-production and delivery of the film to distributor 
11.Distribution and marketing plan  
12. Film launch followed by long-tail monitoring. 
 Table 4: Finney, A. (2008) Learning From Sharks: Lessons on Managing Projects in the 
Independent Film Industry 
There is considerable evidence that there exists a difference between what is 
supposed to happen in effective project management in the film industry, and 
what often happens in reality [6]. The paradox of managing projects in the film 
industry is that practitioners need to master the principles of how projects are 
supposed to be managed to make films that capture value, but to be effective 
they must also learn to acknowledge and cope with the failure of these very 
principles and build on them. 
“o ŶotǁithstaŶdiŶg GoldŵaŶ͛s ĐoŵŵeŶt and De Vany͛s conclusions about 
Hollywood [11-12], what do we know about how to manage projects in the 
film industry [6,7]? 
 
3.4 Managing film projects as a process 
 
1. In principle managing the film project should start and end with the film 
producer. Every decision the producer makes (or avoids) will impact on 
the way each level of a project advances. Managing the creative 
development process means the concept, story and screenplay, which 
all begin early in the project management process. This critical stage of 
the management process can be compared with the design and laying of 
a fouŶdatioŶ foƌ a tall ďuildiŶg. If it͛s slightlǇ out at the staƌt, the ƌest ǁill 
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collapse later. 
 
2. The ambitious producer is also a dealmaker and collaborator by 
definition. An experienced producer knows the number of projects he or 
she is able to manage successfully. From the perspective of a hands-on 
film producer (who is dedicated to the making of films rather than acting 
iŶ a ŵoƌe ƌeŵoǀed ͚eǆeĐutiǀe͛ ĐapaĐitǇͿ, he oƌ she ǁill oŶlǇ ďe aďle to 
make one feature film a year. More might impact on the effectiveness of 
their ͚pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛. A top Hollywood producer making 
blockbusters (films of budgets in excess of $50m, but now normally 
more than $100m+ excluding prints and advertising release costs) can 
normally manage one film every two years or so due to the sheer scale 
and demands of each project.   
 
3. A producer is by definition in the business of multi-tasking; but their 
focus is in three key areas when managing a film project: development, 
production and distribution. At the development stage, an established 
producer would be reading (and where appropriate optioning) a range 
of books, plays and other source material for adaptation, considering 
original film treatment outlines, commissioning scripts, reading original 
screenplays and packaging more advanced films. These activities form 
the R&D element of their business. So while overseeing the physical 
production process on any given film project, a producer should be 
concurrently developing a slate of projects at varying stages of 
advancement.  
 
4. As films come closer to achieving financing and entering the production 
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stage, the producer  needs to identify and attach value to the project. 
Foƌ eǆaŵple, ďǇ attaĐhiŶg ͚͚eleŵeŶts͛͛ suĐh as a diƌeĐtoƌ, Đast etc., 
financiers and distributors are better aďle to assess the pƌojeĐt͛s ŵaƌket 
potential and intended audience. That same producer is also responsible 
for securing distribution for the film. This is a challenge that they should 
ďe ĐoŶsideƌiŶg fƌoŵ the eaƌlǇ stage of a pƌojeĐt͛s ĐoŶĐeptioŶ. Alongside 
the distribution stage is the marketing and commercial exploitation of 
each completed film through a series of windows, albeit the detailed 
management is delegated to third-party distributors around the world. 
They in turn deal with exhibitors, aggregators etc. 
 
5. The producer is a pivotal figure in the production process, but he or she 
normally works along- side the executive producer and/or operates with 
co-lead pƌoduĐiŶg paƌtŶeƌs. The ͚eǆeĐutiǀe pƌoduĐeƌ͛ is ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ 
raising part or all of the finance, but is expected to complement and 
assist the pƌoduĐeƌ͛s daǇ-to-day management of each film project. Most 
executive producers manage larger companies than the sole producer 
with an active slate of 10 or 15 films on an annual basis. They are 
therefore expected to oversee each project with specific focus on 
financing and exploitation. While financing entails raising funds to cover 
the costs of production and marketing, exploitation focuses on 
maximizing revenues from all release and distribution formats and 
platforms: cinema release, DVDs, Video-On-Demand, Pay-per-view, Pay-
tv, Free-TV, etc.  
 
6. Producers must also negotiate and liaise with international or local 
distributors. International distributors ;aka ͚sales ageŶts͛Ϳ are 
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responsible for selling films to each territory around the world [5, 52], 
whereas local distributors take charge of releasing films in a specific 
territory. Distributors normally see the product at a later stage and 
therefore have a different perspective to that of the producer. They 
often play the role of executive producers, helping to finance films. For 
the most part, how- ever, their overriding imperative is to manage the 
film release process in their respective territories. 
  
7. Within each film project, a range of additional practitioners plays a role. 
They divide into four key sectors: a) creative, including writers, directors 
and actors; b) the crew who make the film; c) third-party financiers, 
including banks, investors, sales companies, broadcasters, distributors; 
and d) ͚seƌǀiĐes͛, including lawyers, accountants and agents. Some exist 
inside the film value chain while others are outside the chain, 
highlighting the fragmented nature of the non-Hollywood industry in 
question. To help guide the reader through the inside/outside players 
see Table 5, below: 
 
Insiders and Outsiders in the Film Industry 
Film industry Insiders    Film Industry Outsiders 
Producer/writer/director   Lawyer, accountant 
Executive Producer    Financier/investor 
Sales company    Agent/manager 
Studio/Distributor    Public funding body 
Festivals and markets    Aggregator  
Table 5: Finney, A. (Thesis, 2014)  
 
 57 
3.5 Knowledge and the challenge of learning through projects 
 
Translating expertise into control when possible is desirable from a project 
eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe. No producer is expected to be a leading expert in 
all the above areas. Their respective project management skills, however, will 
dictate which areas they control and lead directly; and which they delegate, 
including what appropriate teams and levels of responsibility are given down 
the line. Each area is extremely demanding. A producer who is inexperienced 
in certain areas will fail if he or she does not delegate effectively; a producer 
who cannot co-ordinate executives and representatives and drive timelines will 
be unable to achieve financing. A producer who can complete the creative 
package and finance for a film but has not considered the market for 
distribution and exploitation will fail to recoup (meaning recover the negative 
cost of the project and then share in net profit revenue streams). In summary, 
producers need to know a huge amount about a) themselves aŶd people͛s 
behaviour and b) effective, specialised project management, if they are to 
succeed (Finney, 2010, 2014) [7]. 
Knowledge of what may happen, often optimistically mapped [13] by the film 
producer in the style of a ͚pre-mortem͛ (Markridakis, 1990) [1] analysis, 
including the use of such tools including a filŵ͛s fiŶaŶĐe plaŶ, forecasted value 
iŶ all teƌƌitoƌies ;aka ͚sales estiŵates͛Ϳ aƌouŶd the ǁoƌld, oƌ a Đasting wish list, 
list. Which are is not the equivalents to understanding, controlling and 
conquering the project management process. Such pre-mortems and map- 
making may provide the project manager with a sense of project momentum. 
TheǇ also plaǇ a doŵiŶaŶt ƌole iŶ pƌoǀidiŶg fiŶaŶĐieƌs͛ ofteŶ a false seŶse of 
comfort, as the case site evidences in detail.  Based on my practitioner 
experience, much can change very quickly to make such planning redundant, 
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or ultimately misleading and empirically wrong. There are few industries where 
project leaders and managers have as little control over results aŶd ͚ĐaptuƌiŶg 
ǀalue͛ in the film industry, and yet operate on basis underpinned by the 
͚illusioŶ of ĐoŶtƌol͛ [37]. This inherent threat applies even more so to film 
producers working outside the Hollywood system. Ultimately, the only way 
that film producers learn how to deal with the gap between knowledge of how 
the process is supposed to unfold, and control over this process, is on the job: 
dealing with crises and rising to the challenges. Indeed, project management in 
the filŵ iŶdustƌǇ is ofteŶ akiŶ to ͚Đƌisis ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ aŶ oƌdeƌlǇ 
progression from development to production, post-production to delivery, and 
finally to festivals, markets and an audience [7]. 
The knowledge that emerges from learning to manage this gap is heavily based 
and dependent on individual experiences, hearsay and tacit assumptions. It is 
therefore heavily idiosyncratic in as far as most filmmakers are fortunate (or 
unfortunate) enough to directly experience only a small number of crises in 
one professional lifetime. But the lessons that filmmakers acquire from these 
incidents are at times tacitly gleaned but more often ignored by other 
filmmakers, production organizations and competitive groups. There is a 
marked tension between recognizing how competing project entrepreneurs 
operate in this uncertain market space, while acknowledging how little control 
each of them actually have over the highly demanding process whatever they 
may think that can map, and attempt control [6,7]. 
The research site and case studies illustrate an initial range of projects that 
were handicapped through poor development management, overly ambitious 
project selection, commit group-think, hubris, and a wide range of misguided 
actions and misjudgements.  Many, gleaned through the interpretation of the 
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research material, can be usefully analysed thƌough the ͚oďjeĐtiǀe͛ ĐogŶitiǀe 
school of strategy (including themes such as the ͚illusion of control͛, ͚escalating 
commitment͛, ͚Ŷaƌƌoǁ fƌaŵiŶg͛, ͚single outcome calculation͛, ͚optiŵisŵ͛ and 
͚blind spots͛, et alͿ [1, 17, 37].  In light of the range of cited research, it is hard 
to discover project managers and organizations that appear to display the 
aďilitǇ to ͚sǁitĐh ĐogŶitiǀe geaƌs͛ [Ϯ]. There are, however, lessons and tangible 
evidence that is readily available through project management activity, which 
appear to be repeatedly ignored by film industry peers and rarely tapped in 
education and training. Some film industry research suggests that existing 
training techniques are of little value to practitioners and their ability to 
capture value going forwards (Lampel, et al) [8], but my thesis research 
suggests that by highlighting biases and challenging industry norms and 
assumptions, a new, fresh cognitive awareness is capable of being captured.  I 
am not alone, given the recent enlightening contribution from Catmull to the 
body of literature [16]. The registering of such heightened levels of awareness 
about cognitive bias supports the importance and relevance of these lessons 
and their wider implications for film, creative industries and beyond (See 
Section 6).  
 
In Section 4, the research site, I analyse and discuss a range of in-depth film 
industry cases. In each project I was acting as financier, sales agent (meaning 
selling the film to third party distributors and Studios).9 The majority of the 
cases analyse film projects that had an indirect but critical relationship to 
Hollywood talent, studios and key distributors. While the majority were 
                                                             
9 Three of the case studies are also published in The International Film Business: A Market 
Guide Beyond Hollywood (2010) [5].  
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developed and packaged outside Hollywood, all were connected with 
significant globally acknowledged filmmakers and actors with strong track 
records.  Each case sheds light on my thesis: that there exists a perplexing gap 
between what is supposed to happen and what actually takes place in film 
project management. Cognitive strategy, as this thesis evidences, can help 
explain why that gap is so prevalent in film project management, and what we 
can learn from the way that individuals and companies have overcome that 
gap and captured both repeated success and valuable insights into creative 
management, leadership and knowledge capture. 
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SECTION 4. The Case Site: Six film project case studies and a 
company perspective.  
 
4.1 Introduction 
  
The research site for this thesis dƌaǁs oŶ the authoƌ͛s practitioner 
experience and field research over the past two decades, combined 
with selected material from his previous academic publications (see 
Appendix). Five of the case studies are comprised of films financed 
and/or produced and sold to distributors around the world by 
Renaissance Films. So that the reader does not assume that the UK 
film company in question suffered from acute previous 
mismanagement and was operating as a lead project manager under 
the shadow of creative and commercial failure, it is instructive to 
note that by 1999, Renaissance Films had enjoyed considerable 
success and was emerging as a highly respected UK film producer. 
Renaissance had received 11 Academy Award nominations, including 
Ϯ OsĐaƌ ǁiŶs. The suĐĐessful Đatalogue iŶĐluded KeŶŶeth BƌaŶagh͛s 
Much Ado About Nothing, Henry V aŶd Peteƌ͛s FƌieŶds, along with 
NiĐholas HǇtŶeƌ͛s The Madness of King George aŶd IaiŶ “oftleǇ͛s 
Wings of the Dove. Three of those five titles were already returning 
net profit payments to the company by 1999, and Henry V was to 
follow them into net profit two years later. What happened 
subsequently to Renaissance, following a City of London investment 
by a pension fund of $40m, in the years between 2000 and 2005 and 
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why, forms the critical link between the each case study, including 
the sixth and final project analysed, The King’s Speech10.  
The thesis specifically adapts and reflects on the case material in 
light of the theoretical approach as enshrined in Section Two this 
with a specific focus on Makridakis and his work on common biases, 
future-orientated decisions and forecasting [1, 51, 60, 61,62], in 
tandem with further aspects eŶshƌiŶed ďǇ the ͚oďjeĐtiǀe͛ CogŶitiǀe 
School of Strategy (Mintzberg, et al 2009) [13].   
The case study site refers in ethnographic detail to a range of film projects and 
companies, and is comprised of the following: 
 
i) Green Lighting at Renaissance Films: The Reckoning, (aka Morality 
Play). A $14m UK-Spanish medieval mystery story starring Willem 
Dafoe, Paul Bettany and Brian Cox, and directed by Paul McGuigan. 
(First published: Finney 2008 [10] and revisited 2010, [6]).  
 
ii) Project management issues on Pobby & Dingan (aka Opal Dream). A 
$8m UK-Australian drama co-written and directed by Peter 
Cattaneo (The Full Monty). (First published: Finney 2010, [6]). 
 
iii) Creative management in crisis: how Vapor never made it to the 
screen. A case study on a $25m US-UK fantasy drama, written and 
to be directed by Neil LaBute (Company of Men, Nurse Betty, 
Possession) and set to star Sandra Bullock and Ralph Fiennes. (First 
published: Finney 2008 [6], and revisited 2010, [7]). 
 
iv) The illusion of control: the global release strategy for The Safety of 
Objects. A $8m multiple-strand drama, written and directed by 
Rose Troche (Go Fish, Bedrooms and Hallways), and starring Glen 
                                                             
10 Iain Canning, who worked at Renaissance Films as an executive 2000-2005, was the lead 
producer of The King’s Speech (2010). The ŵajoƌitǇ fiŶaŶĐieƌ of the filŵ͛s ďudget ǁas Đo-
committed by the former Renaissance Films director of business affairs, Anne Sheehan. 
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Close, Patricia Clarkson, and Dermot Mulroney (First published 
Finney 2008 [6].   
 
v) Underestimating uncertainty: the search for a Studio deal for Good 
Omens. A $60m US-UK fantasy movie, co-written and to be directed 
by Terry Gilliam (The Fisher King, Twelve Monkeys, Fear And 
Loathing In Las Vegas), and set to star Johnny Depp, Robin Williams 
and Kirsten Dunst. (First published: Finney 2010 [7]). 
 
vi) Risk management lessons: The KiŶg͛s “peech͛s jourŶeǇ froŵ sĐript 
to success. A $13m UK-Australian historical drama directed by Tom 
Hooper (The Damned United, Les Miserables), starring Colin Firth, 
Geoffrey Rush and Helena Bonham-Carter (First published: Finney 
2014 [18]). 
Three of the six cases (cases 1, 2 and 5) are expanded and adapted versions of 
cases cited in a paper written by the author and published in the journal Long 
Range Planning (Finney 2008: Learning From Sharks: Lessons on Managing 
Projects in the Independent Film Industry) [6]. These cases focus on the role of 
the producer as a project manager, and what lessons can be learnt from such 
qualitative, project-orientated research when coupled with the Cognitive 
School of Strategy.  
Indications of the knowledge capture that we can take away from this 
ethnological-grounded approach include the following: 
 A level of insider-derived detail about the processes and actions 
undertaken in film project management. How were knowledge-based 
resources [26] compromised, reduced and regularly lost in the process 
of production? 
  A critical analysis of the decision-making process [37], including analysis 
of actions and related mistakes made by managers and committees (e.g. 
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Green Lighting and how bias issues impacted on the quality of the 
decisions evidenced). 
 
 The role and weight given to forecasting [1, 60-62], including finance 
plans, budgets, pricing, sales estimates of future film values, etc. 
 
 Evidence of a wide range of consistent level of acute cognitive bias [1], 
available to the researcher via direct access of information and contact, 
and enabling detailed subsequent analysis of producer and executive 
behaviour. 
 
 Evidence of outside factors and forces controlling events, actions and 
decisions. 
 
Project entrepreneurs undertaking the varying stages of a film project are 
inevitably forced to navigate the Film Value Chain model, as outlined in 
“eĐtioŶs Ϯ aŶd ϯ of this thesis. IŶ eaĐh Đase, the aĐĐoŵpaŶǇiŶg ͚ŵeŶtal ŵodel͛ 
aŶd assoĐiated  ͚iŶside͛ aŶd ͚outside͛ ĐogŶitiǀe ǀieǁ-points [17] on how to best 
achieve momentum and captuƌe ǀalue iŶ tuƌŶ ƌaises the ĐhalleŶges of ͚ďias͛, 
͚optiŵisŵ͛, ͚aŶĐhoƌiŶg͛, ͚iŶĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ͛, ͚ďliŶd spots͛, ͚ƌeĐeŶĐǇ͛, ͚aǀailaďilitǇ͛, 
͚seleĐtiǀe peƌĐeptioŶ,͛ ͚illusoƌǇ ĐoƌƌelatioŶs͛, ͚ǁishful thiŶkiŶg͛, ͚ĐoŶseƌǀatisŵ͛ 
aŶd ͚uŶdeƌestiŵatiŶg uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͛, et al [1, see Table 2]. 
Rather than constrict the qualitative approach, and concentrate solely on 
projects that have been fully completed and delivered to market, two of the 
Đases eǆaŵiŶe ƌelatiǀelǇ high pƌofile ͚deǀelopŵeŶt͛ pƌojeĐts: Good Omens, 
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which was iŶteŶded to ďe diƌeĐted ďǇ TeƌƌǇ Gilliaŵ, aŶd Neil LaBute͛s 
screenplay and packaged film, Vapor. These two projects failed to receive a 
green light for moving into production and were brought to the marketplace to 
raise financing in at the advanced development stage. It is rare for any creative 
industry sector to examine and analyse in detail failed, in-completed projects 
that Ŷeǀeƌ passed the ͚staƌtiŶg liŶe͛ of phǇsiĐal pƌoduĐtioŶ [64]. Significant 
investment, including six-figure sunk costs and project management energy 
and time, were expended on these projects. A high level of creative endeavour, 
including the act of screenplay writing and re-drafting, amounted to effectively 
nothing. The costs and the creative material are effectively written off at the 
point a project is abandoned.  
The open acknowledgement of failure, mistakes and misperception is a rare 
position in the film and creative industries. The associated lessons that can be 
learnt from such challenges and potential obstacles form the central 
framework for Pixar Animation Studio͛s CEO Ed Catŵull͛s ŵaŶageŵeŶt aŶd 
leadership thesis [16]. Catmull has lead Pixar, a film company he started with a 
former Disney animator John Lasseter in 1986, for nearly three decades. His 
observations, theories and project management tools form a fresh body of 
cognitive-orientated analysis and evidence that my thesis bears down on in my 
concluding sections (Sections 5 and 6).    
Catŵull͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe oŶ the liŵits of ĐogŶitiǀe peƌĐeptioŶ aŶd ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛s 
ability and iŶteŶtioŶ to ͚uŶĐoǀeƌ ǁhat is uŶseeŶ͛ [ϭϲ, p.169] adds a very 
significant contribution to existing research and literature on project 
management aŶd ĐogŶitiǀe ďiases.  The ŵaŶageƌ͛s adherence to the 
importance of post mortems, the constant monitoring of both individual and 
group behaviour, and how best to acknowledge, embrace and learn from 
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failure, as outlined in the seventh and final case is explored in the light of 
reducing the negative impact of bias. Learning, knowledge-capture and value 
ĐƌeatioŶ aƌe haƌǀested thƌough Piǆaƌ͛s ĐoŶsisteŶt aŶd eǆhaustiǀe post-mortem 
stƌategǇ, ŵeaŶiŶg the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s iŶteŶsiǀe eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of Đoŵpleted pƌojeĐts, 
including a full analysis of their history to and beyond the cinema screen. My 
thesis builds on that strategic approach beyond the culture and management 
of a film animation studio, and delves deeply into a range of film projects that 
are managed outside an umbrella organisation, and unmindful of the potential 
daŶgeƌs of ǁoƌkiŶg ͚ďliŶd.͛ It is useful to reflect to what extent project 
management is inherently disadvantaged when operating outside the 
Hollywood Studio sector, oƌ iŶdeed ͚ŵiŶdful͛ oƌgaŶisatioŶs suĐh as Piǆaƌ, aŶd 
where its components can still succeed, and what clues lie behind such 
potential value capture in the face of daunting odds.  
It is important to acknowledge that challenge of capturing knowledge and 
value creation is not limited exclusively to the study of failure. Insights into 
cognitive bias and project management behaviour are not limited to failed 
projects, management teams and companies. This thesis also considers the 
findings and possible reasons behind success via an analysis of the Oscar-
winning, worldwide hit, The King’s Speech. The film grossed more than $413m 
at the cinema around the globe, on a budget of just $13m.  
In a discussion of Common Biases in Future-Orientated Decisions Makridakis 
(1990) proposes a set of ͞WaǇs of AǀoidiŶg oƌ ‘eduĐiŶg the Negatiǀe IŵpaĐt of 
Bias͟[ϭ]. 
 ͞WaǇs of AǀoidiŶg or ‘eduĐiŶg the Negatiǀe IŵpaĐt of Bias͟ 
 Induce disconfirming evidence  
 IŶtƌoduĐe a deǀil͛s adǀoĐate ƌole 
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 Formalize the decision-making process  
 Create decision-making rules to be followed 
 Monitor changes in the environment, and when change is identified  
 Build procedures to take actions 
 Not all ups and downs are permanent: realise that cycles exist 
 Consider the fundamental factors that affect the event of interest 
 Present complete information, and in a way that points out all sides of the situation being 
considered 
 Verify statistical significance of patterns 
 Model relationships, if possible, in terms of changes 
 Ask people with different backgrounds and experience to independently suggest solutions 
 Explain that when errors are random the chances of a negative error increases when several 
positive ones have occurred 
 Do not punish mistakes, instead encourage people to accept their mistakes and make them 
public so they and others can learn to avoid similar mistakes in the future 
 Have the forecasts made by a disinterested third party 
 Have more than one person independently make the forecasts 
 Estimate uncertainty objectively. Consider many possible future events by asking different 
people to come up with un-predictable situations/events 
Table 6: Makridakis, S., (1990), Chapter 2, pages 36-37 
 
The thesis specifically adapts and reflects on the case material in light of the 
theoretical approach as enshrined in Section Two, with a specific focus on 
Makridakis and his work on common biases and future-orientated decisions 
[1], in line with the Cognitive School of Strategy. IŶ additioŶ to Makƌidakis͛s 
potential offered solutions, Catŵull͛s pƌaĐtitioŶeƌ-based, ethnographical 
grounding, and published work [16, 17], which reflects and draws upon his 
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three decades of experience, offers a valuable resource for both academics, 
leaders and project managers. 
 
The extent to which the following case studies and associated project 
ŵaŶageƌs͛ aĐtions and behaviour followed common cognitive biases (as 
opposed to implementing ways of avoiding or reducing negative bias) is 
monitored and analysed throughout the case site. See-Saw Films, the lead 
producers of The King’s Speech aŶd Piǆaƌ͛s ŵaŶageŵeŶt aŶd appƌoaĐh to 
leadership have somehow managed to consistently turn adversity to 
advantage when faced with demanding project management decisions, pitfalls 
and potential project management failure [7]. Neither company has managed 
projects that became limited one-off, ͚flashes iŶ the paŶ.͛ “uďseƋueŶt filŵs 
produced by See-Saw following The King’s Speech have also met with market 
success, as has its creative players
11. Piǆaƌ͛s ĐoŵŵeƌĐial duƌaďilitǇ is ďoƌŶe out 
by the fact that the company has not to date ŵade a ͚flop͛ filŵ that has failed 
to recoup the pƌojeĐt͛s negative cost. Indeed, the final two case studies 
ĐoŶsideƌ hoǁ helpful ďias ƌeduĐtioŶ ĐaŶ ďe to pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageŵeŶt ͚ďest 
pƌaĐtiĐe͛, aŶd ǁhetheƌ theƌe is a diƌeĐt liŶk ďetǁeeŶ ĐogŶitiǀe ͚ŵiŶdfulŶess͛, 
iŶĐludiŶg ͚sǁitĐhiŶg geaƌs͛ [Ϯ] aŶd the suďseƋueŶt suĐĐess of theiƌ ƌespeĐtiǀe 
projects and companies. 
 
 
                                                             
11 The King’s Speech’s director Tom Hooper went on to direct global hit Les Miserables; See 
“aǁ͛s folloǁ up ŵoǀies iŶĐluded Shame and Trance, which have performed commercially 
aŶd ĐƌitiĐallǇ oŶ a gloďal sĐale. “haŵe͛s diƌeĐtoƌ “teǀe MĐQueeŶ ǁeŶt oŶ to ǁiŶ a ďest 
Oscar for his 2013 film 12 Years A Slave, and garnering significant commercial results.  
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4.2  ͚Green Lighting͛ at Renaissance Films: ͚The ‘eĐkoŶiŶg͛ 
 
This case study explores the process of ͚GƌeeŶ LightiŶg͛ [7, 10] from both a 
company perspective and a project management perspective. The film was 
packaged, financed and produced by Renaissance Films, a UK-based company 
[7]. The film suffered acute project management stress, broke the 
pƌoduĐtioŶ/fiŶaŶĐiŶg ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s Green Lighting rules, and failed both 
ĐƌeatiǀelǇ aŶd ĐoŵŵeƌĐiallǇ iŶ the UK aŶd gloďal ŵaƌketplaĐe. The filŵ͛s 
negative performance also played a critical role in the failure of the new 
͚ĐoŵpaŶǇ teaŵ͛, ǁhiĐh ultiŵatelǇ ƌesulted iŶ ‘eŶaissaŶĐe Filŵs͛ eŶteƌiŶg into 
ƌeĐeiǀeƌship thƌee Ǉeaƌs afteƌ the filŵ͛s pƌoduĐtioŶ (2005). 
The pƌaĐtiĐe of ͚ŵaŶageŵeŶt ďǇ Đoŵŵittee͛ aŶd the so-Đalled ͚ǁisdoŵ of 
collective decision-ŵakiŶg͛ [ϭ] pƌeseŶt pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageƌs ǁith ŵoƌe pƌoďleŵs 
than help overcome them. Part of the challeŶge is hoǁ the ŵaŶageŵeŶt ͚sees͛ 
(Mintzberg, et al, 2009) [13] the problem, if at all? The following in-depth case 
study examines some of the inherent problems, issues and consequences that 
arise when key Green Lighting decisions are made through a collective 
committee, effectively commissioning and underwriting an inexperienced and 
compromised producer to lurch into a highly risky production.  
 
The Reckoning, a $14m UK-Spanish co-production starring Willem Defoe, Paul 
Bettany and Brian Cox, was already $2m over budget prior to actually shooting, 
aŶd $ϰŵ ŵoƌe eǆpeŶsiǀe thaŶ the pƌoduĐeƌ͛s oƌigiŶal pƌiĐe estiŵate ϲ ŵoŶth 
before production. This case study focuses on the decision-making process 
suƌƌouŶdiŶg the ͚GƌeeŶ Light͛ deĐisioŶ-making process, subsequent project 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt issues, aŶd liŶks its fiŶdiŶgs aŶd aŶalǇsis to the ĐogŶitiǀe ͚failuƌe͛ 
 70 
fƌaŵeǁoƌk, iŶĐludiŶg issues suƌƌouŶdiŶg ͚ďias͛, ͚optiŵisŵ͛, ďliŶd spots, 
͚iŶĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ͛, aŶd ͚esĐalatiŶg ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt͛ [ϭ, ϭϯ, ϯϳ]. 
 
4.2.1 Green Lighting films 
 
Before examining the case in detail, it is useful to establish what we 
understand ďǇ the teƌŵ ͚GƌeeŶ LightiŶg͛. The film industry uses the term 
͚Green Lighting͛ to desĐƌiďe the ŵoŵeŶt a fiŶaŶĐieƌ oƌ set of fiŶaŶĐiŶg paƌties 
decide to move ahead, commit investment, and place a film project into formal 
physical production. In a perfect world, that moment normally happens at a 
formal meeting, whose attendants in turn consider a set of criteria prior to 
taking a formal decision. One might expect that decision-making is based on 
rational beliefs or thoughts, to minimize risk investment. The reality, as this 
case study explores, can be rather different, and the actual process varies 
considerably from Studios to mini-majors, and through to the myriad of 
sources of finance that make up the typical lower budget (e.g. non-Hollywood 
Studio) filŵ͛s stƌuĐtuƌe. This Đase studǇ eǆploƌes soŵe of the ŵistakes aŶd 
misjudgements so often made by project manager, in this case through the 
authoƌ͛s foƌŵeƌ ĐoŵpaŶǇ, ‘eŶaissaŶĐe Filŵs Ltd. 
For a Hollywood Studio, most often responsible for 100% of the budget (or at 
least 50% through a split-rights deal that shares the cost and rights with a 
partner), the decision will have taken place with all key heads of departments, 
including world-wide territory managers, who will supply revenue projections 
for their global regions. The one-stop shopping approach entailed by the 
studio͛s aďilitǇ to fullǇ fiŶaŶĐe a filŵ ŵakes the GƌeeŶ Light pƌoĐess ƌeasoŶaďlǇ 
straightforward although there is still considerable issues surrounding bias, 
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optimism, resistance and second-guessing from owners and powerful 
executives along the way (De Vany, 2004)  [11]. By contrast, non Hollywood 
Studio films are rarely triggered in such an orderly process, as their financing 
relies on a variety of sources of finance and investment, alongside sales and 
distribution estimates and commitments. This complex web, sometimes 
ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚jigsaǁ puzzle͛ fiŶaŶĐiŶg, ŵakes the task of ĐoŵpletiŶg a filŵ͛s 
finance particularly challenging when working outside Studio sector. 
Any Green Light decision requires information upon which a decision can be 
made. Prior to investing or committing finance, financiers will demand full 
details of a pƌojeĐt͛s ďudget, Đast, diƌeĐtoƌ, pƌoduĐeƌ, fiŶaŶĐe plaŶ, pƌe-sales, 
remaining sales estimates (or distribution projections, territory by territory, if a 
studio) and estimated timing of delivery. If a recoupment order (indicating the 
different stages of repayment to each party and relative share of net profits if 
achieved) has been proposed by a producer, this too will form a critical part of 
the assumptions; but often financiers tend to use the exercise (colloquially 
ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚ƌuŶŶiŶg the Ŷuŵďeƌs͛) in order to negotiate their recoupment 
position re other investors. This range of information is then placed into a 
͚ĐoŶtƌol sheet͛ that ƌelies pƌedoŵiŶaŶtlǇ oŶ the sales estiŵates oƌ teƌƌitoƌǇ 
projections, as these combined revenue streams are the key to an 
iŶǀestoƌ/fiŶaŶĐieƌ͛s ďeiŶg ƌepaid.  
The approach, given the importance attached to forecasting, is empirically 
vulnerable to a range of cognitive biases, including the assumptions behind 
futuƌe pƌojeĐtioŶs, iŶĐludiŶg ͚suppoƌtiǀe eǀideŶĐe͛, ͚optiŵisŵ͛, ͚aŶĐhoƌiŶg͛, 
͚illusoƌǇ ĐoƌƌelatioŶs͛, aŶd ͚seleĐtiǀe peƌĐeptioŶ͛ ;Figuƌe ϮͿ, [ϭ]. ͚Wishful 
thiŶkiŶg,͛ foƌ eǆaŵple, is a fuƌther bias that is can become prevalent in 
integrated film production/sales/distribution organizations, as they rely on 
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their in-house sales forecasts rather than from a disinterested party, and will 
fail to seek more than one person/party to independently compile the 
estimates. Renaissance Films, as we shall see, is a clear case in point.
 
Many Green Light decisions will include further hurdles that the management 
and the specific film project have to overcome before draw down of finance 
and/or investment is alloǁed. At tiŵes, a GƌeeŶ Light ŵeetiŶgs͛ ͚Ǉes͛ deĐisioŶ 
ŵaǇ ŵeaŶ oŶlǇ a paƌt of the filŵ͛s fiŶaŶĐe is tƌiggeƌed, aŶd the filŵ͛s fiŶal 
move into principal photography is still dependent on other deals or Green 
Light͛s fƌoŵ otheƌ Đo-financing sources being closed or approved. Film projects 
often crawl haphazardly through a vague and ill-disciplined Green Light stage, 
where in the words of producer Stephen Woolley (The Crying Game), one of 
the most eǆpeƌieŶĐed UK filŵŵakeƌs, ͚the producer starts, and everyone else 
catches up͛ (Finney, 1996) [58]. 
  
4.2.2 Green Lighting at Renaissance Films: From Disco Pigs to The Reckoning 
 
The Đall Đaŵe iŶ fƌoŵ ‘eŶaissaŶĐe Filŵ͛s FiŶaŶĐe DiƌeĐtoƌ Anne Sheehan to the 
ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s Đo-Managing Director Angus Finney (the author of this thesis), just 
as Finney was set to board a plane in Malaga Airport following a summer 
ďƌeak. ͚We need to call a Green Light committee meeting as soon as you are 
ďaĐk. I thiŶk ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg to Ŷeed to do this filŵ MoƌalitǇ PlaǇ. We͛ƌe uŶdeƌ a 
lot of pressuƌe fƌoŵ the Boaƌd to use the iŶǀestoƌs͛ ŵoŶeǇ ŵoƌe ƋuiĐkly and 
get pƌoduĐtioŶs goiŶg.͛ As his plane took off, Finney pondered the numerous 
issues and variables that would inevitably be raised and considered at the 
upcoming meeting. Morality Play (aka The Reckoning) was the third 
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‘eŶaissaŶĐe filŵ to ďe ďƌought to the ďoaƌd͛s GƌeeŶ Light Đoŵŵittee oǀeƌ the 
past year, but by far the most ambitious both in terms of budget and 
production and level. 
Rules for how Renaissance Films placed films into production had been clearly 
mapped out in a Business Plan written by Finney and his partner Stephen 
Evans the previous year. The Green Lighting rules had been previously 
discussed at length and jointly drafted by the management and the investor, 
Hermes (a pension fund). They had been further refined before the investment 
of £24.5m in Renaissance Films had been finalised in the summer of 2000. The 
investors and the management (also at risk for a combined £500,000 in shares) 
had jointly recognised that the Green Light system formed a critical part of the 
risk management of their investment decisions in movie productions.  
‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s GƌeeŶ Light Đoŵŵittee ǁas Đoŵpƌised of fouƌ EǆeĐutiǀe 
DiƌeĐtoƌs, iŶĐludiŶg the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s Đo-Managing Directors Finney and Evans; 
the Finance Director Anne Sheehan, and the Director of Sales Bill Stephens; 
and three non-EǆeĐutiǀe DiƌeĐtoƌs, iŶĐludiŶg the IŶǀestoƌ͛s ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe aŶd 
the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s ChaiƌŵaŶ. Fouƌ ǀotes ;a siŵple ŵajoƌitǇͿ iŶ faǀouƌ of a GƌeeŶ 
Light decision would carry the day, as long as the film fulfilled all criteria within 
the ƌules. The IŶǀestoƌ͛s ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀe had the poǁeƌ of a ͚ǀeto͛ if the fouƌ 
Executive Directors voted for a film, while the three non-executive Directors 
voted against. The intention was that the Đoŵŵittee opeƌated a ͚ĐheĐks aŶd 
ďalaŶĐes͛ sǇsteŵ. It ǁas assuŵed that the eǆisteŶĐe of a ǀeto ǁould effeĐtiǀelǇ 
guaƌd agaiŶst the ŵaŶageŵeŶt ͚ƌailƌoadiŶg͛ its filŵ ĐhoiĐes iŶto pƌoduĐtioŶ. It 
can be argued that such rules were there to guard against manageŵeŶt͛s  
͚eǆĐessiǀe optiŵisŵ͛ aŶd the daŶgeƌ of ͚suppoƌtiǀe eǀideŶĐe͛ that had Ŷot 
ďeeŶ fullǇ tested. IŶdeed, the pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageƌs aŶd the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s loĐal 
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decision-making structure as mapped out by the Green Light committee were 
seen as a vital resource to the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s opeƌatioŶs. But iŶ this Đase ǁhat 
appeared to be a risk management ͚ƌesouƌĐe͛ in truth and action became a 
critical liability.  
If a film that failed the criteria was to still receive a Green Light, (albeit with 
one or more of the rules effectively broken), all seven committee members 
would have to vote in favour of going ahead. The rules were clearly mapped 
out iŶ the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s AƌtiĐles of AssoĐiatioŶ and covered the following: 
 
 A film under consideration had to present a package containing the 
following elements: a script, budget, producer track record, director and 
two main cast actors. The package had to be satisfactory to the 
Committee. These documents needed to be made available at least 10 
days prior to the committee meeting. 
 
 A reputable Completion Guarantor needed to have issued a letter of 
iŶteŶt to ďoŶd the filŵ͛s pƌoduĐtioŶ aŶd deliǀeƌǇ at the ďudget leǀel 
(less standard exclusions) submitted to the Committee. 
 
 A ŵiŶiŵuŵ of ϯϬ% of the filŵ͛s total ďudget Ŷeeded to ďe Đoǀeƌed iŶ 
either pre-sales to distributors, and/or co-financed by third party 
investors. Such co-financing had to be in place prior to the Green Light 
decision. 
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 Satisfactory minimum sales projections from available territories 
indicating no less than a straight 100% return on investment had to be 
pƌoǀided ďǇ ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s “ales teaŵ.  
 
 Any bank involved in cash flowing a section of the finance, and/or 
͚gappiŶg͛12up to Ϯϱ% of the filŵ͛s ďudget, had to ďe pƌe-approved by the 
Committee.  
 
 The Committee could not commit ŵoƌe thaŶ ϱϬ% of a filŵ͛s total 
budget; nor approve an investment of more than $10m in any one single 
film production (unless all members voted in favour).  
 
4.2.3 Previous Green Lighting decisions 
 
Evidence of ͚iŶĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ͛ aŶd ͚seleĐtiǀe peƌĐeptioŶ͛ [1] had already taken 
shape, and had dominated the previous decision-making process regarding film 
production decisions at Renaissance. The two films already green lit by the 
committee were The Luzhin Defence and Disco Pigs. The Luzhin Defence was a 
project already in advanced development when the new Hermes investment 
ǁas seĐuƌed. A ͚go͛ pƌojeĐt ǁas deeŵed attƌaĐtiǀe ďǇ the iŶǀestoƌs. To theiƌ 
                                                             
12 Gap finance means lending against unsold territories, supported by sales estimates (e.g. 
forecasts) 
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eǇes, the filŵ ǁas a ͚kiĐk-staƌt͛ to iŶǀestŵeŶt aŶd pƌoduĐtioŶ aĐtiǀitǇ, aŶd the 
Chairman had agreed to ͚shepheƌd͛ the filŵ thƌough the Green Lighting 
committee.  
In terms of the Green Light criteria, Luzhin was well positioned. The screenplay 
was adapted from a classic novella by Vladimir Nabokov. The producers were 
͚iŶ-house͛. The diƌeĐtoƌ aŶd Đast ǁas deemed attractive enough for an $8.8m 
budget; and more than 30% of the finance was originating from three co-
production partners – France; The Netherlands and Italy. (The Netherlands was 
later replaced by Hungary following a dispute between Renaissance and the 
Dutch producer, but the film still qualified as an official co-production under 
the European Convention on Cinematographic Co-productions, thereby not 
collapsing the complex structure of co-finance from the different territories). 
These co-financing souƌĐes ǁeƌe Ŷot stƌiĐtlǇ ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ͚pƌe-sales͛ to 
territorial film distributors. The co-financing did not form a true market test of 
the projected value of the film, but this point was quickly glossed over at the 
committee stage. In hindsight, one could argue that selective value was 
applied to the finance structure, demonstrating an inability by the committee 
to apply the same decision making criteria to each and all films under review 
[1]. 
One of the risks facing producers and financiers is running over budget, and 
failing to deliver the film product to distributor(s) for exploitation and 
consumption (Rimscha, 2009) [10]. Film Finances, a reputable completion 
guarantor, had issued a letter of intent to bond the film; and Societe General, 
with an experienced film finance arm, was lined up to discount and cash flow 
ŶeaƌlǇ ϰϬ% of the filŵ͛s fiŶaŶĐiŶg. A UK sale aŶd leaseďaĐk taǆ aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶt 
ǁas iŶ plaĐe foƌ aƌouŶd ϭϮ% of the filŵ͛s ďudget. “ales pƌojeĐtioŶs shoǁed 
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acceptable minimum sales from around the world (excluding the UK, where 
Renaissance had secured a guaranteed theatrical distribution deal with a 
leading independent distributor, Entertainment, on an on-going basis). 
However, no hard pre-sales had been achieved on the back of the script and 
package prioƌ to the Coŵŵittee͛s deĐisioŶ to go ahead ǁith the ŵoǀie 
production. Renaissance was investing $4.4m of The Luzhin Defence’s $8.8m 
budget, thereby staying within the 50% maximum investment rule under the 
Green Light rules. 
 
Almost as soon as the film had been Green lit the company secured a co-
financing deal with Clear Blue Sky, a US company engaged in finance, 
development and production, which had long been attracted to the screenplay 
for Luzhin and admired the package. Critically, Clear Blue Sky was keen to do 
business with a company that could match its financial resources, rather than 
be tapped by third-party productions where it was not a full and equal 
production and finance partner. The deal stated that should the film make it 
into production, each party would invest equal amounts of money into the 
production. Additional fees and commission were agreed which allowed 
‘eŶaissaŶĐe to Đhaƌge foƌ its IŶteƌŶatioŶal͛s sales aŶd ŵaƌketiŶg seƌǀiĐes. Cleaƌ 
Blue Sky wanted the deal to include a joint investment in Luzhin albeit that it 
ǁas a ƌetƌospeĐtiǀe aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶt. ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s iŶǀestŵeŶt suďseƋueŶtlǇ ǁas 
offset a further 50%, dropping from $4.4m to $2.2m.  
Prior to completion of the The Luzhin Defence, sales activity based on the 
package and a 12-minute promotional video, indicated that the Committee 
had little to worry about. A pre-sale ǁas aĐhieǀed to JapaŶ foƌ the $ϭŵ ͚askiŶg 
pƌiĐe͛. This ǁas the ͚high͛ sales estiŵate ƌatheƌ thaŶ the ŵiŶiŵuŵ. The pƌe-
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sale was made during the former MIFED film market in Milan, (while the film 
was in post-production), and it helped to provide confidence within the Board 
that the film was on track. 
Disco Pigs, the other film the Green Light committee had already approved, 
was a low budget Irish production adapted from a theatre play. A promising 
first-tiŵe diƌeĐtoƌ ǁas attaĐhed, aloŶgside oŶe of IƌelaŶd͛s ŵost iŶteƌestiŶg 
and prolific film producers. The Green Light decision rested on the following 
criteria:  
 The filŵ ǁas suppoƌted ďǇ IƌelaŶd͛s state suďsidǇ ďodǇ, the Iƌish Film 
Board with an investment worth 25% of the budget.  
 
 A further 14% was to be raised by the Irish tax deferral system, Section 
481.  
 
This left Renaissance needing to put up around 61% of the budget, 11% more 
than its 50% rule. All other criteria had been fulfilled, with the exception of 
pre-sales or investor finance covering more than 30% of the budget. It was 
deeŵed ďǇ the Coŵŵittee that the ĐoŵďiŶatioŶ of tǁo souƌĐes of ͚soft͛ 
financing was applicable to cover the 30% rule. As the film was seen, in the 
ǁoƌds of the ChaiƌŵaŶ, as a ͞ďaďǇ pƌojeĐt͟, Disco Pigs went ahead, backed 
unanimously by the Green Light committee, with Renaissance investing just 
under $2m of the $3m budget. Critically, no notice was taken of the fact that 
the rules had effectively been ignored in order to place the film into 
production. During the decision-making process, information was put in the 
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most positive way to the committee, rather than all information and forecasts 
being openly challenged or tested by a third party for example [1].  And there 
was to be no post-mortem insisted upon by Evans and Finney that might have 
critically reviewed the decision-making process against the Articles of 
Association and the stated rules. 
Such activity and group behaviour could be deemed to be subject to the perils 
of ͚aǀailaďilitǇ͛ aŶd ͚aŶĐhoƌiŶg͛, aŶd dƌiǀeŶ ďǇ ͚optiŵisŵ͛ aŶd ͚ǁishful thiŶkiŶg͛. 
The Renaissance Green Light committee was comprised of high profile, 
financially experienced non-executive directors and impatient executive 
directors (mostly made up of producers) keen to make films. All decision- 
ŵakeƌs ultiŵatelǇ uŶdeƌestiŵated ͚uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͛ [1, 11]. None of them 
considered what had taken place on the previous two projects when it came to 
considering the third: Morality Play.  
 
4.2.4 Morality Play 
 
Like Luzhin, Morality Play had been in lengthy gestation at Renaissance Films 
prior to the arrival of the Hermes £24.5m investment in the reputable 
production company. A dark tale set in medieval Britain adapted from Barry 
UŶsǁoƌth͛s adŵiƌed and award winning novel, the script had gone through a 
number of drafts, and had been considered and rejected by a range of UK and 
European directors. That spring prior to the August Green Light meeting, a 
former photographer and second-time director, Paul McGuigan (Gangster No 
1.), read the screenplay and responded positively to the material. Although his 
first film had not scored at the box office it had won some critical acclaim and 
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he had disĐoǀeƌed a Ŷeǁ ͚hot͛ UK aĐtoƌ, Paul BettaŶǇ. The filŵ offeƌed an 
iŶsight iŶto the diƌeĐtoƌ͛s aďilitǇ to haŶdle tough ŵateƌial aŶd attƌaĐt stƌoŶg 
performances from his actors. When Renaissance showed interest in this 
director, the new actor in turn showed willingness to play the lead role in 
Morality Play.  
During that Ǉeaƌ͛s CaŶŶes filŵ festiǀal aŶd ŵaƌket, ‘eŶaissaŶĐe held a Ŷuŵďeƌ 
of meetings with prospective co-production and finance partners for Morality 
Play. These included numerous potential German co-production partners and a 
German tax fund that showed keen interest in the project. However, no 
distributors showed any appetite for pre-buying the (then) $10m budgeted 
project. Indeed, during the Cannes film festival one award-winning producer 
who worked regularly with German director Wim Wenders, warned the 
RenaissaŶĐe teaŵ that the ĐoŵpaŶǇ ǁas ͞ĐƌazǇ ŵakiŶg EuƌopeaŶ filŵs at teŶ 
ŵillioŶ ďuĐks. You͛ll Ŷeǀeƌ eǀeƌ get Ǉouƌ ŵoŶeǇ ďaĐk!͟ NoďodǇ, iŶĐludiŶg 
Finney, recounted or recalled that comment four months later at the Green 
Lighting committee meeting that initially approved and committed $12m to 
the filŵ͛s fiŶaŶĐiŶg.  
A Cannes meeting with Clear Blue Sky – ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s fiŶaŶĐiŶg paƌtŶeƌ oŶ 
Luzhin - focused mainly on a different, US film that the company ended up co-
financing later that year. Morality Play was given scant attention by Clear Blue 
Sky and was seen as an over-budgeted and unattractive project.  Clear Blue 
“kǇ͛s feed-back was stubbornly ignored by the Renaissance team, just as 
previous concerns raised at Cannes had fallen on deaf ears.  
Talks with a German tax fund partner had continued during the summer prior 
to the August Green Light meeting. Finney had travelled to Los Angeles in July 
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in an effort to close a deal, but no commitment in writing had been issued by 
the taǆ ǀehiĐle͛s ƌepƌesentative. Meanwhile, with no interested German co-
producing partner, the lead producer looked to southern Spain as a region to 
shoot the film. A large and expensive set was to be built, with the ultimate 
intention to burn it down at the end of the shoot, as per the narrative in the 
screenplay. An experienced Spanish co-production partner was brought in, 
contributing the minimum 20% under the Anglo-Spanish bilateral co-
production Treaty rules. However, while the contribution on paper needed to 
be 20% of the budget, the hard cash contribution from the Spanish partner 
was $800,000 – just 8% of the $10m budget. It was also going to be cash 
flowed by the co-producer against future distribution and TV deals rather than 
discounted and guaranteed by a bank. 
A UK sale and leaseback tax partner was contracted, contributing a further 12% 
of the budget. By the first week of August just 20% of the $10m budget had 
been raised. Major territory distributors, including North American buyers, 
who had read the screenplay and held meetings with the Renaissance sales 
team during Cannes, all, without exception, chose to wait rather than pre-buy 
rights in the movie. A number of them stressed their concern about the subject 
matter when compared to the relatively high budget. And despite meetings 
and greetings, and paying a former Societe General banker consulting fees, 
Renaissance failed to close a German tax deal. 
The filŵ͛s ďudget, folloǁiŶg the appoiŶtŵeŶt ďǇ the pƌoduĐeƌ of a leadiŶg 
Director of Photography and an ambitious Production Designer, had 
meanwhile quickly swollen to $12m. Both heads of department had worked 
ǁith the diƌeĐtoƌ oŶ his pƌeǀious filŵ. ͞I͛ŵ Ŷot iŶteƌested iŶ Đoŵpƌoŵise,͟ 
McGuigan had indicated forcefully at a meeting with the production team and 
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the executive pƌoduĐeƌs. ͞This is the filŵ ǁe͛ƌe ŵakiŶg aŶd theƌe͛s Ŷo poiŶt iŶ 
goiŶg ahead uŶless ǁe͛ǀe got this ďudget. Theƌe has to ďe a leap of faith.͟  
Meanwhile, the film had been formally presented to Clear Blue Sky under the 
co-financing deal that had already partnered on Luzhin. Despite Willem Defoe, 
a leading US independent actor joining the cast, Clear Blue Sky elected to pass 
on Morality Play. At this stage, one of the co-Managing Directors had chosen 
to plaĐe Paul BettaŶǇ, the Ŷeǁ, ƌisiŶg aĐtoƌ oŶ a ͚paǇ-or-plaǇ͛ deal. EǀaŶs͛s 
iŶteŶtioŶ ǁas to stop a ƌiǀal filŵ ͚stealiŶg͛ the aĐtoƌ aǁaǇ that autuŵŶ aŶd 
pushing Morality Play back into a shoot the following year. This meant that the 
relatively new actor would be paid his fee even of the film did not go ahead. In 
addition to the development and pre-pre production costs, which by August 
mounted to some $300,000, Renaissance was going to be penalised a further 
$250,000 payable to the actor if the Green Light committee decided not to go 
ahead with the film. While the UK sale and leaseback deal was able to remain 
at 12% of the new budget ($1.44m), the Spanish contribution in hard cash 
remained at $800,000, or 6.6% of the budget.  
BǇ this stage, eǀideŶĐe of ͚esĐalatiŶg ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt͛ [ϭϱ] aŶd ͚ƌeĐeŶĐǇ͛ [ϭ] ǁeƌe 
clearly doŵiŶatiŶg ďoth the pƌoduĐeƌ aŶd ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s eǆeĐutiǀe deĐisioŶ 
making behaviour. Why did the film rise in production costs by some 20% with 
no significant elements of market value attached? Why was the company now 
at significant risk if the film did not go ahead, thanks to the pay or play deal 
and considerable sunk development costs already spent? Why was there such 
an absence of any risk management? 
MoralitǇ PlaǇ͛s fiŶaŶĐe plaŶ (as presented to the Renaissance Green Light 
Committee) 
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UK Sale and leaseback contribution: 12% 
Spanish Co-producer contribution: 6.6%  
Renaissance Films equity: 81.4% 
TOTAL: 100% 
Table 7: Finney, A. Chapter 5 (2010)  
 
4.2.5 The Green Light meeting  
 
Finney had only 24 hours from the moment his flight landed and the Green 
Light ŵeetiŶg that ǁas to take plaĐe at ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s offiĐes iŶ LoŶdoŶ. He had 
a series of meetings and conversations, including with one of the in-house 
producers of Morality Play, who argued that a decision to go into formal pre-
pƌoduĐtioŶ ǁas ĐƌitiĐal if the pƌoduĐtioŶ ǁas to hit its aĐtoƌs͛ aŶd loĐatioŶ 
dates. Deposits and crew contracts were being made on a daily basis. A delay 
or postponement of a decision would effectively collapse the film, an 
argument that was made forcefully by Evans, lead producer Caroline Wood, 
and the Finance Director Sheehan to Finney just before the meeting. Finney 
was concerned about the lack of pre-sales and indeed real interest in the 
project from the independent distribution market. He recalled how difficult the 
film had proved with regards to pre-sales and potential co-financiers only three 
months earlier at the Cannes Film Festival. However, he was potentially 
compromised if he went up against his senior co-managing director in front of 
the GƌeeŶ Light Coŵŵittee. If FiŶŶeǇ ďeĐaŵe the ͚ǀeto͛ ǀote fƌoŵ ǁithiŶ the 
Executive Director management team, he was aware that he might well be 
͚ǀetoed͛ out of the ĐoŵpaŶǇ all togetheƌ. FiŶŶeǇ ǁas ǀieǁiŶg the pƌoďlematic 
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iŵpeŶdiŶg deĐisioŶ iŶ teƌŵs of his oǁŶ ͚ďaĐkgƌouŶd aŶd eǆpeƌieŶĐe͛, aŶd ǁas 
suffering from a perceived conflict of interest between what was right for the 
film and company, next to his own future job and career: a clear case of what 
Makridakis terms ͚seleĐtiǀe peƌĐeptioŶ͛ and cognitive dissonance [1].     
The management decided to divide the presentation into two key parts. Part of 
the management team put forward the creative case for the film going ahead. 
This argument highlighted the cast, script, subject matter, production values 
aŶd diƌeĐtoƌ͛s ǀisioŶ. OŶĐe this ͚pitĐh͛ had ďeeŶ ŵade, the seĐoŶd paƌt of the 
presentation concentrated on the financials. The point was underlined that not 
doing the film was going to cost the company more than $800,000 dollars as a 
ƌesult of the esĐalatiŶg ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt uŶdeƌtakeŶ ďǇ ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s pƌoduĐeƌs. 
Heads of departments had been placed on contracts that would have to be 
met; bookings would need to be cancelled with associated kill fees; the lead 
actor would have to ďe paid his full $ϮϱϬ,ϬϬϬ fee; aŶd ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s histoƌiĐal 
costs would be effectively lost and ultimately written off. In addition to the 
fiŶaŶĐial hit, EǀaŶs stƌessed that a ͚Ŷo͛ deĐisioŶ ǁould Đause ĐoŶsideƌaďle 
daŵage to ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s ƌeputatioŶ, a Đoncern given the slow start the 
company had experienced post-Hermes. Time delays, and production 
͚slippage͛ foƌŵed aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ďaĐkdƌop to the atŵospheƌe iŶ the meeting 
(Manning and Sydow, 20) [59], as did reputational issues for the company 
going forwards (Rimscha, 2009) [10]. Evans fleshed out his worries by 
explaining that agents, talent and existing and potential partners would lose 
ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s aďilitǇ to GƌeeŶ Light iŶǀestŵeŶt deĐisioŶs. 
‘eŶaissaŶĐe, iŶ his ŵiŶd, Ŷeeded to ͚ǁalk the ǁalk, aŶd Ŷot just talk the talk͛ 
[7]. 
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The Finance Director Sheehan presented the investment case for the film, but 
this part of the meeting was already under the shadow of the financial ͚hit͛ 
that Renaissance would have to take if the Green Lighting committee was to 
reject the film. Financing actually in place by this date totalled just 18.6% of the 
budget. No pre-sales had been achieved. This in turn meant that no bank had 
ďeeŶ appƌoaĐhed to ͚gap͛13 a percentage of the budget against remaining 
available territories, (as had been the case with Luzhin). All film finance banks 
deŵaŶd a ͚ŵaƌket test͛ iŶ the foƌŵ of haƌd pƌe-sales to significant territories 
ďefoƌe leŶdiŶg agaiŶst ƌeŵaiŶiŶg estiŵates. ϴϭ.ϰ% of the filŵ͛s Ŷegatiǀe Đost 
would need to be guaranteed by Renaissance if the decision was made to go 
ahead.  
The minimum estimates from the international sales team amounted to 
around $7m, some $5m lower than the (then) negative cost of the $12m film 
(excluding the value of the UK distribution rights). The estimates would not 
Đoǀeƌ ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s eǆposuƌe of just uŶdeƌ $ϵ.ϳϲŵ. The aƌguŵeŶt, hoǁeǀeƌ, 
ǁas oŶĐe agaiŶ put ďǇ the ͚optiŵistiĐ͛ pƌoduĐeƌs to the Coŵŵittee that the 
difference between writing the film off and risking losing $2.76m on the 
downside of the minimum sales estimates, (with the possible boost of a strong 
UK performance to help mitigate any losses), was a reasonable way to gauge 
the investment decision at hand. Much was made of the production fees, at 
around 8% of the $12m budget that would also partly mitigate the risk and 
pƌoǀide iŶĐoŵe foƌ ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s oǀeƌhead. The pƌessiŶg Ŷeed to ͚ƌeduĐe 
aŶǆietǇ͛ [ϭ] ďǇ takiŶg the ŵost optiŵistiĐ ǀieǁ of futuƌe peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe ǁas 
manifest in the above representations.   
                                                             
13 Gap finance means lending against un-sold territories based on future estimates 
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Finney, who had recently returned from Los Angeles prior to his Spanish 
ǀaĐatioŶ, also fell uŶdeƌ the spell of ͚optiŵisŵ͛. He stƌessed the likelihood of 
the company closing a German tax fund deal, which in turn would bring a co-
fiŶaŶĐiŶg paƌtŶeƌ ǁoƌth ϮϬ% of the filŵ͛s oǀeƌall ďudget. If suĐh a deal was 
Đlosed, it ǁould ďƌiŶg a fuƌtheƌ $Ϯ.ϰŵ to the pƌoduĐtioŶ, aŶd ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s 
contribution would effectively drop to $7.36m, still higher than the 50% of a 
total budget Green Light rule and still below 100% coverage on minimum sales 
estimates, but significantly more acceptable in the eyes of the Committee. 
LastlǇ, ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s theŶ DiƌeĐtoƌ of “ales pƌeseŶted ǁhat iŶ ǀieǁ of hiŶdsight 
ǁas aŶ ͚optiŵistiĐ͛ ;he lateƌ used that speĐifiĐ ǁoƌd afteƌ the ĐoŵpaŶǇ paƌted 
with his services) view of the cast, script and his ability to close sales at the 
MIFED film market as the film proceeded through production. This was despite 
a pooƌ ƌeĐeptioŶ at CaŶŶes aŶd a stƌaight ͚pass͛ fƌoŵ ŶeaƌlǇ all the FƌeŶĐh aŶd 
German independent distributors who had reviewed the project over the 
proceeding four months. To place this in perspective, part of the problem 
facing the sales team at Cannes had been the inability of the lead producer to 
manage her writer and appoint the remaining leading actors. The sales team 
were trying to sell an incomplete package with the wrong script draft for 
distribution to buyers. 
Film Finances, a reputable completion guarantor, had issued a letter of intent 
to bond the production at the agreed budget of $12m. The guarantor had a 
historically strong relationship with Evans, and felt comfortable at this stage 
aďout ďoŶdiŶg the pƌoduĐtioŶ. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s pƌoduĐtioŶ fees aŶd 
historical costs were excluded, as is usual, from the overall delivery guarantee.  
 
The Green Light committee had no Renaissance films that had completed their 
fiƌst full ĐǇĐle of sales ǁith ǁhiĐh to Đoŵpaƌe the estiŵates aŶd ͚ultiŵate͛ 
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results presented on the behalf of Morality Play. However, The Luzhin Defence 
had premiered at the Cannes film market in May that year. The film had sold to 
North America during Cannes to Hollywood Studio arm, Sony Pictures Classics, 
but for a $300,000 advance. The minimum estimate from the sales team prior 
to the film being Green Lit had been $1m. No one on the board raised the 
$700,000 gap between the forecasted projection and the end result. 
The Chairman Anthony Chambers asked the management what risks North 
America presented to The Reckoning͛s poteŶtial suĐĐess. EǀaŶs eǆplaiŶed that 
it was his intention to try to sell the film to a North American distributor as the 
filŵ ǁas shootiŶg. ͚They will take the film seriously once the cameras are 
rolling and they kŶoǁ the filŵ is iŶ pƌoduĐtioŶ.͛ The minimum (low) figure for 
North American value had been estimated at $1.5m by the sales team. 
Hermes͛s IŶǀestoƌ ‘epƌeseŶtatiǀe had iŶdiĐated duƌiŶg ƌeĐeŶt Boaƌd ŵeetiŶgs 
that the Investor was growing somewhat frustrated that the company was not 
using its financial resources to make more films. The company was well behind 
in its stated aim to produce or acquire four to five films per annum, as set out 
in the Business Plan.  
During the Green Light meeting, which formally voted unanimously to Green 
Light Morality Play, the iŶǀestoƌ ĐoŶĐluded the ŵeetiŶg ǁith the ǁoƌds: ͞It͛s 
good to see the company is fiŶallǇ ŵakiŶg filŵs.͟ 
 
4.2.6 Reflections on the Green Light decision 
Morality Play, which was finally released as The Reckoning, underwent the 
following: 
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1. Further over-spend: the final budget was $14.2m, and the additional 
$2.2m cost was excluded by Film Finances at the point of closing the 
completion bond. Renaissance received no production or financing fees 
for the film. The significant project management failure, including the 
inability to control costs, talent and rising creative demands on set, 
through fuƌtheƌ light oŶ the GƌeeŶ Light Đoŵŵittee͛s ͚ĐoŶseƌǀatisŵ͛ [ϭ]. 
Evidence was plentiful that lead producer Caroline Wood was out of her 
depth at aŶ eaƌlǇ stage iŶ the pƌojeĐt͛s histoƌǇ, Ǉet Ŷeitheƌ the 
committee nor the joint Managing Directors changed their minds in the 
light of escalating costs and compelling evidence that she was a project 
management liability.  
2. No further partners came to the table: the German tax deal was never 
closed, in part due to the agents representing the tax fund falling out 
with their partner – something that only became clear in late August, 
two weeks after the Green Light decision had been made. Finney had 
overestimated the potential downsizing of risk by taking an 
unrealistically positive view on a future deal. 
3. No further pre-sales were made until completion and screening to 
buyers in August 2001. All films once completed and seen by an 
audience are worth what the market deems they are worth, and not the 
price they cost to be produced [7].   
4. The Spanish co-production deal was to remain stuck at $800,000 despite 
the budget overspend, and was subject to months of negotiation after 
the filŵ͛s ĐoŵpletioŶ due to late paǇŵeŶts. 
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5. Final sales (aka ͚ultimate͛ numbers rather than estimates/projections) 
were significantly lower than the minimum sales estimates. The 
forecasting from the sales team had been inaccurate and overly 
optimistic. On screening, Paramount Classics, the specialist arm of 
Paramount Studios, bought North America, Japan, Latin America, South 
Africa, Middle East for $1.75m, but demanded a new music score, and 
significant edits and a two day re-shoot. The additioŶal ͚Đost͛ of the deal 
was around $130,000, which was to be split 50-50 between Renaissance 
and Paramount14. Overall sales on the film remained at around $2.5m, 
compared to the low estimates of $7m, despite the North American 
multi-territory deal. 
 
6. The film was rejected from all the major film festivals, including Toronto, 
Venice and Berlin. It premiered in Taormina, in Sicily, Italy, in the fall of 
2002, some 12 months after completion. It premiered in North America 
at the Tribeca Film Festival a further 8 months later, and sunk without 
trace at the box office. The UK theatrical release lasted just two weeks.  
7. The corporate impact of the film being green lit had severe 
consequences: Renaissance Films lost more than one third of its 
available capital for film investment due to its decision to green light The 
Reckoning. 
8. No post-mortem [16, 17] was held either by the management team or 
the Board. The Green Light rules were never properly revisited, and 
                                                             
14 Ironically, Paramount covered the shoot and failed to invoice Renaissance for their share 
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became redundant as the company ran out of funding within 18 months 
of The Reckoning entering production. 
 
Of Makƌidakis͛s tǁelǀe keǇ CoŵŵoŶ Biases iŶ Futuƌe-Orientated Decisions, this 
case study demonstrates both a wide level of visibility (some eight biases are 
raised in the case) and their repeated occurrence at different stages across the 
value chain. As an in-depth case study, the aptly named The Reckoning should 
serve as an appropriate warning signal to group decision-makers, investment 
committees and project managers of how many local decision-making 
pƌoĐesses ĐaŶ go ǁƌoŶg, aŶd hoǁ ͚ďliŶd͛ pƌojeĐt eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌs ĐaŶ ďe to eǀeŶ 
seeing problems them after the event, let alone during the process. A key 
aspeĐt to eŵeƌge fƌoŵ this Đase studǇ͛s fiŶdiŶgs is the ƋuestioŶ of Boaƌds, 
committees and risk management resources: what should have been a positive 
͚ƌesouƌĐe͛ as ideŶtified ďǇ GƌeeŶ Light ƌules aŶd stated pƌoĐess, iŶ pƌaĐtiĐe 
failed to protect the company due to inept, selective and local decision-making 
ďias. Makƌidakis͛s suggestioŶ that the deĐisioŶ-making process needs to be 
clear and adhered to was broken, resulting in both poor risk management and 
a subsequent significant loss of value in both the project but also the overall 
organisation. 
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4.3 Project Management Issues on Pobby & Dingan (aka Opal Dream) 
 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
This case study examines a successfully pre-sold and financed $8m production, 
but one that ultimately failed in the marketplace. The case explores the 
ĐhalleŶge of ͚foƌeĐastiŶg͛ [ϭ, ϱϲ] thƌough the ĐoŵpilatioŶ of estiŵates foƌ a 
filŵ͛s futuƌe ǀalue iŶ teƌƌitoƌies aƌouŶd the ǁoƌld. It also raises the spectre of 
͚delusioŶs of suĐĐess͛ ;KahŶeŵaŶ aŶd Loǀallo, ϭϵϵϯͿ [Ϯϱ] aŶd ƌeĐeŶĐǇ͛, 
meaning that the most recent events that took place during the financing, 
selling and producing of this project dominated all that had gone before, 
including Peter Cattaneo, the director whose most pƌeǀious filŵ͛s ŵaƌketplaĐe 
failure was conveniently ignored [1]. The author, who was responsible for 
‘eŶaissaŶĐe Filŵ͛s iŶǀolǀeŵeŶt aŶd selliŶg of the filŵ, Đoŵpaƌes aŶd aŶalǇses 
initial estimates with actual sales made at the different points during the 
packaging, production and delivery process and the problem that arises when 
different film versions are cut. From a cognitive perspective, the case focuses 
oŶ the pƌoduĐeƌ͛s pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageŵeŶt teĐhŶiƋue, iŶĐludiŶg the ĐhalleŶge of 
inherent conflicts of interest, poor casting decisions, and the ineffective 
haŶdliŶg of fiŶaŶĐieƌs aŶd the pƌoduĐtioŶ teaŵ. Issues of ͚attƌiďutioŶ͛, 
͚aǀailaďilitǇ͛, ͚optiŵisŵ͛ aŶd ͚ĐoŶseƌǀatisŵ͛ aƌise, aloŶg ǁith ƋuestioŶaďle 
attribution of success and failure [1]. 
Pobby & Dingan (aka Opal Dream) was an $8m UK-Australian co-production, 
directed by Cattaneo (best know and feted for directing the hit UK film The Full 
Monty
15
), which was produced by Academy Films and financed by BBC Films, 
UK Film Council, Invicta, New South Wales Film and TV Fund and the Royal 
                                                             
15 The Full Monty, released by Fox, grossed $258m world wide from the box office 
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Bank of Scotland. The story is about a little girl growing up in the opal mines of 
New South Wales with her brother and parents, and the loss and ultimate 
death of her two imaginary friends, Pobby and Dingan. 
4.3.2  The pre-sales challenge 
Renaissance International, the London-based foreign sales operation linked to 
the former Renaissance Films Ltd., bid for the project against other competing 
sales aŶd fiŶaŶĐiŶg opeƌatioŶs foƌ ǁoƌld ƌights iŶ JaŶuaƌǇ ϮϬϬϰ. The ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s 
competitive advantages included its enthusiasm for the screenplay, a very 
quick response to the script and project, and a determination to undercut 
other sales companies in terms of rate of sales commission. However, the 
company was also desperate for new film product to attract distributors and 
Hollywood, making it vulnerable to selecting films on questionable supporting 
evidence [1]. The script, for example, submitted to the distributors included 
the ǇouŶg giƌl dǇiŶg at eŶd of the stoƌǇ. ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s support for the highly 
emotional ending was a key reason why Academy and the director chose them 
as the sales company representing the film.  
As part of the negotiation to acquire world rights to the film outside the UK, 
Renaissance had to provide a full set of sales estimates for the world to the 
producer. At this stage, no cast was in place, so Renaissance was estimating 
the filŵ's Ask aŶd Take pƌiĐes ;aka ͚High͛ aŶd ͚Loǁ͛ foƌeĐastsͿ aŶd desigŶiŶg a 
pre-sale strategy for the film against the screenplay, the material, and the track 
record of the director. No star names were anticipated, and the leading roles 
were to be played by children – who by definition have no deemed market 
value in contrast to older teen and adult movie stars [11].  
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Renaissance also had to take into account how to cover the budget, which was 
at approximately $8m when it ran its sales estimates. The imperative to cover 
a filŵ͛s Đosts ǀia filŵ estiŵates ƌaises the speĐtƌe of ͚optiŵisŵ͛ aŶd ͚ǁishful 
thinking͛ in turn driving the perceived value rather than a reality check before 
committing [1, 37]. A sales team working closely with a project manager (e.g. 
filŵ pƌoduĐeƌͿ ǁill haǀe a ͚pƌefeƌeŶĐe foƌ futuƌe outĐoŵes͛ that iŵpaĐt diƌeĐtlǇ 
oŶ ͚the foƌeĐast of suĐh outĐoŵes͛ [1]. Indeed, Finney was under so much 
pressure to acquire film rights to sell that this in turn led him to attribute a 
higher value to the project than the marketplace might bear. Makridakis also 
points out that predictions and financial forecasting can also be unduly 
influenced by initial information, which is given more weight in the forecasting 
pƌoĐess. IŶ the Đase of this filŵ, the seleĐtiǀe peƌĐeptioŶ of the diƌeĐtoƌ͛s 
ŵaƌket ǀalue ǁas suďjeĐt to ͚aŶĐhoƌiŶg,͛ ǁith sigŶifiĐaŶt ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes foƌ the 
filŵ͛s ultiŵate peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe. 
A key element of the deal agreed with the producer included the requirement 
for Renaissance to achieve no less than $1.8m of pre-sale contracts by the 
close of the American Film Market in February 2004. As no advance was paid 
for world rights, the produceƌ uŶdeƌstaŶdaďlǇ iŶĐluded a ͚peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe͛ Đlause 
to pƌoteĐt the filŵ͛s poteŶtial sales if ‘eŶaissaŶĐe failed to deliǀeƌ. This 
strategy, however, was potentially risky to the producer. If RenaissaŶĐe͛s 
efforts fell flat, the project would have been badly damaged commercially in 
the marketplace, possibly fatally.  
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The sales estimates submitted to the producer of the film demonstrated a 
heavy dependence on Western Europe, Japan and Australasia. The prices 
;diǀided iŶto ͚Ask͛ aŶd ͚Take͛ ĐoluŵŶsͿ ƌeĐoƌded the ŵaximum amount 
Renaissance decided it could ask distributors to pay, and the minimum it felt 
pƌiĐes Đould ďe aĐĐepted ǁithout uŶdeƌŵiŶiŶg the ƌeĐoupŵeŶt of the filŵ͛s 
ďudget. It is the ŵiŶiŵuŵ pƌiĐes ;oƌ ͚Takes͛ oƌ ͚Loǁs͛Ϳ that aŶǇ ďaŶk ǀieǁs to 
be the poteŶtial iŶdiĐatoƌ of a filŵ͛s ǀalue, teƌƌitoƌǇ ďǇ teƌƌitoƌǇ, Ŷot the ͚Asks͛ 
oƌ soŵetiŵes eupheŵistiĐallǇ ƌefeƌƌed to as the ͚Highs͛.  
The American Film Market was relatively slow that year, with few quality or 
'hot' screenplays in circulation. The combination of Cattaneo͛s track record and 
finely written and emotionally sensitive screenplay worked to ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s 
advantage, despite the potentially negative material around a climax focused 
on a plethora of deaths, two imaginary and one sadly real. Indeed, a number of 
distƌiďutoƌs passed oŶ the pƌojeĐt due to the giƌl͛s passiŶg aǁaǇ iŶ the fiŶal 
pages. 
Territories sold included Australasia ($500k) – which was made available rather 
than controlled by the Australian co-producer - Italy ($500k), Benelux (plus 
Indonesia), ($160k) and Japan ($750k – for which permission had to be granted 
as it was $50k lower than the take price). Renaissance also turned down 
(unwisely on reflection) an offer for the UK ($250k) for theatrical and video 
rights only (which would have allowed room for a BBC Films deal, taking pay 
and free TV under a licence deal that had yet to be conclude).  
Renaissance went on to pre-sell a further $700k approximately of sales at 
Cannes in May 2004, including France, Switzerland, Greece, Israel and Middle 
East. The Royal Bank of Scotland discounted the pre-sale contracts, and lent a 
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further 12% of the budget against remaining 'Take' sales estimates. However, 
Japanese distributor Gaga, who was experiencing acute cash flow problems 
that summer, attempted to cancel their contract during July just as their first 
'deposit' payment of 20% of their contract was falling due. Had the pre-sale 
fallen through, the film would have collapsed. A new set of payment 
percentages and terms was agreed with Gaga, with Lee Beasley, then head of 
RBS's media banking arm, proving very flexible in cash-flowing the adjusted 
deficit. The finance was finally closed August 2004, and a further major 
territory (Spain at $500k) was sold on script and rough footage screened at the 
second AFM in November that year. A total of $3.2m of pre-sales had been 
ŵade pƌioƌ to the filŵ͛s deliǀeƌǇ, a sigŶifiĐaŶt ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ fƌoŵ the 
ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ŵaƌket plaĐe toǁaƌds the filŵ͛s total ďudget. 
 
4.3.3 Achieving further distribution deals beyond the pre-sales 
 
‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s sales teaŵ saǁ the filŵ ďetǁeeŶ FeďƌuaƌǇ aŶd MaƌĐh ϮϬϬϱ 
throughout a number of editing stages. The investors, including BBC Films, UK 
Film Council and the sales team felt that although the film was uneven – and 
would be improved with certain re-shoots and a new editor. However, these 
enhancements could not be achieved under the time constraints of the Cannes 
market in May 2005. 
The foreign distributors who had already bought the film from Renaissance 
were insisting on seeing the completed film at Cannes. They were prepared to 
see the film at a private screening, or at a market screening. The Royal Bank of 
Scotland insisted on the film screening during the Cannes market to all buyers 
as it has an outstanding gap of 12% to be repaid. The producer and director 
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didŶ͛t ǁaŶt to shoǁ the filŵ, takiŶg a ͚seleĐtiǀe peƌĐeptioŶ͛ positioŶ ƌegaƌdiŶg 
the financiers͛ ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts aŶd ƌisk ŵaŶageŵeŶt pƌoĐesses. Instead, they 
placed their own careers and reputation in front of their financial partners͛ 
interests [1, 5]. BBC Films and the UKFC, who together had put up more than 
ϰϬ% of the filŵ͛s fiŶaŶĐe aŶd ŵiŶdful that the filŵ Đould ƋuiĐklǇ ďe duďďed a 
͚pƌoďleŵ͛ ŵoǀie if delaǇs ďeĐaŵe puďliĐ, deĐided ultiŵatelǇ that the filŵ 
should screen at the Cannes market.  
Pobby & Dingan had a poor reception at its market screenings during Cannes 
that Ǉeaƌ. But UŶiǀeƌsal “tudio͛s foƌŵeƌ FoĐus Featuƌes, a keǇ U“ distƌiďutoƌ, 
made an offer for North American rights. James Shamus, a very experienced 
filmmaker as well as the then joint-MD running Focus, asked to talk to the 
director about potentially changing the ending. Focus made an offer to buy the 
film and to contribute 50% towards re-shoots, initially without insisting that 
the existing ending, where the girl dies, being changed. As the North American 
deal dƌagged out, hoǁeǀeƌ, the eŶdiŶg ǁas ĐhaŶged at FoĐus͛s iŶsisteŶĐe. 
There were now two versions of the film – a North American version and a 
foreign version. What options did the producers and sales company have given 
the confusion that two different films were likely to enter the marketplace?  
 
1. Agree to try to deliver the two different versions by offering foreign 
distributors a choice? What problems would this create? 
2. Insist that foreign distributors have to take delivery of the foreign 
version.  
3. Try to convince foreign to all take the North American version. 
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What actually happened? 
 
1. Focus insisted on changing the title from Pobby & Dingan to Opal 
Dream.  
 
2. Renaissance went into administration two months after Cannes 05. The 
filŵ͛s sales duties ǁeƌe takeŶ oǀeƌ ďǇ BeĐkeƌ Filŵs, ǁho took the 
position of trying to convince all distributors that the Focus version was 
the most commercial and the only real option available. 
 
3. The film was marketed specifically as a childƌeŶ͛s filŵ oŶĐe the eŶdiŶg 
ǁas alteƌed. It plaǇed iŶ the ChildƌeŶ͛s seĐtioŶ of the BeƌliŶ Filŵ Festiǀal 
in 2006. 
 
4. Many of the original buyers who pre-bought the film from Renaissance 
lost interest in the film, and have rolled it out straight to video.  
 
5. The balance of the $500k Advance from the Spanish distributor was not 
paid to RBS, leaving the bank with a problem recouping its 12% gap. 
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6. BBC Films pointed out to Focus that they had invested in a script where 
the lead girl died at the end of the story, and that they had no intention 
of screening the US version. Two versions of the film exist as of today. 
 
Makƌidakis͛s ƌeseaƌĐh aŶd fiŶdiŶgs oŶ foƌeĐastiŶg aŶd the powers of prediction 
(or otherwise) [1, 51, 60, 61, 62], which is complemented and further 
supported by Kahneman and Loǀell͛s ǁoƌk oŶ ͚delusioŶs of suĐĐess͛ aŶd ͚ďold 
foƌeĐasts͛ [ϭϲ, ϮϬ] aƌe ďƌought iŶto shaƌp foĐus iŶ this Đase studǇ. IŶ additioŶ, 
͚IllusioŶs of ĐoŶtƌol͛ ;Duhaiŵe aŶd “ĐhǁeŶk, ϭϵϴϱͿ [ϯϬ] iŶ the foƌŵ of the 
producer and financiers taking comfort in initial sales estimates and early pre-
sale tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs ďoƌe Ŷo ƌelatioŶ to the filŵ͛s fiŶal ǀalue iŶ the ŵaƌket. The 
Đase studǇ͛s fiŶdiŶgs seƌǀe to highlight the shiftiŶg ǀalue of a pƌojeĐt as it 
navigates the film value chain: early success served as a misleading indicator of 
fiŶal peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe, despite ĐoŶsideƌaďle ͚optiŵistiĐ͛ ǁeight ďeiŶg giǀeŶ to 
theŵ ďǇ ďoth the pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageƌ aŶd the filŵ͛s fiŶaŶĐieƌs. Pƌe-sale 
forecasting is viewed as a risk-management tool for project managers and film 
financiers [5] but the reality once a film is completed complements De Vany 
aŶd GoldŵaŶ͛s positioŶ [ϴ, ϵ] ͞NoďodǇ kŶeǁ aŶǇthiŶg͟ in this particular 
instance. 
 
4.4 UK and US project management perspectives: the case of Vapor 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
 
This case study analyses a film developed, packaged but not produced due to a 
range of complicating facts: the wrong scale of budget, an inappropriate choice 
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of star (Sandra Bullock) and a subsequent lack of sufficient enthusiasm and 
finance from the film market to green light the project. Vapor, which was a 
$25m budgeted UK-US movie written and directed by Neil LaBute, and set to 
star Ralph Fiennes and Sandra Bullock collapsed just in early pre-production, 
costing Renaissance Films more than $700,000 in sunk costs and a significant 
hit to the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s ƌeputatioŶ. The Đase foĐuses oŶ ďoth pƌoduĐeƌ aŶd 
executive producer biases in decision making during the development and 
paĐkagiŶg of the pƌojeĐt. The theŵes ƌaised iŶĐlude ͚aǀailaďilitǇ͛, ͚illusoƌǇ 
correlatioŶs͛, ͚optiŵisŵ͛, ͚ƌeĐeŶĐǇ͛ aŶd ͚uŶdeƌestiŵatiŶg uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͛ [ϭ].   It 
also ĐoŶsideƌs the ƌole that ͚suppoƌtiǀe eǀideŶĐe͛ aŶd ͚ďliŶd spot͛ ďiases plaǇ iŶ 
the pƌojeĐt͛s failuƌe. 
 
Taking an American-piece of material and attached talent, and seeing what can 
occur when a European-based company commits to developing and financing 
that package, can illuminate the creative, cultural and financial hazards that 
are associated with ambitious cross-border investments in the film business. 
However, such ambitious projects that have high-value elements either 
attached or potentially likely to join a production often form part of the price 
of doing business in the higher end of the independent film business. Projects 
that ĐaŶ poteŶtiallǇ dƌiǀe a ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s peƌĐeptioŶ aŶd reputation forwards are 
haƌd to Đoŵe ďǇ, aŶd eŶtƌǇ Đoŵes at a pƌeŵiuŵ: ͚the pƌiĐe of doiŶg ďusiŶess͛. 
The following case study highlights many of the above issues.  
 
4.4.2 The development package  
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Pretty Pictures, an LA-based production company run by producer Gail Mutrux 
(Rain Man, Quiz Show), approached Renaissance Films in 2001 to finance the 
development of a Neil LaBute project. The novella, written by French and US 
educated emerging novelist, Amanda Filipacchi, is about a young ambitious 
actress in New York, who meets and falls for a strange scientist who ostensibly 
makes clouds for a living. They embark on a highly charged and challenged 
affair, while the story takes on fantasy-like Pygmalion aspects as the lead 
actress is re-shaped, literally, by her admiring scientist. In other words, Vapor is 
an off-ďeat, tƌulǇ ͚aƌt house͛ pƌojeĐt, Ŷot Đut out foƌ iŶ-house Hollywood Studio 
development but potentially original enough to attract high end talent given 
the status of the director and producer committed to developing the material. 
The project came to light thanks to a vigilant acquisitions executive working at 
Renaissance during that time. Sarah Sulick had found out about the book and 
the attaĐhŵeŶts, aŶd pitĐhed it iŶteƌŶallǇ to ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s Đo-managing 
directors, who were interested in pursuing the project. After initial discussions, 
the agreement between Renaissance and Pretty Pictures stated that Neil 
LaBute (In The Company of Men, Nurse Betty, Possession), would adapt the 
novella, and direct the film. Pretty Pictures was to produce, and Renaissance 
was committed to financing, controlling world sales rights, and executive 
producing. The dates of writing commencement (two drafts and a polish) were 
iŶitiallǇ left ǀague, as LaBute had soŵe ͚pƌioƌ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶts͛, ďut Mutƌuǆ 
assured Renaissance that she would be able to get the writer/director to focus 
on the screenplay once his latest film, Possession, an AS Byatt adaptation, was 
completed.  
During a meeting between Renaissance, Mutrux and LaBute, prior to signature 
of the three-way development deal, Renaissance stressed that some of the 
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more extreme elements of the story needed to be handled carefully if the 
sĐƌipt ǁasŶ͛t to alieŶate ďoth poteŶtial Đast, aŶd ultiŵatelǇ the pƌojeĐt͛s 
intended audience. Renaissance internally debated whether it should consider 
including the right to appoint a third-party writer to the project as an insurance 
for timely delivery and a greater level of creative control – with LaBute writing 
a ͚diƌeĐtoƌs͛ dƌaft͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ tǁo full drafts and a polish, but nothing was 
decided upon. Renaissance decided, instead, to rely on a delivery date for the 
first draft (February 2002) in the long form development contract, which 
allowed LaBute more than six months from signature to deliver.  
At this stage, an LA-based company, Catch 22, approached Renaissance about 
sharing the development costs 50-50, with a view to co-financing the project. 
Renaissance decided that this partnership would help offset the upfront risks 
of development, and a verbal agreement was established, but not papered 
(e.g.: legally drawn up) in a timely manner. (Later, Catch 22 fell away as the 
company closed for business prior to any formal legal contract being in place, 
leaving Renaissance to pick up the costs for the full development and pre-pre 
production expenditure). 
 
4.4.3 Illusions of ĐoŶtrol aŶd the Đurse of ͚slippage͛ 
 
The first draft of Vapor was delayed by 12 months (script delivery ended up 
being in February 2003) due to LaBute directing a new movie of one of his 
plays (The Shape of Things), a project that was not mentioned when the 
development deal was agreed. Renaissance, despite contracted delivery dates, 
was unable to control the development process. Talent has a tendency to shift 
geaƌs aŶd pƌojeĐt foĐus, depeŶdiŶg oŶ ǁhat͛s ŵost iŶtƌiguiŶg to theŵ at aŶǇ 
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one moment, making them a flight risk (Finney, 2010)  [7]. Slippage is a regular 
occurrence in film project development, costing time, momentum and money. 
Although the first draft was potentially strong, it needed significant rewriting. 
Specifically, the writing in the more extreme and emotional scenes in the script 
required attention. Most problematic was that the first 40 pages read like a 
zestful romantic comedy,; while the following 80 read like a noir psycho-
thriller. To be specific, the male lead literally throws the female lead into a 
Đage ǁith a feǁ to ͚iŵpƌoǀiŶg͛ aŶd tƌaiŶiŶg heƌ on page 48. 
 
After notes and a meeting with Renaissance, LaBute made some minor 
revisions. Renaissance, however, was under time pressure to package the film 
(i.e. attach key cast and agree a budget) prior to the imminent film market, 
Cannes 2003. Why? Because that was where the film had its best chance to be 
fiŶaŶĐed, aŶd ďeĐause ‘eŶaissaŶĐe ǁas hopiŶg that the pƌojeĐt͛s lauŶĐh iŶto 
the ŵaƌketplaĐe ǁould also lift the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s oǀeƌall status aŶd ƌeputatioŶ 
with international distributors. Finney, and his sales team, were being driven 
by the most important recent and upcoming evens, rather than the reality that 
the project was possibly not ready to be considered by financiers, distributors 
aŶd HollǇǁood “tudios Ǉet, a Đleaƌ Đase of ͚ƌeĐeŶĐǇ͛ aŶd ͚seleĐtiǀe peƌĐeptioŶ͛ 
[1]. 
Creative Artists Agency (CAA), acting on the behalf of Renaissance, sent out the 
under-developed screenplay, which had undergone just one draft plus scant 
revisions, to lead cast. Following a 10-week period, Ralph Fiennes and Sandra 
Bullock committed to play the leads. The director assumed that now that key 
talent was attached, the script was in shape and required no major additional 
ǁoƌk. ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s sales teaŵ aƌgued that the dƌaft suffeƌed fƌoŵ ŵiǆed-
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genre confusion, and was not yet in shape for key distributors to read. The 
Managing Director pointed out that the script needed to be sent to North 
American and foreign distributors at least three weeks prior to the 
commencement of Cannes. Otherwise the script would not be read, the 
project would not be considered and no crucial pre-sales and financing 
partners would be closed. In turn, the talent would move on to other projects.  
 
What options did the project managers have available? 
1. Put project on hold, and request a new draft from LaBute as per his 
contract. 
 
2. Put project on hold, and appoint a writer agreed by LaBute to make the 
changes in tone etc. that Renaissance feelts weare crucial to the project 
working. 
 
3. Request further work from LaBute on the screenplay right up to the eve 
of the market, and then deliver that draft to primed US and foreign 
distributors in the hope that they will read promptly given the 
attachments. 
 
4. Allow the existing draft to go out three weeks prior to the market, and 
bring LaBute to Cannes to talk face to face with distributors about his 
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vision for the film. Renaissance could then use a North American partner 
attracted to the project to bring pressure on the screenplay once they 
become partners. 
 
What actually happened? 
 
5) The script went out three weeks ahead of Cannes, and LaBute attended. 
However, whilst the project was taken very seriously, the script was not 
widely liked, mainly due to the mixed genre problem. 
 
What other actions could have been taken? 
 
1. Renaissance could have included and exercised the option to appoint a 
third party writer in the original development contract. This might have 
avoided some of the delays and hence subsequent time pressures on 
Renaissance to finance the film so soon after first draft script delivery. 
  
2. Renaissance could have placed the project on hold rather than take a 
screenplay that was not ready to be read by distributors to the market. 
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3. The writer and producer could then have had more time to work on a 
fully re-worked draft. If the script worked, new talent would have 
committed.  
 
 
4.4.4. The packaging stage 
 
Afteƌ the pƌeǀiouslǇ ŵeŶtioŶed ͚slippage͛ as sigŶified ďǇ ƌepeated false 
development starts and late draft delivery, Renaissance decided that Vapor 
still held ĐeƌtaiŶ stƌoŶg attƌaĐtioŶs ƌe Đƌeatiǀe paĐkagiŶg. ͚Cƌeatiǀe paĐkagiŶg͛ 
refers to the writer, director and cast (potential or attached) – that make up 
most of the key elements when planning a production. Firstly, the writer was 
also the director. Secondly, the writer/director had a cast already in mind 
when the book was optioned and the screenplay commissioned. 
The pitch from LaBute and Mutrux was that Neil was intending to write the 
part for Rene Zellwegger, who had played the title lead in LaBute͛s Nurse Betty 
and was now an A list actress in the eyes of the Hollywood Studios. Mutrux had 
a strong relationship with Ralph Fiennes (whom she spoke on the phone 
regularly) thanks to their work on Quiz Show. Renaissance considered the cast 
combination commercially appealing – possibly to the tune of around $15m-
$20m re a prospective budget. And Fiennes was extremely keen to work with 
Zellwegger. 
When the screenplay was deemed ready to go out to cast, CAA, who 
represented Zellwegger, (and Renaissance), gave the project to her agent and 
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management on an exclusive basis. No time limit was set initially, as the 
director, producer, agent and Renaissance all expected Zellwegger to read 
promptly. She was aware of the project, and LaBute had spoken to her on the 
phone about the role and the concept. Zellwegger had the script the first week 
of March 2003. Concurrently, she had been nominated for a Best Actress Oscar 
for her role in Chicago. Despite repeated calls from Mutrux, LaBute and 
Renaissance, CAA and Zellweggeƌ͛s ŵaŶageŵeŶt ĐoŶtiŶued to ask foƌ ͚ŵoƌe 
tiŵe͛. What ďeĐaŵe Đleaƌ ǁas that )ellǁeggeƌ ǁas Ŷot goiŶg to ŵake a 
decision about her next role until she knew if she had won the Oscar. CAA rang 
the producer six weeks after the initial submission, and told Mutrux that 
)ellǁeggeƌ ͚ǁas passiŶg.͛ It lateƌ tƌaŶspiƌed that the aĐtƌess Ŷeǀeƌ ƌead the 
screenplay.  
Renaissance had just four weeks prior to the Cannes market to package Vapor 
to a level that would attract pre-sales and an American financing partner. A 
shortlist was drawn up, that included Cameron Diaz at the top. It became clear 
ƋuiĐklǇ that Diaz ǁas Ŷot aǀailaďle. ICM͛s CEO Jeff Beƌg ƌaŶg ‘eŶaissaŶĐe 
suggesting Julia Roberts, but by that stage (three weeks prior to Cannes), CAA 
had got LaBute to focus on Sandra Bullock, also a CAA client. Bullock read the 
script within four days. Bullock has a very close relationship with Warner Bros., 
including a production company with her sister that operated on the Studio lot. 
Bullock was scheduled to play the lead in Miss Congeniality 2 for Warner Bros., 
but the shoot was not starting until January 2004 – leaving a gap that Fall for 
the actress to play the lead part in Vapor opposite Fiennes. 
LaBute met Bullock, who liked the screenplay and her character very much. 
She spoke to Fiennes about their prospective partnership, and that seemed to 
go well. Renaissance had little time to consider whether Bullock was the right 
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commercial fit for the project – as the creative elements (writer/director, 
producer, existing cast), all appeared convinced. Mutrux, the lead project 
manager, was convinced that such high level casting was going to push the film 
over the line when it came to financing, without reflecting on the real nature 
of the art house material. Connected parties were all in a hurry: CAA, as the 
lead agency packaging the project, was mindful of the timing issues re getting 
the filŵ͛s details out to distƌiďutoƌs pƌioƌ to the CaŶŶes ŵaƌket.  
 
A letter from CAA with the draft and cast attachments confirmed, was sent out 
10 days prior to the Cannes market. John Ptak, the lead agent representing the 
project, put a budget price of $25m on the film in his letter. (This number was 
an issue for RenaissaŶĐe͛s sales head. “he ǁoƌƌied that the pƌiĐe ǁas plaĐiŶg 
the project at a higher level than the material could justify, despite the strong 
cast attachments). Renaissance managed to get an announcement about 
Vapor, with Bullock and Fiennes attached, onto the front page of Screen 
IŶteƌŶatioŶal͛s fiƌst dailǇ ŵagaziŶe of the ŵaƌket. EǀeƌǇthiŶg seeŵed oŶ ďe oŶ 
track. 
Vapor proved to be a particularly demanding screenplay. Most key territory 
buyers did read the screenplay prior to attending Cannes. But many were 
ĐoŶfused, as theǇ uŶdeƌstood BulloĐk͛s ĐastiŶg up to page ϰϴ of the sĐƌipt, ďut 
at the poiŶt that FieŶŶes͛ ĐhaƌaĐteƌ ͚foƌĐes heƌ iŶto a Đage͛ aŶd shoots at heƌ 
ǁith aŶ ͚iĐe guŶ͛, ŵaŶǇ ďeĐaŵe ĐoŶfused aďout geŶƌe aŶd ĐastiŶg suitaďilitǇ. 
With the exception of two key distributors, Renaissance failed to make any 
pre-sales at Cannes. And many financiers and distributors only read a 
screenplay once. Financiers rarely re-read later drafts once they have passed 
on a film project.  
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Post-Cannes, What other actions could have been taken? 
 
1) Re-cast Bullock, and re-launch the film later that year at MIFED? 
 
2) Stick with the casting, and try to close a WaƌŶeƌ Bƌos.͛ North American 
deal and an ICON deal for UK/Australia/New Zealand with existing 
cast? 
 
3) Return to Zellwegger, when she did not win a Best Actress Oscar? 
 
What actually happened? 
Renaissance tried to close a Studio deal for the US with Warner Bros and with 
Mel GiďsoŶ͛s ĐoŵpaŶǇ IĐoŶ foƌ the UK aŶd Austƌalasia, aŶd also atteŵpted to 
pre-sell during the summer of 2003 by visiting distributors in Spain, Germany 
and France face-to-face, but to no avail. 
 
What other actions could have been taken? 
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Renaissance should have kept control over the project much more tightly at 
the poiŶt that )ellǁeggeƌ ͚passed.͛ IŶstead of being rushed into a creative 
decision chosen by the lead project manager, the financier should have been 
cautious and patient. As an international sales company, it should have been 
aǁaƌe of the daŶgeƌous juǆtapositioŶ that BulloĐk͛s ĐastiŶg ƌepƌesented: 
͞Light, ĐoŵediĐ aĐtƌess iŶ daŶgeƌous, iŶdie ŵoǀie fƌoŵ auteuƌ…͟ It should 
have said no to Bullock prior to her coming on board. 
 
4.4.5 The Financing stage 
 
It is relevant now we come to examine the budget issues and finance that had 
to be raised, to recall that Mutrux and LaBute had worked previously on Nurse 
Betty ($32m) and Possession ($30m). These budget levels supposedly provided 
the eǆeĐutiǀe pƌoduĐeƌ ǁith aŶ iŶdiĐatioŶ of the diƌeĐtoƌ͛s poteŶtial ͚ǀalue͛ iŶ 
the independent market place. But did they really, and was Finney making 
͚illusoƌǇ ĐoƌƌelatioŶs͛ [ϭ] by assuming the pricing patterns of the filmmaker͛s 
pƌeǀious ǁoƌk ƌelated to the ĐuƌƌeŶt pƌojeĐt͛s ǀalue? OŶ ƌefleĐtioŶ, FiŶŶeǇ 
should haǀe ďeeŶ ŵoƌe ŵiŶdful aďout: aͿ ǁhetheƌ the filŵŵakeƌ͛s 
expectations were too high, and b) why the material should have warned him 
about the true market value of the project in question.   
The two leads by mid-May 2003 attached to Vapor were Sandra Bullock and 
Ralph Fiennes. However, despite the high level of casting for an independent 
film, Renaissance had indicated to Mutrux that no more than $20m-$22m was 
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likely to be available to Vapor from the marketplace due to the challenging 
ŵateƌial aŶd LaBute͛s ƌeĐeŶt tƌaĐk ƌeĐoƌd. 
Renaissance asked Pretty Pictures to deliver a production budget on the draft 
that distributors read at Cannes 2003. The first production budget submitted 
totalled $ϯϯŵ ǁithout fiŶaŶĐiŶg Đosts. IŶ ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s opiŶioŶ, this ďudget 
was at least $10m too high. Renaissance decided to fix on what they thought 
was a realistic figure for distributors and financiers, and re-work the script, 
schedule and budget while the financing was being raised. A figure of $25m 
was arrived at, including financing costs (E.g.: cost of banking gap, loans, 
interest, and financing fees, etc.). 
Renaissance had two potential plans for raising the finance for Vapor, based on 
the need to raise $25m. Both first required a North American deal, that could 
be announced, and promote the film to the attention of key foreign buyers. 
These financial components would, potentially, be the cornerstone financing of 
the film. 
 
1. North American deal (plus Australasia and South Africa) with Paramount 
Pictures (33.3% of budget), German tax fund (20%), further foreign pre-
sales (30%) and ďaŶk ͚gap͛ agaiŶst ƌeŵaiŶiŶg sales estiŵates ;ϭϳ%-22%), 
requiring 200% coverage. 
 
2. North American deal at $5m (20%), further foreign pre-sales at 40% 
;iŶĐludiŶg UK/Austƌalasia; GeƌŵaŶǇ; FƌaŶĐe aŶd ItalǇͿ; GeƌŵaŶ ͚supeƌ͛ 
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tax fund (30%), and bank gap against remaining sales estimates (10%), 
requiring 200% coverage. 
 
Finance plan 1 – Paramount 
 
This plan stemmed from a first look deal Renaissance had secured with 
Paramount Pictures in 2001. The agreement was to cover projects owned and 
submitted by Renaissance, whereby on presentation of script, director, budget 
and two lead actors, Paramount would have the option to co-finance 33.3% of 
the filŵ͛s ďudget. The “tudio ǁould take Noƌth AŵeƌiĐa, Austƌalasia aŶd “outh 
Africa (The Territory). Paramount considered Vapor carefully, and their head of 
business affairs, Bill Bernstein, coordinated the financial assessment. However, 
despite the numbers looking promising, the studio did not feel that Neil LaBute 
was a director they wanted to work with. The studio passed two days prior to 
the start of the Cannes market. 
 
Finance plan 2 – Warner Bros. 
 
Sandra Bullock had a production company on the Warner Bros. lot, and the 
actress was signed up to do Miss Congeniality 2 for the studio starting Winter 
2003. When it became clear to Renaissance that all other Studios and US 
independent buyers were passing on Vapor during the market, Renaissance 
asked the producer to call WaƌŶeƌ Bƌos.͛ CEO AlaŶ HoƌŶ͛s offiĐe aŶd ƌeƋuest 
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their support. Horn responded with an offer of $5m (later upped to $5.5m), 
but the deal was not agreed until the second to last day of Cannes. All major 
foreign distributors had left the market by then. The Warner Bros. deal was 
also not agreed in any detail, limiting its use as an announcement to attract 
foreign distribution deals. 
Renaissance set about trying to close the Warner Bros. deal in May/June, and 
visited in person key distributors that summer in German, Italy, France, Spain 
and Japan. Nearly all distributors slowly passed, based on a) script, b) director, 
cͿ BulloĐk͛s ĐastiŶg. Any still keen were later put off when the project was 
moved from Warner Bros. to WIP (Warner Bros. Independent Pictures, the 
newly created specialist distribution platform), and a vastly reduced theatrical 
opening. WIP͛s head Maƌk Gill was not keen to inherit the project. He called 
ICON, who keen to pre-buy UK and Australasia, and explained the WIP was not 
going to do the movie. Finance plan 2 was dead.  
 
 
 
 
Finance plan 3 - Equity 
 
When it became clear that no North American deal was going to work, 
Renaissance then tried to find equity for the film, and to bring the budget 
down. The producer and director worked hard to bring the film down to $21m, 
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and relocated the film to Toronto to cut NYC shoot costs, and pick up Canadian 
benefits. However, as the budget dropped, so too did the percentage 
commitments of some of the cornerstone financing, including the German 
͚supeƌ taǆ͛ plaŶ. The plaŶ looked as folloǁs: 
Budget: $22.5m including financing 
 
Plan 3  
 
German tax: $6.75m (30%)  
Canadian benefits: $2.25m (10%) 
Pre-sales: $3.4m (mainly medium and minor territories, including Benelux, 
Eastern Europe/CIS, Middle East, Israel etc.) (15% approx.). 
Bank gap: $3.4m (15%) – in first position re recoupment  
Equity required: $6.75m [30%] 
 
Renaissance attended Toronto in September 2003 with a view to trying to 
close the above financial package. It was under pressure to get the production 
into principal photography, and was starting to spend money on pre-
production to keep the cast. 
 
What actions were open to the project managers? 
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1. More than 6 potential equity partners requested in-depth meetings. 
Most focused on the strength of the cast, and why the project had not 
managed to close significant pre-sale territories.  
2. All equity players focused on the bank gap being repaid prior to their 
equity being recouped.  
3. No equity players decided to come into the project. 
4. The GeƌŵaŶ ͚supeƌ͛ taǆ fuŶd dƌopped its offeƌ fƌoŵ ϯϬ% to ϮϬ%.  
 
What other actions could have been taken? 
 
1. Renaissance should have never spent monies beyond development and 
certain pre-production items such as the budget and location work.  
2. Renaissance should have been much more concerned about the 
mismatch of Sandra Bullock in a project that was mixed genre – and far 
from a standard romantic comedy. This is in no way a criticism of the 
actress, but a realisation post-distributor testing. 
3. Once there was no North American distributor for the film, Vapor should 
have been closed down. Equity partners were unlikely to come to the 
table by that stage. 
4. When the first budget at $33m was submitted, Renaissance should have 
confronted both the producer and writer/director much more 
specifically about the financing challenge and the need for a) script work 
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and b) a reduced budget that correlated to the complexity of the 
material. 
 
CoŶĐludiŶg ĐoŵŵeŶts: Of Makƌidakis͛s tǁelǀe keǇ CoŵŵoŶ Biases iŶ Futuƌe-
Orientated Decisions, this case study demonstrates both a level of visibility 
(some seven biases are raised in the case) and once again their repeated 
occurrence. As an in-depth case study, Vapor serves to highlight how different 
environments and cultures also impact on cognitive bias. Renaissance failed to 
ƌeĐogŶise the HollǇǁood ͚ĐoƌƌelatioŶ͛ ďetǁeeŶ the A list Đast aŶd fiŶaŶĐiŶg 
was unlikely to unlock distribution finance, given the challenging and art house 
nature of the screenplay and story. Creative management skills [5] were clearly 
lacking given the way Renaissance handled the project management process 
right across the film value chain: the team failed to drive the development 
process; was pushed into setting the wrong level of budget, failed to work 
coherently with its US production counterpart and misread the value of the 
filŵ͛s ĐoŵŵeƌĐial eleŵeŶts Ŷeǆt to the peƌpleǆiŶg Đƌeatiǀe ŵateƌial. MaŶagiŶg 
high profile Hollywood talent (from a UK based perspective) highlights both the 
daŶgeƌ of ͚seleĐtiǀe peƌĐeptioŶ͛, ďut also in this instance also raises the 
teŵptatioŶ to ͚uŶdeƌestiŵate uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͛ [ϭ]. The pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageŵeŶt teaŵ, 
lead by Finney, felt significant pressure to keep the talent happy and on track, 
and made overt efforts to reduce anxiety – ǁhile ĐoŶtiŶuiŶg to ͚underestimate 
futuƌe uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͛ [ϭ]. Despite the peƌĐeiǀed ǀalue of the taleŶt eleŵeŶts, the 
case proves that if a package has weak links (in this case the screenplay, 
diƌeĐtoƌ͛s attitude aŶd ǁƌoŶg ĐastiŶgͿ, it ǁill fail to Ŷaǀigate the ǀalue ĐhaiŶ. 
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4.5:  Underestimating uncertainty:  the search for a studio deal for Terry 
Gilliaŵ͛s ͞Good OŵeŶs͟ 
 
4.5.1 Introduction  
 
The purpose of this case study is to analyse a range of issues that arise from an 
in-depth examination of a larger scale ($60m), European-based movie project 
as it navigates the initial, critical film value chain links. It examines the 
development, packaging and financing stages of an ambitious project. As a 
direct result of this selected focus, the case covers: a) project management 
behaviour; b) creative and talent management challenges; c) commercial and 
͚ŵaƌket ǀalue͛ oďstaĐles ǁheŶ ŵaŶagiŶg pƌojeĐts aimed at the bigger budget 
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market yet sub-blockbuster pricing; d) the financing strategy required to 
finance ambitious, larger non-Hollywood Studio films; and e) the problem of 
͚ĐlosiŶg͛ the fiŶaŶĐiŶg oŶ a Đoŵpleǆ pƌojeĐt.  
Good Omens, adapted from the Terry Pratchett and Neil Gaiman novel, was co-
written and to be directed by Terry Gilliam, and was intended to star Robin 
Williaŵs, JohŶŶǇ Depp aŶd KiƌsteŶ DuŶst. The filŵ͛s failuƌe to ďe gƌeeŶ lit ǁas 
mainly due to no US Studio deal being achieved prior to production, but that 
factor requires further analysis and investigation rather than being taken at 
face value. The project management process was materially damaged by 
diƌeĐtoƌ͛s ďehaǀiouƌ aŶd ƌeputatioŶ foƌ ďeiŶg ͚diffiĐult͛, aloŶgside a leǀel of 
entrepreneuƌial ͚pƌoduĐeƌ ĐoŵpetitioŶ͛ ƌatheƌ thaŶ pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageŵeŶt 
cooperation.  
From a cognitive behavioural perspective the case examines conflicts between 
the diffeƌeŶt ŵaŶageƌs aŶd Đƌeatiǀe taleŶt, ƌaisiŶg issues aƌouŶd ͚illusioŶs of 
ĐoŶtƌol͛, ͚aǀailaďilitǇ͛, aŶd ͚esĐalatiŶg ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt͛ [ϯϬ,ϭ, ϯϱ]. The Đase also 
offeƌs iŶsights ƌelated to ĐoŶfliĐtiŶg ͚ŵeŶtal ŵodels͛ that depeŶd aŶd aƌe 
influenced according to where each project entrepreneur/manager is rooted 
aŶd phǇsiĐallǇ ďased, aŶd ǁhat ͚seleĐtiǀe peƌĐeptioŶs͛ [ϭ] theǇ ďƌiŶg to the 
project management process. 
 
ϰ.ϱ.2   The ͚pitĐh͛ 
It was a typical producer-financier lunch meeting in Milan in early November 
1999, at a traditional Italian eating-house just outside the grey gates of the 
MIFED film market, that the first pitch to Renaissance for Good Omens took 
place. Marc and Peter Samuelson, the experienced English-born producers 
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who traversed the Atlantic, with Peter based in Los Angeles and Marc 
operating out of London, left their most ambitious project until last on their 
development slate hit list. The two managing directors of Renaissance Films 
had raised some $40m earlier that year from a single source of capital, Hermes 
Pension Fund Management, and Finney was immediately interested in the 
ambitious project. Investing equity in larger budget films was not part of the 
Renaissance business plan. Developing potentially commercial projects and 
then financing them from third parties, and putting those projects through 
‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s iŶteƌŶatioŶal sales opeƌatioŶ, however, was a strategy that 
appeared worthy of exploring. 
Co-written by Terry Pratchett and Neil Gaiman, Good Omens is a sprawling, 
multi-ĐhaƌaĐteƌ Ŷoǀel ǁoǀeŶ aƌouŶd a ͚ƌeĐoŶstƌuĐted͛ ApoĐalǇpse. The ďook͛s 
central characters, Crowley – a slick, cunning eaƌth ͚deǀil͛ - and Aziraphale – a 
ĐoŶfused, eŵotioŶallǇ eƌƌatiĐ Ǉet ďookish ͚aŶgel͛ – represent the timeless 
ŶotioŶs of good aŶd eǀil thƌough theiƌ ĐhaƌaĐteƌs. EǆĐept theǇ͛ǀe ďeeŶ dƌiŶkiŶg 
friends for more than 400 years, and have jointly decided that the world is far 
too good a place to abolish and that the Apocalypse need to be aborted. That 
means they have to find the Antichrist – iŶ the foƌŵ of a ͚Ŷoƌŵal͛ ϭϭ Ǉeaƌ-old 
boy called Adam living in a quintessential English village - very quickly if the 
Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse and the final reckoning are to be halted and 
the world (and their drinking and friendship) can continue without threat. The 
story is distinctive, original, and thrives off heady elements of anarchy and 
morality in equal doses.  
The Samuelson brothers had optioned the lengthy book some years previously, 
but had found it hard to tap the right director. Despite Warner Brothers 
controlling the project for a period, no script had been commissioned. Warner 
 119 
Bros. had made it clear that the material would need to be set in North 
America rather than the UK if they were to even consider financing the project.  
What ŵade the “aŵuelsoŶ͛s pitĐh ƌide aďoǀe the tǇpiĐal ŵaƌket haǁkiŶg ǁas 
the scale of ambition and, in particular, the director they had potentially 
secured. Terry Gilliam had expressed a genuine interest in co-writing and 
directing Good Omens, but only if the film was to be developed, financed and 
predominantly shot in Europe. His writing partner, Tony Grisoni (co-writer with 
Gilliam of Fear And Loathing in Las Vegas), was also keen to have a go at jointly 
adaptiŶg the Ŷoǀel. ͞What TeƌƌǇ ǁaŶts is to ŵake this filŵ iŶ EŶglaŶd. He͛s Ŷot 
interested in setting the story in America and having a Hollywood Studio 
controlling every aspect. He͛s ďeeŶ thƌough all that ďefoƌe. This tiŵe he ǁaŶts 
to fiŶish eaĐh daǇ aŶd go to ďed iŶ his hoŵe iŶ Noƌth LoŶdoŶ,͟ eǆplaiŶed 
producer Samuelson.  
Back in Milan, the Samuelson brothers indicated to Finney that the film would 
cost around about $25m to produce, a Ŷuŵďeƌ that seeŵed ͚ĐoŶseƌǀatiǀe͛ iŶ 
terms of the ambition of the project but also low enough to convince 
Renaissance that the pitch was worth considering.  At the end of the lunch, it 
was agreed that the Samuelson brothers would set up a meeting for 
Renaissance with Gilliam, Grisoni, and Marc. When Finney got back to London, 
he ƌaŶ EǀaŶs thƌough the pitĐh, aŶd the paƌtŶeƌs agƌeed that heaƌiŶg Gilliaŵ͛s 
take on a Pratchett novel was an experience not to be missed. Sure enough, in 
late November, Gilliam performed a an imaginative, energetic and high octane 
pitch - supported by a more cautious and less gregarious Grisoni - who 
patiently explained that the book was going to be difficult to shape into a 
workable screenplay and may take significant time to conquer. The discussion 
skipped quickly over what sections and elements of the book would need to be 
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pruned or cut,; iŶstead it ǁas lifted ďǇ Gilliaŵ͛s iŶfeĐtious huŵouƌ deƌiǀed 
fƌoŵ the ŵateƌial aŶd his oǁŶ peĐuliaƌ ǀisioŶ. ͚AŶĐhoƌiŶg͛ ƌefeƌs to the 
cognitiǀe iŵďeddiŶg of the poǁeƌful ͚iŶitial iŶfoƌŵatioŶ͛, ǁhiĐh was firmly 
established in favour of the talent and their influence on the next creative 
steps across the value chain at this stage of the proceedings [1]. 
By now, privately, the Samuelsons' had indicated to Renaissance that the 
budget was more likely to be around $40m, nearly double the initial $25m 
mentioned in the original discussion in Milan. Work on the screenplay was not 
goiŶg to staƌt foƌ soŵe ǁhile, as Gilliaŵ ǁas ďusǇ settiŶg up his ͚passioŶ͛ 
project, Don Quixote, with a view to shooting the film in Spain the following 
year. But Evans and Finney were not put off, especially after being seduced by 
Gilliaŵ͛s luŵiŶous peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe aŶd theiƌ ͚optiŵisŵ͛ foƌ ǁoƌkiŶg ǁith a 
significant director. It was decided that Sophie Jansen, the Deputy 
DeǀelopŵeŶt eǆeĐutiǀe at ‘eŶaissaŶĐe, should ďe the ͚poiŶt peƌsoŶ͛ oŶ the 
project. She was to strike up a strong relationship with Grisoni, which was to 
pƌoǀe iŵpoƌtaŶt duƌiŶg the ĐoŵiŶg ŵoŶths. ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s tǁo MDs, Finney 
and Evans, were to be attached as Executive Producers, in light of their 
financial commitment, ownership of the forthcoming script, and intention to 
work with the Samuelson brothers to package and finance the project. All 
seemed set to go forwards. 
 
4.5.3 The development deal 
 
Developing Good Omens ǁas goiŶg to ďe fiŶaŶĐiallǇ deŵaŶdiŶg. AŶ ͚esĐalatiŶg 
ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt͛ [ϭ] aǆioŵatiĐallǇ aƌose fƌoŵ the fiƌst deǀelopŵeŶt deal sigŶiŶg 
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onwards.  Specifically, a stepped development deal was agreed in principal, 
with co-writers Gilliam and Grisoni being guaranteed a total of £360,000 to 
deliver two screenplay drafts and a polish. The initial payment was £30,000 to 
each writer on commencement of the first draft; £60,000 each on delivery of 
the first draft, £60,000 on delivery of the second draft, and £30,000 each for 
the polish. Once that polish was completed, each further polish was to cost an 
additional £40,000.  
 
The book option deal was as follows: 
  
1st 18months 14/11/97 - 15/5/99 $25,000 on account of purchase price (at 
this point the book was optioned by the Samuelson brothers) 
  
2nd 18 months 16/5/99 - 15/11/2000 $25,000 50% on account (and here 
Renaissance took over) 
  
3rd 18 months 16/11/2000 - 15/5/2002 $25,000 not on account (RFL paid) 
  
4th 12 months 16/5/2002 - 15/5/2003 $50,000 not on account  
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The purchase price (that is the sum to be paid on first day of principal 
photography – aŶd effeĐtiǀelǇ ͚eǆeƌĐises͛ the optioŶͿ: Ϯ.ϱ% of ďudget, floor of 
$250,000, and a ceiling of $400,000 and 5% of 100% of net profits. 
Jenne Casarotto, a very experienced London-based talent agent, who had 
represented Gilliam for some years (among other clients including Stephen 
Frears, Neil Jordan, Nick Hornby, etc.), had stressed to Renaissance that the 
oǀeƌall ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt, ǁhilst ͞appƌeĐiated͟ fƌoŵ a UK ĐoŵpaŶǇ, ǁas ͞faƌ less 
than a Hollywood Studio would have been prepared to pay to develop the 
pƌojeĐt.͟ The iŵpliĐatioŶ ǁas that ‘eŶaissaŶĐe ǁas ͚gettiŶg it Đheap͛, and that 
she would have been asking for more than $1m in writing fees (around 
£700,000 in 2000) if a Hollywood Studio was paying the development costs. 
The oŶe eǆĐeptioŶ to the supposed ͚Đut pƌiĐe͛ ǁas the ĐostlǇ fuƌtheƌ polish 
fees. She stated that it was an attempt to stop her client (and later Grisoni was 
added to heƌ ĐlieŶt listͿ ďeiŶg stuĐk iŶ ͚peƌpetual deǀelopŵeŶt hell͛ aŶd to 
force the producers to focus on getting the film into production rather than 
going round in circles. Ironically, writing work did not start on Good Omens for 
ŶeaƌlǇ oŶe Ǉeaƌ afteƌ the agƌeeŵeŶt ǁas Đoŵpleted, thaŶks to Gilliaŵ͛s 
unfortunate experience on Don Quixote (recorded in detail in the documentary 
Lost In La Mancha).  
In addition to the cost of commissioning the screenplay, Renaissance picked up 
all the “aŵuelsoŶ ďƌotheƌs͛ histoƌiĐal Đosts, totalliŶg aƌouŶd £ϭϭϬ,ϬϬϬ; aŶd 
agreed to fund the ensuing book option payment schedule (see above). The 
overall commitment from Renaissance was more than £500,000 by the time all 
the contracts had been tied up. What was not included or set out in the 
deǀelopŵeŶt ŶegotiatioŶs ǁas the ͚iŵpliĐit͛ uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg that ‘eŶaissaŶĐe 
ǁas to ďe ͚oŶ the hook͛ foƌ all fuƌtheƌ deǀelopŵeŶt aŶd pƌe-production costs 
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right through pre-pre production and up to first day of principal photography. 
In other words, Renaissance had unwittingly [1] become the equivalent to a 
Hollywood Studio in the process of setting up Good Omens, with associated 
cost and control implications that had not been considered in full (or in detail 
by the team) by Renaissance Films. The implications were potentially 
considerable. 
 
4.5.4   Competing interests: Project management behaviour in relation to the 
different Good Omens producers within the value chain 
 
Within a matter of days of the verbally agreed development deal, a new 
element was added to the project management composition, although one 
that had been very clearly planned by the Gilliam camp in advance of the 
project set up. Jenne Casarotto told Evans that Gilliam was concerned about 
the “aŵuelsoŶ ďƌotheƌs͛ pƌoduĐiŶg the filŵ as loŶe lead pƌoduĐeƌs. Gilliaŵ͛s 
Twelve Monkeys, which had starred Bruce Willis, Brad Pitt and Madelaine 
Stowe, had been produced by an A-list Hollywood Studio producer, Charles 
Roven (later to go on to produce Scooby Doo and the later Batman franchise 
among other Hollywood Studio blockbusters). Gilliam was insisting that Roven 
was to be brought into the film as the lead producer, according to Casarotto. 
She also stressed that all parties would need RoveŶ͛s sĐƌipt aŶd HollǇǁood 
Studio-driven access and packaging skills if the project was to be developed 
suĐĐessfullǇ to the poiŶt that pƌojeĐt͛s ďudget ǁas ƌaised aŶd the filŵ ǁas to 
be Green Lit.  
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A ŵeetiŶg ǁas fiŶallǇ held at the “aŵuelsoŶ͛s laǁǇeƌs, OlsǁaŶg, iŶ eaƌlǇ ϮϬϬϬ. 
The intention was to map out how the project in principal would be financed; 
hoǁ ŵuĐh eaĐh paƌties͛ fees ǁould ďe peƌ theiƌ ƌespeĐtiǀe ǁoƌk aŶd fiŶaŶĐiŶg, 
and how, by now lead project manager, Roven would work with the Samuelson 
brothers and Renaissance Films. Was Renaissance Films cognisant that the deal 
on offer meant that the company was being set up to become a replacement 
entity for a Hollywood Studio:  bearing sunk cost and cash flowing 
commitments  
An in-depth three-way agreement between the parties was going to be 
required. (In addition, a separate producer deal between US producer Charles 
Roven and the Samuelson brothers was also going to have to be documented – 
something that took a very lengthy amount of time and caused considerable 
divisions between the two producing parties).
16
 What should have been a 
collaborative relationship throughout the producer team, and a strong 
resource, was now a potential liability that would impact on future decision-
making.  
Before the meeting had really started, Roven asked bluntly whom 
‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s distƌiďutioŶ paƌtŶeƌs ǁeƌe iŶ oƌdeƌ to guaƌaŶtee at least ϰϬ% of 
the pƌoduĐtioŶ͛s fiŶaŶĐe. The ƋuestioŶ eǆposed the fledgliŶg sales opeƌatioŶ 
that Renaissance had added to its development and production interests when 
closing its deal with Hermes. The sales arm had no experience of pre-selling a 
film at a $40m budget level. Roven, in turn, explained how he had financed the 
$29m Twelve Monkeys (to be ultimately delivered at around $32m) through 
                                                             
16 Whilst this thesis does not seek to address issues of competitive advantage [40] directly 
through the case site, the inter rivalry between project managers is an intriguing and 
essential element relating to film productions and their ability to achieve alignment of 
interest in the place of failure. 
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four key distribution partners, which included UGC PH (France), Toho Towa 
(Japan), Concorde (Germany), and Lauren (Spain). The deal was split 25% four 
ǁaǇs, aŶd had effeĐtiǀelǇ left Noƌth AŵeƌiĐa ͚opeŶ͛ for a sale at a later point. 
As a result, in part, to the budget being controlled when compared to the 
challenging material - and fronted by A-list stars - Twelve Monkeys had made 
considerable profits for the investor-distributors and producers. ͞AŶgus, heƌe͛s 
the thing. I receive a seven figure cheque every year thanks to the financial 
stƌuĐtuƌe of that filŵ,͟ ‘oǀeŶ eǆplaiŶed lateƌ. Twelve Monkeys had gone on to 
take more than $160m worldwide during its theatrical release and far more 
from video and DVD revenue streams. 
While soŵe of ‘oǀeŶ͛s Twelve Monkeys partners had either moved on or been 
changed (with Helkon replacing Concorde, and UGC PH looking unlikely to be 
involved in a larger budgeted Gilliam film), his experience and relationships far 
outweighed ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s. ‘oǀeŶ stated that he Đould ďƌiŶg GeƌŵaŶǇ aŶd 
Japan to the Good Omens table. Renaissance had nothing to match this. With 
the exception of an output deal with Entertainment Film Distributors, where 
no advance was paid in return for a modest 25% distribution fee and a strong 
share of the ancillary income, Renaissance had no long standing foreign 
distributor relationships. On the other hand, given that Renaissance was 
stumping up the entire development and pre-pƌoduĐtioŶ ƌisk, the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s 
managers felt that they should have a fair shot at trying to pre-sell and sell-
and-service the majority of the sales on the film and be paid commission 
accordingly. A deal was later agreed that gave Roven/Samuelson a 5% 
commission on key foreign territories (defined as France, Germany, Spain, 
Italy, Australasia and Japan) if they made the deal, and 5% to Renaissance if in 
turn they closed the territory. It was agreed that Renaissance would handle the 
remaining Rest of the World for a 10% commission.  
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No commission was due to be paid until the negative cost of the film had been 
met, so in practice all commissions were to be deferred and would only be paid 
out if: a) sales and finance came to more than the negative cost prior on first 
day of principal photography; or b) placed in a recoupment agreement once 
the fiŶaŶĐiŶg had ďeeŶ ƌaised. The deal also alloǁed ‘oǀeŶ͛s ĐoŵpaŶǇ the 
opportunity to control and exploit music-publishing rights in return for a share 
of royalties. That left North America to be dealt with. 
 
ϰ.ϱ.ϱ ͚CoŶtrolliŶg͛ the tippiŶg poiŶt: North AŵeriĐa  
 
On a projected budget of $60m, the project management team and 
development financiers knew that a North American advance for distribution 
ƌights ǁas goiŶg to ďe ĐƌitiĐal to the pƌojeĐt͛s ŵoǀe iŶto phǇsical production. 
‘oǀeŶ, as ǁas to ďe eǆpeĐted, had a ͚deal͛ ǁith a Majoƌ “tudio. He had 
recently moved away from Warner Bros., and had set up a deal at MGM. The 
terms of the financing and distribution terms with MGM were undisclosed, and 
were vaguely understood by Renaissance to be negotiated on a film-by-film 
ďasis. The ͚deal͛, iŶ staŶdaƌd HollǇǁood pƌaĐtiĐe, did hoǁeǀeƌ outliŶe ‘oǀeŶ͛s 
producing fees and profit position. Roven, rather than insisting that MGM had 
an automatic first look at Good Omens, openly acknowledged that he did not 
own the project. Therefore it was agreed that whichever party brought a North 
American deal to the table was to be entitled to a further 5% fee post the full 
negative cost of the film being raised. 
ThaŶks to EǀaŶs͛ ƌelatioŶship with Ruth Vitale, then President of Paramount 
Classics, Renaissance had been approached by Paramount Studios to work 
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more closely on its slate financing. The MDs were invited to a meeting with 
Paramount President Sherry Lansing and Production chief John Goldwyn during 
the suŵŵeƌ of ϮϬϬϬ. FolloǁiŶg the ͚get-to-know-Ǉou͛ ŵeetiŶg, FiŶŶeǇ aŶd his 
Director of Finance picked up the baton, and started to close a first look deal 
ǁith PaƌaŵouŶt “tudios thƌough Bill BeƌŶsteiŶ͛s BusiŶess Affaiƌs offiĐe. ;The 
deal was not to cover any submissions to Paramount Classics, the specialist 
arm of the studio). The agreement was to cover projects owned and submitted 
by Renaissance, whereby on presentation of script, director, budget and two 
lead actors, Paramount would have the option to co-finance a third of the 
filŵ͛s ďudget. The “tudio ǁould take Noƌth AŵeƌiĐa, Austƌalasia aŶd “outh 
Africa (The Territory), and charge a 25% distribution fee across all income 
streams (e.g.: theatrical, video, ancillaries and television). The deal͛s stƌuĐtuƌe 
was particularly attractive in terms of potential video and DVD income from 
‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe. The “tudio ǁould fuŶd the P&A, to ďe deteƌŵiŶed 
on a film-by-film basis, which was to be recouped off the top. Post full 
recoupment from the Territory, Paramount was to take a 2/3 – 1/3 split from 
overages; and keep the Territory in perpetuity. Three rejections in a row by 
PaƌaŵouŶt ǁould lead to the deal ďeiŶg ĐaŶĐelled at ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s eleĐtioŶ. 
PaƌaŵouŶt͛s oƌigiŶal iŶteŶtioŶ had ďeeŶ to have an option over English-
speaking territories, but Renaissance had successfully kept the UK out of the 
deal, hence protecting its output deal with Entertainment Film Distributors in 
the UK. On paper, the deal looked fair. In reality, what it represented ǁas ͞aŶ 
agƌeeŵeŶt to agƌee͟ ƌatheƌ thaŶ aŶǇ sigŶifiĐaŶt ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt fƌoŵ PaƌaŵouŶt 
towards co-fiŶaŶĐiŶg ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s laƌgeƌ, ŵoƌe ĐoŵŵeƌĐial pƌojeĐts. AŶd 
Renaissance was at risk for all development, overhead and pre-production 
costs. 
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Roven was gracious about the Paramount deal, and was pleased that Good 
Omens was to have two potential North American backers, rather than just 
MGM. However, before any realistic approach could be made to any Studios, 
financiers and international distributors, the screenplay, budget, locations and 
staƌ attaĐhŵeŶts Ŷeeded to ďe iŶ plaĐe. A ͚paĐkage͛ Ŷeeded to ďe ĐoŶstƌuĐted, 
which was to require considerable project management, time and money over 
the coming months. 
 
4.5.6 Screenplay development 
 
The first draft of Good Omens came in at more than 170 pages long. It also was 
delivered in the late autumn of 2000, many months later than anticipated 
thaŶks to Gilliaŵ͛s ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to DoŶ Quiǆote aŶd suďseƋueŶt ;aŶd 
uŶdeƌstaŶdaďleͿ depƌessioŶ folloǁiŶg that filŵ͛s Đollapse. Deliǀeƌy would have 
ďeeŶ eǀeŶ lateƌ had it Ŷot ďeeŶ foƌ GƌisoŶi͛s ǁoƌkiŶg ŵethods aŶd dediĐatioŶ 
to the project. The writer had devised a workable structure with Gilliam, and 
was able to get a number of pages down, send them to Gilliam, get his notes 
and comments, rewrite, and then move on to the next section. Once a draft 
was in place, both of them then reviewed, discussed and refined the 
sĐƌeeŶplaǇ. ͚Let ŵe ďe Đleaƌ. TeƌƌǇ doesŶ͛t aĐtuallǇ ǁƌite aŶǇthiŶg, ďut he͛s 
right there all the ǁaǇ thƌough the pƌoĐess,͛ explained Grisoni.  
In addition to the length, each page was extremely dense, packed with action, 
images and detailed effects and touches. (Some months later a senior Fox 
eǆeĐutiǀe eǆplaiŶed to ‘eŶaissaŶĐe that ǁhilst he: ͞loǀed the sĐƌipt, eǀeƌǇ 
page read like it ǁas ĐostiŶg a ŵillioŶ dollaƌs͟Ϳ. While the stoƌǇ͛s stƌuĐtuƌe ǁas 
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starting to take shape, the multiple characters and density made the read slow 
and confusing. And whenever the devil and angel were not in the action, the 
story tended to drag. As JansoŶ poiŶted out iŶ heƌ Ŷotes oŶ the dƌaft, ͞ǁe ŵiss 
CƌoǁleǇ aŶd Aziƌaphale ǁheŶ theǇ aƌeŶ͛t oŶ the page, as theǇ aƌe the heaƌt 
aŶd aĐtioŶ of the stoƌǇ.͟ 
A development meeting was held, where Renaissance made it clear that the 
script needed to come down to no ŵoƌe thaŶ ϭϮϬ pages. IŶ Gilliaŵ͛s diƌeĐtoƌs͛ 
contract, it was stated that the film would be no longer than 120 minutes; and 
that financiers/producers would have final cut. (The standard industry 
estimate is that a script page matches around one minute of completed film). 
Gilliam paid scant lip service to the length, and was already arguing about 
favourite scenes and characters that he did not want to lose in the new draft. 
Grisoni tried to reason with the director during that meeting, recognising that 
the project was fenced in by practical realities. Extensive notes from Janson 
were passed on to the writers, suggesting specific cuts and character removals 
and reductions, many of which Grisoni appreciated. A new draft was embarked 
upon. 
 
4.5.7 Early concept marketing 
 
When the first draft of Good Omens arrived at Renaissance, it was read by the 
sales aŶd ŵaƌketiŶg teaŵ. Despite the sĐƌeeŶplaǇ͛s leŶgth, the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s 
executives could all see the rich commercial potential. It was agreed with the 
pƌoduĐeƌs that ‘eŶaissaŶĐe Đould desigŶ a ͚ĐoŶĐept posteƌ͛, ǁhiĐh ǁould 
include the name of the project, director, writers and producers. A concept 
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posteƌ ŵakes distƌiďutoƌs aǁaƌe of a pƌojeĐt͛s eǆisteŶĐe, aŶd aĐƋuisitioŶ 
eǆeĐutiǀes staƌt to ͚tƌaĐk͛ its pƌogress and note the imminent arrival of a 
sĐƌeeŶplaǇ to ƌead aŶd pƌoǀide ͚Đoǀeƌage͛ foƌ theiƌ seŶioƌ ŵaŶageŵeŶt. IŶ the 
case of Good Omens, the ďook͛s jaĐket Đoǀeƌ ǁas adapted aŶd a laƌge fieƌǇ ƌed 
poster was designed with gothic black lettering. It was placed within the 
Renaissance offices at the American Film Market in February 2001 as a way of 
introducing the project to the market. It was also agreed between the parties 
that the fiƌst dƌaft, uŶdeƌ Ŷo ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes, should ďe ĐiƌĐulated to ͚ďuǇeƌs͛ 
(e.g. distributors and Studios) at this stage. Renaissance and the producers 
were aware of the damage often done in the marketplace when early 
screenplay drafts, which require considerably more work, are released and 
read before they are ready. And re-reading screen- plays is an unpopular task 
within the film buying community.  
Between the American Film Market and Cannes 2001, Renaissance made some 
significant changes in staffing. Finney took over the international sales team. 
The shift in senior management made the producers understandably wary of 
whether Renaissance had the experience and clout to raise significant foreign 
pre-sales on the film. 
 
4.5.8 Screenplay drafts and the casting process 
 
The second draft materialised some five months after the arrival of the first. 
More than 30 pages had been cut, with the length now at 137 pages. Whilst 
decisions had been made about certain scenes to omit, the screen-play was 
still packed with a wide range of ĐhaƌaĐteƌs, aŶd still ͚ĐhalleŶgiŶg͛ to ƌead 
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through without having to go back and check on names and places, etc. Roven, 
however, felt that it had improved considerably, and began to work more 
ĐloselǇ oŶ the sĐƌipt. He also appƌeĐiated JaŶsoŶ͛s Ŷotes, many of which he 
agreed with. Crowley (the devil), and Aziraphale (the angel), were now much 
more central and present within the structure. But Renaissance and the 
producers all agreed that one of the characters (Shadwell, a witch finder) 
needed to either be cut completely or edited back, as he cluttered the third 
act; while the role of witch (Anathema Device) needed clarifying and more 
characterisation. A polish was embarked upon, with the intention that the 
script would be considerably reduced. A draft needed to ready for casting and 
distributor-financiers if the project was not to lose momentum. However, what 
oĐĐuƌƌed ǁas a ͚daŶĐe͛ of a feǁ pages ĐoŵiŶg out, aŶd ĐeƌtaiŶ sĐeŶes that 
Gilliaŵ ǁas keeŶ oŶ, goiŶg ďaĐk iŶ. ͚What the experience made me realise was 
how important it is, when script editing, to make your points really clearly 
about cuts ƌight fƌoŵ the staƌt,͛ eǆplaiŶed JaŶsoŶ lateƌ. ͚I should haǀe ďeeŶ 
stƌoŶgeƌ.͛ IŶ faiƌŶess, ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s Đo-MDs should have been more verbal and 
aggressive if this situation was to have been resolved. The project 
management team was clearly in fear of falling out with the director. 
Gilliam had always been clear that he wanted Johnny Depp to play Crowley. He 
had become close to the actor during their work on the film Fear and Loathing 
In Las Vegas, and Depp had been a lead character in Don Quixote. He had 
suďseƋueŶtlǇ ǁitŶessed the filŵ͛s Đollapse at fiƌst haŶd. UŶfoƌtuŶatelǇ, the 
producers and Renaissance were mindful that in 2001, Depp was unable to 
͚opeŶ͛ a ŵoǀie. His credits over the previous three years ranged between 
lower budget independent films to large budget-but-mediocre results. The 
producers drew up alternative lists, that included George Clooney (who read, 
and liked the script but was too busy to commit); Brad Pitt (with whom Gilliam 
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had fallen out with following a quote in a book regarding Twelve Monkeys); 
Mel Gibson (who was more focused on his own directing career, with The 
Passion Of The Christ on the horizon); and Eddie Murphy. Will Smith was added 
to MuƌphǇ͛s Ŷaŵe oŶ the list, aŶd a deďate ďetǁeeŶ the Noƌth AŵeƌiĐaŶ aŶd 
the UK partners about whether it was politically offensive to cast a black 
person as a devil ensued. The US producer was against; the European project 
ŵaŶageƌs didŶ͛t see the pƌoďleŵ. Neither black star took up the role anyway. 
Good Omens͛ CƌoǁleǇ ƌole kept ĐoŵiŶg ďaĐk to Depp, iŶ paƌt ďeĐause Gilliaŵ 
had not personally pushed the script with any other of the above A list stars. 
Aziraphale, the angel role, was more straightforward, at least to start with. 
Robin Williams had worked with Gilliam on The Fisher King, and had been 
pencilled in by the director from day one. Unfortunately, Williams was also 
going through a difficult period re his relationship to box office performance. 
Renaissance had hoped that an A list Crowley would solve the problem, but 
that ǁasŶ͛t foƌthĐoŵiŶg. The thiƌd keǇ ƌole ǁas AŶatheŵa, the ǁitĐh. While 
Renaissance and the producers felt the role might be able to attract a star such 
as Cameron Diaz, Gilliam was keen on Kirsten Dunst, who showed great 
potential to become an A list star, but had not reached her Superman status 
back in 2001. He met with the actress in Los Angeles, and she was keen to be 
attached. 
 
4.5.9 A fluctuating budget and rising costs 
By now, Renaissance had commissioned a budget. A schedule – essential for 
any realistic budget to be compiled - was drawn up by the experienced line-
producer David Brown, and after a number of meetings with Gilliam, Brown 
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produced the first full budget for Good Omens. It came in at $93m. $10m was 
reserved for the two lead roles, at $5m each (fee levels that were nominal 
ƌatheƌ thaŶ estaďlished ǁith the aĐtoƌs͛ ageŶts as agƌeedͿ; $ϭϱŵ ǁas 
earmarked for CGI and special effects; and the overall shoot period was to last 
18 weeks. The physical and technical demands of the complex and lengthy 
sĐƌeeŶplaǇ ǁeƌe the ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt faĐtoƌs ƌe the Ŷeǁ ͚Ŷeaƌ-ďloĐkďusteƌ͛ 
budget. Renaissance was extremely worried at the level of this budget, and the 
schedule informing it was based on a script that had not been nailed down, 
making it an unreliable number.  
In reaction, Renaissance and the producers focused once again on the 
screenplay. The new polish brought the screenplay down by a further six 
pages. Every cut, however, was becoming a personal fight with Gilliam – even 
when Roven stepped in to take up the cause. Ultimately, the polish removed 
Shadwell, the witch finder, from the third act. The screenplay was sent out to a 
shortlist of buyers, including MGM and Paramount. However, rather than 
commission a new schedule and budget, the producers and Renaissance told 
Gilliam that they could raise a maximum of $60m for this film, and that he 
would have to work within that parameter. Whilst the budget, through 
considerable skill on the part of Brown, was reduced downwards, at no point 
was a full, completed schedule and budget completed to fit the nominal $60m 
cap.  
Part of the problem facing the project was that different elements required for 
a film of this size were not coming together at the same time. The script was 
still not at 120 pages,; the cast was unofficially attached to the project rather 
than formally signed up,; and despite different budgets being compiled around 
a) a UK shoot; b) a UK and Isle of Man shoot; c) an Australian shoot; d) a 
 134 
German shoot; e) an Eastern European shoot; Gilliam was clear that he wanted 
the UK only. This was communicated only after a trip to Studio Babelsberg in 
Berlin, and after Marc Samuelson and David Brown did a research trip to the 
Isle of MaŶ. The Isle of MaŶ ǁas ǀeƌǇ ĐleaƌlǇ Ŷot to the diƌeĐtoƌs͛ satisfaĐtioŶ. 
Considerable sums of money were now being spent in addition to 
‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s deǀelopŵeŶt Đosts. Foƌ eǆaŵple, all ‘oǀeŶ͛s tƌaǀel Đosts, phoŶe 
bills, trips to London etc., were being charged back to Renaissance. 
;‘eŶaissaŶĐe eǀeŶ had aŶ iŶǀoiĐe foƌ $Ϯϱ fƌoŵ ‘oǀeŶ͛s offiĐe ŵaŶǇ ŵoŶths 
lateƌ ǁheŶ ŵeetiŶg the pƌoduĐeƌ iŶ LA, ǁhiĐh he offeƌed to Đleaƌ iŶ Đash… 
‘oǀeŶ said to foƌget it, ͞ďut I͛ŵ ƌeallǇ glad ŵǇ guǇs aƌe ƌight oŶ the Đase͟Ϳ. 
Heads of departments and a casting director were being approached and 
attaĐhed. Gilliaŵ aŶd BƌoǁŶ ǁeƌe ǁoƌkiŶg out of ‘adiĐal Media͛s “oho offiĐes 
– giǀeŶ gƌatis thaŶks to Gilliaŵ aŶd the diƌeĐtoƌ͛s ǁoƌk ǁith the ĐoŵpaŶǇ. But 
the offices and momentum gave the producers and director the feeling that 
the film was about to happen. 
Certain heads were not working out. Production Designer Assheton Gorton, for 
example, could never 'get' the Apocalypse as a concept let alone design it, was 
working in a very dated way though nobody would really come out and say it. 
Oǀeƌall, fƌoŵ oŶe eǆeĐutiǀe assistaŶt͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe, all the people who were 
brought in at this unofficial prep stage were half-hearted about it because the 
film wasn't cast or financed and they therefore didn't throw themselves into it. 
 
4.5.10 Pre-selling Good Omens 
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Despite interest in the project from major foreign distributors, it became clear 
to Finney from his experience at Cannes 2001 that for a project of this size, 
foreign distributors would only believe that it was financed and worth stepping 
up for once a North American studio was attached. Roven agreed with him 
that a North American deal was essential if the film was to proceed. He too 
was mindful of his ability to bring his foreign partners to the table without the 
US secured. The finance plan for Good Omens was still vague at this point. The 
general strategy was as follows: If 25%-33% of the finance could be raised from 
North America, it was presumed that five major foreign territories could be 
pre-sold. Say, France, Italy, Germany, Japan and Australasia –bringing in by 
‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s estiŵate aƌouŶd ϰϬ% of the ďudget ;oƌ $Ϯϱŵ, see ďeloǁͿ. IŶ 
addition, if the film were to shoot in the UK a tax deal would be done, bringing 
in a further 8% approximately. On the back of this level of pre-sales, a bank gap 
would be made to work if there was enough value in the remaining territories 
to provide 200% coverage on the gap loan. So the plan looked in theory like 
this: 
 
i) There was some debate over the amount that could possiblye beto raised in 
the UK through tax deals. This figure was reached on the conservative 
assumption of any break allowable to a film of more than £15m. A more 
aggressive deal may have been possible, but for the purposes of the finance 
plan, this was the figure assumed. 
 
ii) Territories left included: Spain, Scandinavia, Russia/E Europe, Latin America, 
South Korea, and South East Asia.  
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The two MDs went out to Paramount and MGM respectively at the same time. 
Renaissance had developed a relationship with a senior Paramount production 
executive, who in turn pressured Rob Friedman, Executive Vice President of 
Marketing and Distribution, to consider the project under the terms of the 
Renaissance-Paramount deal. Friedman did not like the script. In particular, he 
did not like the ending, which he found offeŶsiǀe ;Adaŵ͛s ǇouŶg fƌieŶds aƌe 
killed in a variety of gory ways when the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse 
aƌƌiǀe oŶ eaƌthͿ. ͞You ĐaŶ͛t do that to ĐhildƌeŶ oŶ a ďig sĐƌeeŶ,͟ eǆplaiŶed 
FƌiedŵaŶ. ͞DefiŶitelǇ Ŷot oŶ a pƌojeĐt ĐostiŶg this ŵuĐh.͟ 
͞Would Ǉou ŵeet TeƌƌǇ aŶd tell hiŵ that?͟ asked FiŶŶeǇ. 
͞Yes, ďut oŶlǇ oŶ the gƌouŶds that PaƌaŵouŶt is Ŷot ŵakiŶg this ŵoǀie at this 
poiŶt. I doŶ͛t ǁaŶt a ŵisuŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg ǁheƌe ǁe fall out ǁith TeƌƌǇ,͟ said 
Friedman.  
Oǀeƌ at MGM, ‘oǀeŶ eŶgaged the studio͛s head of pƌoduction in the project. A 
new budget was requested that bore a resemblance to the $60m pitch, but 
ďefoƌe that ǁas dƌaǁŶ up, MGM͛s pƌesideŶt Aleǆ Yemenidjian took a view on 
the pƌojeĐt. ͚UŶfoƌtuŶatelǇ, it͛s just Ŷot his kiŶd of thiŶg. He doesŶ͛t get it,͛ 
eǆplaiŶed ‘oǀeŶ. ͚TheǇ͛ƌe passiŶg.͛ 
Most other Studios had politely passed – always with the proviso that they 
ǁould ͚loǀe to see the filŵ ǁheŶ Đoŵpleted͛ - but Evans had a strong 
relationship with Fox chief Tom Rothman. The two had become friends while 
Rothman was head of production at Samuel Goldwyn, and Much Ado About 
Nothing was one of the successful fruits of their work together. Evans 
 137 
managed to get Rothman and his partner, Jim Giannopoulos, to read the 
screenplay and take a meeting with Gilliam, Roven, Evans and Finney. The 
meeting took place a few weeks after 9/11 – an event that Roven viewed as a 
ǁoƌld politiĐal ǁateƌshed. ͚The world ǁill Ŷeǀeƌ ďe the saŵe agaiŶ,͛ Roven 
stated darkly. The Europeans working on Good Omens took a much more 
relaxed ǀieǁ. “uƌelǇ theƌe ĐouldŶ͛t ďe a ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶ ďetǁeeŶ the Woƌld Tƌade 
Centre bombings and Good Omens, they thought. 
The pitĐh seeŵed to ďe goiŶg ǁell iŶ ‘othŵaŶ͛s aiƌǇ offiĐe oŶ the Foǆ lot. FoƌtǇ 
ŵiŶutes iŶto the ŵeetiŶg, Gilliaŵ took out a laƌge aƌtists͛ pad. As he flipped 
each page, Rothman and Giannopoulos took an increasing interest in the wild 
aŶd sĐaƌǇ iŵages, ďeautifullǇ dƌaǁŶ ďǇ Gilliaŵ͛s haŶd. TheŶ the page tuƌŶed 
again: an image that none of the producers has seen loomed off the page. Two 
huge towers, close to each other, with angels flying from one, while devils and 
evil beings scampered around the other, filled the room. Rothman suppressed 
a gasp, and appeared to pale as he sunk back in his chair.  
Fox were going to pass. No North American deal was available to Good Omens 
in the autumn of 2001. Shortly after the Fox meeting, Finney and Evans met 
ǁith ‘oǀeŶ at his offiĐes oŶ “uŶset Bouleǀaƌd. ‘oǀeŶ ǁas uŶeƋuiǀoĐal: ͞GuǇs, 
ǁe͛ƌe fiŶished. MǇ adǀiĐe is that Ǉou aďsolutelǇ haǀe to Đlose this filŵ doǁŶ. 
We͛ƌe dead.͟ 
 
Of Makƌidakis͛s tǁelǀe keǇ CoŵŵoŶ Biases iŶ Futuƌe-Orientated Decisions, this 
case study demonstrates a high level of sightings, along with a perplexing level 
of ŵultiple ͚ďliŶd spots͛ aŶd ͚esĐalatiŶg ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt͛ ĐoŶĐeƌŶs. As aŶ iŶ-depth 
case study, Good Omens serves to highlight how different environments and 
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cultures also impact on cognitive bias, and how so-Đalled ͚Đollaďoƌatiǀe 
ƌelatioŶships͛ ĐaŶ Đause daŵage ǁheŶ theǇ Đoŵpete ƌatheƌ thaŶ a teaŵ͛s 
strategic framework and actions to critical third parties, such as Hollywood 
“tudios. ‘eŶaissaŶĐe failed to ƌeĐogŶise the HollǇǁood Ŷegatiǀe ͚ĐoƌƌelatioŶ͛ 
ďetǁeeŶ a ͚diffiĐult͛ aŶd ǁilful diƌeĐtoƌ Ŷeǆt to ĐoŵŵittiŶg upfƌoŶt fiŶaŶĐial 
resources to acquiring, developing, producing and selling the film to world 
wide distributors.  Creative management skills [5] were clearly lacking given 
the way the producers and Renaissance handled the project management 
process right across the film value chain: the team failed to drive the 
development process and achieve a screenplay running at the right length and 
story structure; was pushed (once again) into setting the wrong level of 
budget, failed to work coherently with its US production counterpart and 
ŵisƌead the ǀalue of the filŵ͛s ĐoŵŵeƌĐial eleŵeŶts Ŷeǆt to the peƌpleǆing 
creative material. Managing high profile Hollywood talent (from a UK based 
peƌspeĐtiǀeͿ highlights ďoth the daŶgeƌ of ͚seleĐtiǀe peƌĐeptioŶ͛, ďut also iŶ 
this iŶstaŶĐe also ƌaises the teŵptatioŶ to ͚uŶdeƌestiŵate uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͛ [ϭ]. The 
project management team, lead by Finney, felt significant pressure to keep the 
talent happy and on track, and made overt efforts to reduce anxiety – while 
ĐoŶtiŶuiŶg to ͚uŶdeƌestiŵate futuƌe uŶĐeƌtaiŶtǇ͛ [ϭ]. Despite the peƌĐeiǀed 
value of the talent elements, the case proves that if a package has weak links 
;iŶ this Đase the sĐƌeeŶplaǇ, diƌeĐtoƌ͛s attitude aŶd ǁƌoŶg pƌoduĐtioŶ teaŵͿ, 
the project will fail to navigate the value chain and move into production. 
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4.6 Safety of Objects: managing the film distribution process 
 
4.6.1 Introduction 
 
The next case focuses on a North American film, The Safety of Objects, which 
was co-fiŶaŶĐed ďǇ Paul AlleŶ͛s U“ filŵ ĐoŵpaŶǇ, Cleaƌ Blue “kǇ aŶd 
Renaissance Films on a 50-50 funding basis, ǁith eaĐh ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s ŵaŶageƌs 
acting as co-executive producers on the project. Writer-director Rose Troche 
had garnered considerable attention with her first feature, Go Fish, and her 
Đƌeatiǀe ƌeputatioŶ aŶd sĐƌeeŶplaǇ adaptatioŶ of A.M. Holŵes͛ Ŷoǀel, The 
Safety of Objects, attracted strong A-list Đast iŶ the Đase of GleŶ Close͛s 
attachment to the project. The two lead producers working with Renaissance 
and Clear Blue Sky included New York based award-winning Killer Films and 
UK-US based InFilm. Prior to and during production, key distribution deals in 
foreign territories including Spain, Italy, the UK, France and Benelux, were 
successfully pre-sold by the Renaissance. For a film budgeted at just over $8m, 
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the pre-sales were worth nearly $2m, a significant financing component. 
However, a North American deal was not closed until the film was ready to be 
screened to US Studios and distributors, leaving a question mark over the 
filŵ͛s ǀalue iŶ its ŵost iŵpoƌtaŶt teƌƌitoƌǇ. 
 
4.6.2 The Toronto International Film Festival and US distribution 
 
The film was completed in summer 2001, and was selected for a world 
premiere at the Toronto International Film Festival that September. After the 
first screening (and despite the impact of the 9/11 World Trade Center 
bombings), an independent US distributor and cable operator IFC made an 
offer of $750,000 for North AmericaŶ ƌights. The offeƌ iŶĐluded ͚ďuŵps͛, 
stating that on certain levels of theatrical performance, the financiers would 
receive additional advances against receipts, making the overall deal 
potentially worth as much as $1.5m. 
The distribution contract stated that IFC would release the film theatrically 
within nine months of signature of the agreement. This clause was vital to the 
foreign distributors who had bought the film already, and who intended to 
wait until the US release of the film before taking it out to cinemas in their 
respective territories. It was also important for the film not to be held back 
longer than this period, as press and talent start to suspect the film suffers 
fƌoŵ a ͚͚pƌoďleŵ͛͛ oƌ ǁill ďe ͚͚diffiĐult͛͛ to plaĐe aŶd ŵaƌket. IŶ ŵaŶǇ Đases, 
lengthy delays lead to talent being unable to commit to supporting a film, both 
ďeĐause of sĐhedule aŶd theiƌ ͚͚ƌeputatioŶ͛͛ iŶ the eǇes of theiƌ agents, 
managers and press advisers. 
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NiŶe ŵoŶths passed. All the UK fiŶaŶĐieƌ͛s foƌeigŶ distƌiďutoƌs gƌeǁ 
iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ aŶǆious aďout the filŵ͛s plaŶs iŶ Noƌth AŵeƌiĐa, as IFC had still Ŷot 
given clear dates for the theatrical release. A conference call was set up 
between the producers, Clear Blue Sky, Renaissance and the US distributor, 
IFC. 
During the conference call, held 10 months after the signature of the 
agƌeeŵeŶt, IFC͛s Đhief eǆeĐutiǀe eǆplaiŶed that ďeĐause the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s ŵaiŶ 
shareholder owned a cinema that was under construction in downtown New 
Yoƌk, he ǁas uŶdeƌ pƌessuƌe to hold ďaĐk the filŵ foƌ the theatƌe͛s opeŶiŶg 
pƌeŵieƌe. IFC͛s plaŶ ǁas foƌ the filŵ͛s staƌ, GleŶ Close, to opeŶ the ĐiŶeŵa, 
and attend the premiere. However, nothing had been agreed with the star or 
her agents and management. The construction was also bogged down, with 
only a vague estimate of a further six months before completion. The film was 
unlikely to open before April 2004. 
The project management team was facing a critical dilemma. What should the 
partners do about the original foreign distributors, who had not accepted full 
delivery of the film (and hence held back 80 per cent of their minimum 
guarantees), as they were waiting for the North American release plan and 
opening in cinemas? 
“hould the filŵ͛s fiŶaŶĐieƌs aŶd pƌoduĐeƌs teaƌ up the U“ ĐoŶtƌaĐt aŶd fiŶd a 
new US distributor? Should they demand an earlier release plan, and insist that 
IFC abandon its cinema premiere? As a damage-limiting strategy, they could try 
to keep talent onside, be patient and not block foreign distributors from 
releasing the film prior to the US release. As a final resort, they discussed the 
pros and cons of taking IFC to court for breach of contract and material 
damages. 
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4.6.3 The lessons learned 
 
What actually happened in this case demonstrates the extreme lack of controls 
ďoth pƌoduĐeƌs aŶd fiŶaŶĐieƌs ĐaŶ ďƌiŶg to ďeaƌ oŶ the keǇ stages of a filŵ͛s 
exploitation process. At the point of the US deal being made at Toronto with 
IFC, the combined pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageŵeŶt teaŵ ĐleaƌlǇ suffeƌed fƌoŵ ͚illusioŶs of 
ĐoŶtƌol,͛ [ϯϬ] aŶd ͚ǁishful thiŶkiŶg͛ [ϭ]. The ͚aǀailaďilitǇ͛ of aŶ attƌaĐtiǀe offeƌ 
dominated the positive response to the deal, to the exclusion of other 
peƌtiŶeŶt iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, suĐh as IFC͛s ƌeal intentions regarding its release plan.  
What transpired isare the following facts: 
IFC released the film in autumn 2003, two years after it had bought the 
film. (The new cinema was still under construction and hence was not 
used for the release after all). 
The theatrical release was a failure The film grossed $350,000 over three 
weeks, having been released on more than 250 screens in the first 
weekend, dropping to 180 screens in the second week and 90 by the 
third.  
All agents and managers blocked the film͛s staƌs fƌoŵ suppoƌtiŶg the filŵ 
where possible. Crucially, Glen Close did not give any interviews or 
attend any promotional screenings, despite having attended the Toronto 
launch previously. 
Due to the leŶgthǇ U“ ƌelease delaǇ, the filŵ͛s foƌeigŶ distƌiďutors 
decided to release the film before IFC. The producers and financiers did 
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not try to block them. Most released on very limited theatrical runs,  and 
some went straight to a video/DVD release, missing out the cinema 
window.  
The filŵ͛s fiŶaŶĐieƌs ƌeĐeived full payment of the $750,000 advance, and 
three years later overages  (net profits) of approximately $150,000. The 
North American income streams were still significantly less than the 
original sales forecast value of $1.5m.  
 
What could the financiers and producers have done to avoid the damaging 
delaǇs aŶd suďseƋueŶt Ŷegatiǀe effeĐt oŶ the filŵ͛s foƌeigŶ distƌiďutioŶ plaŶs? 
Suing is not a realistic option, and can be described as irrational at best. As a 
project management solution tool, a wise produceƌ ǁould kŶoǁ theǇ͛ǀe failed 
even when starting to consider such an action. It would be fair, how- ever, to 
aƌgue that the fiŶaŶĐieƌs should haǀe ďeeŶ ŵuĐh ŵoƌe foĐused aŶd ͚ĐogŶizaŶt͛ 
about the outside release date agreed with IFC from the start of the North 
American deal negotiations. It would have made the US distributor more 
Đoŵŵitted aŶd aǁaƌe of the ͚͚foƌeigŶ ƌelease date͛͛ pƌoďleŵ, aŶd less likelǇ to 
keep delaǇiŶg. “tƌategiĐallǇ, the pƌoduĐeƌs should haǀe utilized the staƌs͛ 
agents and managers to put pressure on IFC and influence a change of mind. 
CoŶseƌǀatisŵ appeaƌed to ƌule the pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageƌs͛ aĐtioŶs, as theǇ failed to 
change their mind in light of the evidence of lengthy delay, which in turn was 
damaging the foreign value of the project.  
On a wider level, and most critically, what the case underlines is the 
fragmented nature of the Film Value Chain. The danger and negative impact of 
de-linkage between production and distribution in the independent, non-
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Hollywood Studio film business leaves project managers and their financiers 
vulnerable to third party risk. Studios tend to control world rights to the films 
theǇ pƌoduĐe aŶd fiŶaŶĐe, aŶd suďseƋueŶtlǇ ƌelease theiƌ filŵs oŶ a ͚͚daǇ aŶd 
date͛͛ ďasis [ϴ]. Their strategy is designed to protect themselves from 
territorial and political divisions to a large extent, and with good reason.  
 
 
 
 
4.7    See-“aǁ Filŵs͛ projeĐt ŵaŶageŵeŶt stǇle: The KiŶg's “peeĐh 
 
4.7.1 Introduction 
 
The King’s Speech, a $13m Oscar-winning UK historical drama – took more than 
$440m worldwide box office, and starred Colin Firth, Geoffrey Rush and Helena 
Bonham-Carter. The producer team behind the project overcame numerous 
potential cognitive biases on their journey through the film value chain, 
including the development financing, pre-selling, production, and marketing 
and distribution phases. This case study (Finney, 2014) [18] seeks to examine 
indicators that demonstrate positive mental models, and link them to project 
management skills and value capture.  Do the very existence of mental models 
offer positive aspects, as none are necessarily or intrinsically positive or 
Ŷegatiǀe? This ƌeseaƌĐh also iŶdiĐates a leǀel of aǁaƌeŶess ;aka ͚ŵiŶdfulŶess͛Ϳ 
and superior cognitive decision-ŵakiŶg, iŶ paƌt due to the lead pƌoduĐeƌ͛s 
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behaviour and his ability to leverage collaborative relationships at a high and 
effective level.  
The story of how The King’s Speech came to the screen and found its global 
audience is instructive in the art of development, packaging, financing and 
marketing. Based on the story of King George VI of Britain, his sudden 
asĐeŶsioŶ to the thƌoŶe afteƌ his ďƌotheƌ͛s aďdiĐatioŶ, aŶd his eŶsuiŶg ďattle 
with, and ultimate triumph over a serious speech impediment with the help of 
a therapist, the project started its life as a film, then a stage play, and finally a 
film again.  
 
4.7.2 The development stage 
 
Writer David Seidler changed tack in 2005 when he was encouraged by 
producers Simon Egan and Gareth Unwin (Bedlam Productions) to adapt the 
material as a film rather than play. By 2008, Unwin had enlisted the help of Iain 
Canning and Emile Sherman of See-Saw Films, a recently established 
Australian/UK-based production company with access to Australian 
distribution support via Transmission Films and independent development 
finance. Canning, a former acquisitions executive at sales and financing 
company Renaissance Films, had recently executive produced Control, while 
“heƌŵaŶ had pƌoduĐed Neil Aƌŵfield͛s Candy, starring the late Heath Ledger 
aŶd GeoffƌeǇ ‘ush. CaŶŶiŶg͛s pƌeǀious eǆpeƌieŶĐe ǁas aĐƌoss a ƌaŶge of ǀalue 
chain stages, including script development, film acquisitions, sales and 
marketing. The scope of his previous experience is arguably one of the key 
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reasons why his project management skills are superior to the majority of 
other film producers.  
UŶǁiŶ ǁas ͚ŵiŶdful͛ that his skills to this poiŶt laǇ iŶ phǇsiĐal pƌoduĐtioŶ 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt ;aka, ͚liŶe pƌoduĐiŶg͛Ϳ, aŶd Ŷot iŶ the Đoŵpleǆ aƌt of sĐƌeeŶplaǇ 
and story development, and international financing. His strategy in 
approaching and sharing the project with See-Saw was instructive, and can be 
seeŶ as a ŵeŶtal aĐtioŶ, oƌ ͚sǁitĐhiŶg of ĐogŶitiǀe geaƌs͛ [Ϯ]. ‘atheƌ thaŶ 
deĐide to opeƌate uŶdeƌ the ͚illusioŶ of ĐoŶtƌol,͛ UŶǁiŶ deĐided to shaƌe the 
risk and rewards with collaborators. Canning and Sherman got behind the 
development financing and packaging process despite being turned down by 
the UK Film Council for single project development finance. Fortunately, See-
Saw was awarded a Vision award worth £75k from the same source shortly 
after, and Bedlam and See-Saw agreed to split the development costs, with 
Seidler now set to further work on the screenplay. The development work was 
taking place with a director, Tom Hooper (The Damned United) already 
attached to the project, allowing his creative input as the screenplay evolved.  
 
4.7.3 The producer-distributor axis 
 
The ability of project managers to link a project with distribution partners is 
͞aďsolutelǇ ĐƌitiĐal͟ iŶ the ǀieǁ of CaŶŶiŶg.17  See-Saw had established an arms 
length cross-shareholding in Transmission, a newly launched Australian 
distributor. Transmission had evolved out of a successful SME Dendy Films 
                                                             
17 Canning, I. (2013). [Interview by Author November 2013] 
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(where Canning had served post-Renaissance as filŵ sĐout, aka ͚aĐƋuisitioŶ 
executive). The company was establishing itself as a fresh, interesting 
distƌiďutoƌ of ďoth speĐialised aŶd poteŶtial ͚Đƌoss-oǀeƌ͛ titles. Co-managing 
director Mackie explained to the author18 that “ee “aǁ͛s pƌoduĐeƌs, ͞ŵostlǇ 
check in on what we think before they commit to a project. We give them a 
sense of what we think our territory is worth. We offer a marketplace sounding 
board on many other aspects too - script, cast and director. It's a productive 
arrangement as I feel we can help prevent them from making choices that may 
huƌt the pƌojeĐt ĐoŵŵeƌĐiallǇ doǁŶ the tƌaĐk.͟ 
IƌoŶiĐallǇ, despite postiŶg aŶ eaƌlǇ dƌaft of the sĐƌipt thƌough GeoffƌeǇ ‘ush͛s 
MelďouƌŶe hoŵe͛s letteƌďoǆ to the iƌƌitatioŶ of ‘ush͛s ageŶts, ‘ush ďeĐaŵe 
attached in principal to playing the part of Lionel Logue, the speech therapist 
ǁho helps Geoƌge Vϭ to oǀeƌĐoŵe his staŵŵeƌ. ͞This ďƌoǁŶ eŶǀelope ǁas oŶ 
ŵǇ fƌoŶt dooƌŵat oŶe daǇ, aŶd I thought, ͞Oh, this is iŶteƌestiŶg.͟ The 
attaĐhed letteƌ ďasiĐallǇ said, ͞Eǆcuse the invasion, and for not going through 
the pƌotoĐol of Ǉouƌ ageŶt, ďut ǁe͛ƌe despeƌate foƌ Ǉou to kŶoǁ that this sĐƌipt 
exists, because there is this wonderful role that we could love for you to 
ĐoŶsideƌ.͟ “o I ƌead it.͟ AŶd he ǁas iŶ, despite the iƌritation of his agents given 
the informal approach. 
As the screenplay developed, the producer team rested on a budget of around 
£9m, given the scale of the film and the historical setting, which was knocked 
down by exchange rate fluctuations to settle ultimately at £8.2m. They were 
also armed with a very strong comparison title: The Queen had been released 
in 2006, and had gone on to take $123m worldwide, including $67m from 
                                                             
18 Mackie, A. (2013). [Interview by Author October 2013] 
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international following a successful awards campaign, spearheaded by the 
former Miramax Films, run by Bob and Harvey Weinstein. 
As such, the producers needed a strong package and committed financing 
partners to pull it off. The cornerstone territories, UK and Australia/New 
Zealand were covered with an advance from Transmission of $700k and 
(initially) £1m from a leading UK distributor Momentum – whom Canning had 
worked with on a previous film, Control – and which was later upped to £1.3m 
for the UK advance. In addition, a top sales company was needed to help pre-
sell the film whilst providing a combination of high-yet-realistic sales 
projections. Glen Basner, a former Miramax executive and by now running his 
own sales company FilmNation, provided both appropriate estimates but also 
stƌoŶg liŶks to Boď aŶd HaƌǀeǇ͛s Ŷeǁ ĐoŵpaŶǇ, The WeiŶstein Company 
(TWC), who were circling the film at the same time as Fox Searchlight, 
TǁeŶtieth CeŶtuƌǇ Foǆ͛s speĐialised ǁiŶg. 
 
4.7.4 Selecting the right US partners 
 
The producers faced an interesting choice: To go with Fox Searchlight via 
AŶdƌeǁ MaĐdoŶald͛s UK pƌoduĐtioŶ ĐoŵpaŶǇ, oƌ to stiĐk ǁith TWC, 
Momentum and Transmission – and find the remaining finance required to 
Đlose the filŵ. Foǆ͛s offeƌ ǁas ĐouĐhed iŶ esseŶĐe as a ͚“tudio takes all deal͛ ǀia 
DNA, whereby Fox would control world wide rights, and the producers would 
encounter a demanding Green Lighting process (including final approvals over 
budget and lead cast) which would challenging to meet. By contrast, the TWC 
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deal, which in part thanks to FilmNation had risen to an advance of $6.1 for 
North America, Latin America, Benelux, France, Germany and Scandinavia, left 
eŶough Đoǀeƌage foƌ the ƌeŵaiŶiŶg ͚gap͛ Đoǀeƌed ďǇ uŶsold/ƌeŵaiŶiŶg 
territories, as long as around £1.2m of equity could be raised. The art of the 
TWC deal as negotiated by FilmNation was how to get the highest number 
from these territories, whilst leaving enough significant territorial value on the 
table to still cover the gap through a loan and close the financing package.  
It was no secret across the film industry that TWC was experiencing a difficult 
financial period in 2008-09, thanks to a previous financing round with Goldman 
Sachs that raised doubts about TWC operating as a going concern. 
Entertainment banks had started to refuse to discount TWC paper (meaning 
that they would not lend against it), leaving the producers needing to find a 
fiŶaŶĐieƌ that had the appetite aŶd aďilitǇ to Đoǀeƌ TWC͛s AdǀaŶĐe. At the 
Cannes Film Festival in May 2009 Canning pitched to Prescience Film, a 
London-based film financier. Paul Brett, one of the principals at Prescience, 
and senior executive Anne Sheehan
19
, responded very positively to the 
sĐƌeeŶplaǇ, paĐkage aŶd the oppoƌtuŶitǇ to Đash floǁ TWC͛s adǀaŶĐe. IŶ 
additioŶ, Aegis, PƌesĐieŶĐe͛s seŶioƌ deďt fuŶd, ǁas iŶ a positioŶ to Đash floǁ 
the UK taǆ Đƌedit, aŶd fiŶaŶĐe the ƌeŵaiŶiŶg ͚gap͛ oŶĐe TWC͛s deposit aŶd 
overall minimum guarantee had been taken into consideration. 
The producers decided to stick to the independent model, politely declining 
the DNA/Fox offer, and closing the remaining finance with the UKFC (which by 
Ŷoǁ had ĐhaŶged its ŵiŶd aďout the pƌojeĐt͛s poteŶtialͿ aŶd a LoŶdoŶ-based 
post-production deal with Molinaire.  
                                                             
19 In addition to having worked with Sherman, Rush and Mackie previously, Canning had 
also served at Renaissance Films with Sheehan, who was Director of Business Affairs from 
2000-2004. 
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The project managers were mindful of the ƌisk TWC͛s fiŶaŶĐial positioŶ still 
presented to the project and its partners. TWC was forced to lift its cash 
deposit (normally 20% of the agreed price) for the film, with See-“aǁ͛s 
production lawyer pushing TWC up to 35%. TWC paid $2.125m on deposit, 
leaving $3.475m to pay on delivery plus an additional hold back of $150,000 to 
pay on final acceptance of delivery. Such an arrangement with a North 
American Studio or distributor is very unusual, as the deal is normally 20/80, 
with the 80% paid only after full legal and technical delivery has been agreed. 
Many producers would not have stood up to the formidable and commercially 
aggressive Weinstein brothers (Finney 1996) [58], and insisted on a finance 
structure that aided their ability to close the financing on the rest of the film.  
The project managers considered all the relevant information available, both 
relating to the different financing risks, but also the varying implications 
ďehiŶd theiƌ ĐhoiĐes. GoiŶg ǁith the ͚jig-saǁ puzzle͛ solutioŶ, iŶcluding 
Transmission, Momentum, TWC, FilmNation, Prescience, UKFC and Molinaire, 
meant that the producers would share in the on-going revenue streams in an 
eleǀated positioŶ. IŶdeed, it Đould ďe suggested that aŶ ͚aligŶŵeŶt of iŶteƌest͛ 
between the collaborators had been self-organised, and an acute level of local 
decision-making had been achieved. And once Colin Firth was signed as the 
lead actor, the film was set to enter production. 
 
4.7.5 Strategies to position the film for the market 
 
In post film still went slightly over the £8.2m agreed budget, but this stage of 
post-pƌoduĐtioŶ the WeiŶsteiŶ ďƌotheƌs Đould see the filŵ͛s ŵaƌket poteŶtial. 
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TWC backed the project with further funding, allowing for the producers to lift 
the music and special effects budgets before completion. The further TWC sum 
was advanced in return for Executive Producer credits. 
By the time The King’s Speech entered production, the project management 
team had achieved a considerable distribution footprint, including North 
America, Latin America, the UK, Australasia, France, German, Benelux, 
Scandinavia, Hong Kong and China. Although the UKFC had finally joined the 
fiŶaŶĐiŶg taďle, ďoth BBC Filŵs aŶd ChaŶŶel ϰ͛s ŵoǀie aƌŵ, Filŵ Fouƌ had 
turned the film down. 
The importance of international film festivals in positioning a film to the press 
and closing further distribution deals around the world requires strong sales 
and distribution partners in place before the world premier. Not after the 
event (Finney, 2010, 2014) [7].  The film clearly gained from close cooperation 
between TWC and UK distributor Momentum with both distributors making 
the most of a strong reception at the Toronto International Film Festival in 
September 2010. However, the distribution partners were aware that The 
Wrestler and Black Swan were both doing well so at the US theatres 
throughout November, when TWC had planned to release, that the launch 
date was held back until January (albeit with the minimum of screenings by the 
end of 2010 to enable the film to qualify for the Academy Awards). 
An expansive TWC Oscar campaign was undertaken, with more than $51m 
spent by the Weinstein brothers in first 6 months of the North American 
release. The combination of awards, attention, press coverage and the high 
͚plaǇaďilitǇ͛ of the filŵ all ĐoŵďiŶed to seĐuƌiŶg a worldwide hit. The KiŶg͛s 
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Speech went on to gross box office takings of more than $138m in North 
America and a further $275m in international territories.   
The lessons rising from an analysis of The King’s Speech Producer-Distributor 
strategy are instructive. While project managers and forecasters are deemed 
to ďe deludiŶg theŵselǀes if theǇ ďelieǀe that theǇ ĐaŶ ͚see͛ the futuƌe ǀalue of 
their projects accurately and consistently, See-Saw offers an alternative and 
positiǀe Đase iŶ poiŶt.  FiƌstlǇ, the lead pƌoduĐeƌ͛s eǆteŶsiǀe eǆpeƌieŶĐe aĐƌoss 
the value chain (including Renaissance, Dendy and then as a production entity, 
See-Saw) clearly provided the team with a leader who could draw on his 
experience and gain advantage. Canning, as the key project manager, also had 
developed a valuable yet intangible network of effective, influential contacts 
and key players, many through shared experience in industry organisations. 
Furthermore, while taste and genre are difficult to forecast in terms of a film 
pƌojeĐt͛s futuƌe ǀalue, aŶd the tiŵe ďetǁeeŶ staƌtiŶg a pƌojeĐt aŶd fiŶallǇ 
reaching the audience may impact on its appeal (De Vany 2004) [11] See Saw 
aŶd Bedlaŵ ǁeŶt agaiŶst the gƌaiŶ of ͚iŶdustƌǇ ǁisdoŵs͛ aŶd ƌose to the 
challenge of rejection by working tirelessly to achieve a package and an 
aligŶŵeŶt of iŶteƌest ďetǁeeŶ the pƌojeĐt͛s ĐoŶŶeĐted paƌties. HoldiŶg Ŷeƌǀe, 
and not immediately accepting a face-value offer of financing (Fox), and 
instead analysing all the ͚aǀailaďle͛ [ϭ] iŶfoƌŵatioŶ ͞iŶ a ǁaǇ that poiŶts out all 
sides of the situatioŶ ďeiŶg ĐoŶsideƌed͟ [1, Table 2], demonstrates that 
learning through experience, projects and implementing effective local 
decision-making is entirely possible within the film industry project-dominated 
seĐtoƌ. But to suĐĐeed, ͞the aŶgels Ŷeed to ďe oƌgaŶised like the ŵafia.͟ 
(Finney, 1996) [58]. 
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SECTION 5: Pixar Animation Studios: Addressing cognitive bias and how 
ŵaŶagers ĐaŶ learŶ to ͚uŶĐoǀer the uŶseeŶ͛ aŶd ŵoǀe ďeǇoŶd ͚the hiddeŶ͛ 
 
 ͞“uccess is goiŶg froŵ failure to failure without losiŶg eŶthusiasŵ.͟ 
Winston Churchill [7].  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
Over the past thirty years, much has changed in the world of filmmaking. 
Indeed, that rate of change has been accelerating. The rapid advances in digital 
production and delivery technology, the advent and impact of social media, 
and changing population deŵogƌaphiĐs aĐƌoss ͚gloďal Noƌth͛ aŶd ͚gloďal “outh͛ 
have been significant factors for film companies [6, 7, 19]. Managing the speed 
of change is a constant challenge for project managers and leaders. As this 
thesis has evidenced, a gap has consistently been cited by film-industry 
research between cognitive bias and its impact on project management. 
Formatted: Font: +Body (Calibri)
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Looking forwards appears also perplexingly fraught, as the case sight has 
eǀideŶĐed sigŶifiĐaŶt ǁeakŶesses iŶ the ͚aŶĐhoƌiŶg͛ aŶd ͚optiŵisŵ͛ that 
underlines future project value forecasting.  
Over the same thirty-year period in question, there is one globally significant 
creative company that has successfully managed change, harnessed digital 
technology to its enduring advantage, and built a creative powerhouse that 
consistently has captured cultural, critical and commercial value. Few film 
brands can claim universal recognition on a global scale. Connected to 
Hollywood, yet physically situated apart, owned by Disney since 2006, yet 
ĐoŶĐuƌƌeŶtlǇ ƌespoŶsiďle foƌ leadiŶg the “tudio͛s ƌeĐeŶt aŶiŵatioŶ tuƌŶaƌouŶd 
(Tangled, Frozen
20
), Pixar Animation Studios demands attention and analysis in 
the light of ŵǇ studǇ͛s theoƌetiĐal fƌaŵiŶg aŶd its ĐoŶŶeĐtiŶg eǀideŶĐe.  
Sitting alongside the extensive empirical proof of Piǆaƌ͛s ĐoŵŵeƌĐial aŶd 
creative success
21
 lies, in my view, a central link to the cognitive questions that 
are raised at the heaƌt of ŵǇ thesis: hoǁ ĐaŶ pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageƌs ͚see͛ effeĐtiǀelǇ 
in order to capture value and learn? And how can they best continuously apply 
that learning? How can their leadership and understanding of cognitive bias 
impact on the project management process and the overall culture of an 
organization? How can mangers think actively and progressively about the 
challenge of ǁhat is ͚oďsĐuƌed fƌoŵ ǀieǁ͛ [ϭϲ] when managing projects and 
leading creative organisations? And can we find eǀideŶĐe that Piǆaƌ͛s 
leadeƌship teaŵ͛s ǁaǇ of thiŶkiŶg aŶd aĐtiŶg oŶ the aďoǀe challenges has 
creative a positive, reflexive relationship to the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s pƌojeĐt 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛s skills aŶd consistent capture of value?  
                                                             
20
 Frozen overtook Toy Story 3 as the largest grossing animation film in history, passing $1.2bn world wide in 
May 2014. It should ďe Ŷoted that Catŵull is PƌesideŶt of DisŶeǇ AŶiŵatioŶ aŶd that Lasseteƌ, Piǆaƌ͛s Đo-
founder heads up the Disney animation operation. 
21 See Appendices (2) for data summary 
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IŶ Catŵull͛s seŵiŶal ďook Creativity Inc. (2014) [Ibid], the Pixar co-founder and 
President brings together his previous published work and curates his 
observations and lessons learned over the past three decades. His work delves 
deeply into the key factors that he considers helped build, shape and 
ultimately sustain Pixar AnimatioŶ “tudio͛s Đƌeatiǀe Đultuƌe. Catŵull͛s 
transparent approach to cognitive bias and his extensive citing of actions and 
tools that have helped overcome cognitive challenges are evidenced in detail.  
Catmull͛s self-desĐƌiďed ͚ĐaŶdouƌ͛ [ϭϲ] has also served to  ͚oǀeƌƌide hieƌaƌĐhǇ͛, 
manage both upwards and downwards, and minimalize the potentially toxic 
influence of Pixar owner Steve Jobs [Ibid]. This behaviour was also critical in 
ideŶtifǇiŶg the ĐogŶitiǀe ͚liŵits of peƌĐeptioŶ͛ iŶ people, pƌojeĐts, ŵaŶageƌs, 
and indeed in his challenging of his own leadership powers. The results, 
mapped over the last 30 years, provide us with a positive insight into mental 
models and cognitive bias.  
The Pixar leadership has developed cognitive techniques to deal with and solve 
a range of crisis management issues. Catmull openly acknowledges the danger 
pƌeseŶted ďǇ ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe ǁisdoŵs͛ and a range of biases [1] discussed 
throughout my thesis. Here we can finally cite a sustained, evidenced 
methodology backed up by tangible and continuing results. Catmull offers both 
findings and solutions that directly address and consistently help to overcome 
the negative impact of cognitive bias. The evidence exists at a significant level, 
suggesting that the Cognitive School of Strategy (alongside other connected 
Schools, including Entrepreneur and Learning, for example) [17] should 
consider his work in relation to their future research.  
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5.2 Learning from failure 
 
Success was not immediate. The value of looking back as well as forwards is 
that we are reminded of what in fact went wrong for Pixar in its first decade 
(from 1986-1996), and what moments and problems might have brought the 
company to a halt, and why. Catmull explains, for example, hoǁ ͚pƌoduĐtioŶ 
ŵaŶageƌs͛,22 who play a key part of the animation production process, had 
ďeeŶ alieŶated duƌiŶg the ŵakiŶg of Piǆaƌ͛s fiƌst Đoŵputer-animated film Toy 
Story. Despite his mantra that Pixar operated a level playing field, the creative 
artists and technical staff had little respect for production managers and their 
͚oǀeƌ-ĐoŶtƌolliŶg͛ aŶd ͚ŵiĐƌoŵaŶageŵeŶt͛ teŶdeŶĐies [Iďid, ϲϮ]. On further 
enquiry, Catmull discovered that the production managers did not want to 
ǁoƌk oŶ Piǆaƌ͛s Ŷeǆt ŵoǀie, A Bug’s Life, presenting the leader with a potential 
resource (and management reputation) crisis. In spite of the success of Toy 
Story, Catmull was astonished to discover in his post mortem that the ͚good 
stuff was hiding the bad stuff͛:  
 
͚I realised that this was something I needed to look out for: when 
downsides coexist with upsides, as they often do, people are reluctant to 
eǆploƌe ǁhat͛s ďuggiŶg theŵ, foƌ feaƌ of ďeiŶg laďelled ĐoŵplaiŶeƌs. I 
also realized that this kind of thing, if left unaddressed, could fester and 
destroy Pixar. For me, this discovery was bracing. Being on the lookout 
                                                             
22 PƌoduĐtioŶ ŵaŶageƌs ͞aƌe people ǁho keep tƌaĐk of the eŶdless details that eŶsuƌe a 
movie is delivered on time and on budget. They monitor the progress of the crew; they keep 
tƌaĐk of thousaŶds of shots; theǇ eǀaluate hoǁ ƌesouƌĐes aƌe ďeiŶg used…theǇ do 
soŵethiŶg esseŶtial foƌ a ĐoŵpaŶǇ…TheǇ ŵaŶage people aŶd safe-guard the process [Ibid, 
pp. 61-62]  
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for problems, I realized, was not the same as seeing problems͛ [Ibid, 
p.63]. 
 
The threat of damage and failure had triggered Catmull to think about the 
problem and respond to it. He subsequently brought the company together 
aŶd eǆplaiŶed that ͚aŶǇoŶe should ďe aďle to talk to aŶǇoŶe else, at aŶǇ leǀel, 
at aŶǇ tiŵe, ǁithout feaƌ of ƌepƌiŵaŶd.͛ It ǁas to ďeĐoŵe oŶe of Piǆaƌ͛s thƌee 
defining principles (see below).      
Piǆaƌ͛s eŶduƌiŶg suĐĐess appeaƌs to ďe rooted in the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s Đƌeatiǀe 
management philosophy. Another early example of this ͚ƌefleĐtiǀe͛ leadeƌship 
style emerged following a story crisis during the making of Toy Story. To solve 
the Đƌisis, a gƌoup of ͚pƌoďleŵ solǀeƌs͛ oƌgaŶiĐallǇ eŵeƌged, aŶd togetheƌ the 
five members worked to dissect scenes that were falling flat and analyse the 
emotional beats of the movie. The organic team-approach had no decision-
ŵakiŶg poǁeƌ oǀeƌ the filŵ͛s pƌoduĐeƌ aŶd diƌeĐtoƌ. TheǇ eǆisted to suppoƌt, 
not to super-manage the projeĐt͛s leadeƌs. The stoƌǇ suppoƌt gƌoup was to 
deǀelop iŶto Piǆaƌ͛s ͚Braintrust͛, and it was to have a significant impact on both 
Piǆaƌ aŶd lateƌ DisŶeǇ͛s appƌoaĐh to sĐƌeeŶplaǇ deǀelopŵeŶt aŶd stoƌǇ 
telling.
23
 (Catmull also ensured that Pixar owner Jobs agreed to not be part of 
the ͚Braintrust͛ team, demonstrating his ability to manage upwards and 
protect his team) [63, 64].  
 
5.3 The Toy Story 2 crisis 
 
                                                             
23 See Chapter 5 [2014) Ibid] for full examination. 
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OŶe of the Đleaƌest eǆaŵples of ͞leaƌŶiŶg fƌoŵ failuƌe͟ eŵeƌged duƌiŶg the 
ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s eǆpeƌieŶĐe of ŵaking Toy Story 2, initially assumed by Disney to be 
a DVD title rather than theatrical, an assumption the Pixar team were 
determined to alter. Although the film on release finally became a critical and 
ĐoŵŵeƌĐial suĐĐess, it ǁas also a ͞defiŶiŶg ŵoŵeŶt͟ for Pixar in its first phase 
of filŵŵakiŶg.  ͞It taught us aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt lessoŶ about the primacy of 
people over ideas: If you give a good idea to a mediocre team, they will 
screw it up; if you give a mediocre idea to a great team, they will either 
fix it or throw it away and come up with something that ǁoƌks,͟ 
explained Catmull [60]. 
 
͞Toy Story 2 also taught us another important lesson: There has to be 
one quality bar for every film we produce. Everyone working at the 
studio at the time made tremendous personal sacrifices to fix Toy Story 
2. We shut down all the other productions. We asked crew to work 
inhumane hours, and lots of people suffered from repetitive strain 
injuries. But by rejecting mediocrity at great pain and personal sacrifice, 
we made a loud statement as a community that it was unacceptable to 
produce some good films and some mediocƌe filŵs… eǀeƌǇthiŶg we 
touch needs to be excellent͟ [Ibid]. 
 
5.4 The necessity of failure and the learning process 
 
The eǀideŶĐe uŶdeƌliŶes Piǆaƌ͛s leadeƌship ͚ĐoŶsisteŶĐǇ͛ [ϭ] applied principles 
and its decision-making process underlines a clear thinking modus operandi all 
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the time: not just when managers considers that its projects are underwater 
and that the Pixar brand may therefore be threatened. Such behaviour and 
decision-ŵakiŶg pƌoĐesses suppoƌts Makƌidakis͛s suggested solutioŶs to ďias, 
although the ͚Braintrust͛ process, for example, centres around support to 
enable project managers to reach the right decision themselves and not 
override them.  Catmull has explained that the existence of ͞failuƌe isŶ͛t a 
ŶeĐessaƌǇ eǀil. IŶ faĐt, it isŶ͛t eǀil at all. It is a necessary consequence of doing 
soŵethiŶg Ŷeǁ,͟ [ϭϲ].    
 
͞CaŶdour could not be more crucial to our creative process. Why? 
BeĐause eaƌlǇ oŶ, all of ouƌ ŵoǀies suĐk. That͛s a ďluŶt assessŵeŶt, I 
know, but I choose that phrasing because saying it in a softer way fails to 
ĐoŶǀeǇ hoǁ ďad the ﬁƌst ǀeƌsioŶs ƌeallǇ aƌe. I'ŵ Ŷot tƌǇiŶg to ďe ŵodest 
or self-effaĐiŶg. Piǆaƌ ﬁlŵs aƌe Ŷot good at ﬁƌst, aŶd ouƌ joď is to ŵake 
them so - to go, as I say, "from suck to not-suĐk͟ [Iďid]. 
 
Mantras and specific decision-making rules can be useful according to 
Makridakis (see Table 2)[1]. However, Pixar has also demonstrated 
considerable flexibility in its harnessing of talent and the return of that talent 
to the hub. It openly acknowledges the footloose and freelance nature of film 
industry project-driven landscape. Director Andrew Stanton (Toy Story, Finding 
Nemo) has returned to the company after some years working elsewhere, 
deŵoŶstƌatiŶg Piǆaƌ͛s iŶteƌest iŶ ƌegeŶeƌatioŶ aŶd ĐaptuƌiŶg outside 
experience, which in turn is subsequently encouraged to return to the fold.  
 
Failure was also threatening the Disney dream factory. The evidence exists to 
demonstrate that Disney Animation (Frozen, Tangled), after a tough couple of 
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initial years, has been resurgent since Pixaƌ͛s Đo-founder John Lasseter was 
made creative head of Disney animation post 2006. On its release by Disney, 
Frozen was hailed both with rave critical reviews and record-breaking box 
offiĐe, iŶ ŵuĐh the saŵe ǁaǇ as Piǆaƌ͛s filŵs haǀe ƌegulaƌlǇ ďeeŶ ƌeĐeiǀed.  
 
Although the studio͛s ĐoŵpetitioŶ has ďeeŶ doiŶg ǁell iŶ a ďuƌgeoŶiŶg 
animation space, it still takes Dreamworks Animation to release two movies a 
year to hit the same revenue numbers that Pixar does with one. The company 
by early 2014 had taken gross revenues of more than $8bn at the global box 
office, leaving aside all ancillary returns from DVDs, VOD, television, and 
merchandising (the original Cars movie took more than $5bn alone from 
merchandising). And despite criticisms of doing too many sequels, their 
present slate (2014 onwards) appears to signal a return to originals (outside of 
Finding Dory, the sequel to Finding Nemo): in the summer of 2015 the studio 
will release Inside Out, set inside the head of a young girl, followed that same 
year by the much anticipated The Good Dinosaur, based on an alternate take 
on history in which dinosaurs never went extinct. 
 
 
 
5.5  Piǆar͛s ͚ǀisioŶ͛ aŶd leadership priŶĐiples 
 
 
Piǆaƌ͛s ǁaǇ of ͚seeiŶg͛ iŶdiǀiduals, teaŵs, pƌojeĐts aŶd its͛ ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛s 
deliberate linkage between technology and creativity are significant for the 
Cognitive School of Strategy. Pixar has undertaken and implemented a 
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cognitive-driven, visionary theory and set of tools that have managed and led a 
͚people-dƌiǀeŶ͛ organisation business to global effect and impact.  
Putting well considered mantras into successful action is the gold dust of 
managers. As Lasseteƌ has eǆplaiŶed: ͚The one aspect of Pixar that we 
imported is our simple philosophy that a studio is not the building, a 
studio is its people, so each studio is goiŶg to haǀe a diffeƌeŶt Đultuƌe.͛ 
[17] His co-founding partner Catmull further explained that: ͚It͛s extremely 
difficult for an organization to analyse itself. It is uncomfortable and hard 
to be objective. Systematically fighting complacency and uncovering 
problems when your company is successful have got to be two of the 
toughest management challenges there aƌe.͛ [Iďid] 
 
͚Clear values, constant communication, routine post-mortems and 
the regular injection of outsiders who will challenge the status quo 
aren͛t enough. Strong leadership is also essential – to make sure that 
people don͛t pay lip service to the values, tune out the 
communications, game the processes, and automatically discount 
newcomer͛s observations and suggestions [Ibid].͛ 
 
Catmull and Lasseter stand behind the belief that the creative power in 
a filŵ has to ƌeside ǁith the filŵ͛s Đƌeatiǀe leadeƌship. TheǇ aƌgue that 
whilst this may seem obvious, it is not true of many companies in the 
ŵoǀie iŶdustƌǇ: ͞We believe that creative vision propelling each movie 
comes from one or two people and not from either corporate 
executives or a development department. To emphasise that the 
Đƌeatiǀe ǀisioŶ is ǁhat ŵatteƌs ŵost, ǁe saǇ that ǁe aƌe ͞filŵŵakeƌ 
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led.͟ Theƌe aƌe really two leaders: the director and the producer. They 
form a strong partnership. They not only strive to make a great movie 
but also operate within time, budget aŶd people ĐoŶstƌaiŶts͛ [Iďid] 
 
The oƌgaŶizatioŶ͛s operating principles are intriguing, and far reaching. The 
three key Pixar principles, with commentary from Catmull below each mantra, 
are: 
 
1. Everyone must have the freedom to communicate with 
anyone. 
 
͚This means recognising that the decision-making hierarchy and 
communication structure are two different things. Members of any 
department should be able to approach anyone in any department to solve 
pƌoďleŵs ǁithout haǀiŶg to go thƌough the ͞pƌopeƌ ĐhaŶŶels͟. It also ŵeaŶs 
that ŵaŶageƌs Ŷeed to leaƌŶ that theǇ doŶ͛t alǁaǇs haǀe to ďe the fiƌst to 
kŶoǁ aďout soŵethiŶg goiŶg oŶ iŶ theiƌ ƌealŵ, aŶd it͛s OK to ǁalk iŶto a 
meeting and be surprised. The impulse to tightly control the process is 
understandable given the complex nature of moviemaking, but problems are 
almost by definition unforeseen. The most efficient way to deal with 
numerous problems is to trust people to work out the difficulties directly with 
each other without haǀiŶg to ĐheĐk foƌ peƌŵissioŶ.͛   
 
2. It must be safe for everyone to offer ideas. 
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͚We͛ƌe ĐoŶstaŶtlǇ shoǁiŶg ǁoks iŶ pƌogƌess iŶteƌŶallǇ.  We tƌǇ to staggeƌ 
who goes to which viewing to ensure that there are always fresh eyes, and 
everyone in the company, regardless of discipline or position, gets to go at 
some point. We make a concerted effort to make it safe to criticise by inviting 
everyone attending these showings to e-mail notes to creative leaders that 
detail what they liked aŶd didŶ͛t like aŶd eǆplaiŶ ǁhǇ.͛ 
  
3. We must stay close to innovations happening in the academic 
community. 
 
͚We strongly encourage our technical artists to publish their research and 
participate in industry conferences. Publishing may give away ideas, but it 
keeps us connected with the academic community. This connection is worth 
far more than any ideas we may have revealed: It helps us attract exceptional 
talent and reinforces the belief throughout the company that people are more 
important than ideas. We try to break down the walls between disciplines in 
other ways as well. One is a collection of in-house courses we offer, which we 
call Pixar University. It is responsible for training and cross-training people as 
theǇ deǀelop iŶ theiƌ Đaƌeeƌs͛ [Iďid]. 
 
The first two principles aƌe ƌooted iŶ Catŵull͛s lessons learnt but t h e y  a r e  
straightforward to comprehend as objectives.  The skill displayed by the 
leadership is to make sure that the above actions and associated values 
ďeĐoŵe aŶ eŶduƌiŶg paƌt of the ĐoŵpaŶǇ Đultuƌe aŶd Ŷot ͚gaŵed͛ out of the 
processes. The third is more taxing for managers of film companies who 
tend to fight problems and challenges on a daily ďasis, ͚puttiŶg out fiƌes͛ in 
the guise of crisis management clearly investigated throughout the case site. 
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5.6   Life-long learning: mantras and action that is believable 
 
Catmull explicitly values e d u c a t i o n  a n d  l e a r n i n g .  Pixar runs a 
collection of in-house courses,  which the company calls ͚Pixar University͛. It 
is responsible for training and cross-training people as they develop in their 
careers. But it also offers an array of optional classes – many of which 
Catmull has taken  – that provide people from different disciplines the 
opportunity to mix and appreciate what everyone does. And ultimately, in 
addition to the fusing of technology with art, Pixar is placing learning at the 
centre of its own talent development pool.  
 
There is a confidence and positivity to the Pixar model, but it is the 
management that took the lead and set (and has continued to re-set) the 
tone and core values for the company.  Most importantly, the Pixar 
creative environment enshrines a ͞teaŵ deŵoĐƌaĐǇ͟ approach.  
Attributes i n c l u d i n g  a n d  beyond the Pixar model for a creative 
environment include the following consolidated check list of principles, 
values and actions: 
 
 
The Pixar values and principles checklist:  
 
A) General themes: 
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 A building/office that encourages people to meet, exchange information, 
and share facilities. No rabbit warrens or sectioned-off offices in gated 
silos ;uŶlike ‘eŶaissaŶĐe Filŵ͛s LoŶdoŶ offiĐes iŶ “ohoͿ.  The ŵaŶageŵeŶt aŶd filŵŵakeƌs͛ eŵďodiŵeŶt of a shaƌed oǁŶeƌship aŶd 
vision.   Give a mediocre idea to a great team and they will either fix it or offer you 
something better. Brilliant people and teams are more important than good 
project ideas  Managing upwards successfully: Steve Jobs was subtly encouraged not to 
have an office and daily presence at the building. Post the acquisition by 
Disney the management teaŵ pushed to keep Piǆaƌ͛s own brand, identity 
and culture while encouraging Disney to develop its own.  People are more important than ideas, and form the lifeblood of a film 
“tudios͛ ĐƌeatiǀitǇ aŶd aďilitǇ to Đaptuƌe ǀalue. Therefore embrace their 
brilliance rather than be threatened by them.  Management has enabled those with less experience to have a voice, while 
promoting mutual respect. Inspiration comes from everywhere.  Enjoyment and fun r e m a i n  c e n t r a l  t o  t he  c u l t u r e .  T he y  promote 
team-shared experience, communication, confidence, morale and a 
sense of living in the moment.  The ability of all managers to hire people who are better than they are  No employment contracts have ever been issued at the company.  However, 
sharing of the upside for everyone, and a trust that people believe in the 
organisation has helped shape the spirit and tone of the culture. Bonuses are 
handed out personally by the management, not paid on-line.  The stimulation of a culture of innovation, including experiments, and 
pooling technology development, creative development and production 
management.  A ͞No Heƌo͟ Đultuƌe peƌǀades the ĐoŵpaŶǇ. Art and technology are equal.  The belief in the power of never-ending education at a broad yet central 
level: enshrined by Pixar University. 
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 Cleaƌ Đƌeatiǀe goals: ͞We͛ƌe Ŷot goiŶg foƌ ƌealistiĐ heƌe...ǁe͛ƌe goiŶg foƌ 
ďelieǀaďle.͟  The constant desire to balance commercial demands and creativity 
B) Pixar: Cognitive-orientated actions and themes  
 An ability to learn from mistakes has been fostered – promoted by 
tolerance and positive introspection.   Post mortems: regular and committed feedback that works as long as the 
filmmakers are listening and continue to command the respect of their team  The acknowledgement and acceptance that failure is part of the journey that 
defines project management. Failure is built in to the culture as a tool for 
leaƌŶiŶg aŶd iŵpƌoǀiŶg ;uŶless the diƌeĐtoƌ loses the faith of the filŵ͛s ĐƌeǁͿ.   Outsiders and contrarians are encouraged into the project management 
process, not excluded or merely tolerated.  The setting up of forums and communication/exchange of views rituals 
that are respected by all attendees.  Considered, constant and timely feedback is a backbone to the project 
management experience and is not allowed to slip or paid lip-service to.  Leadership that recognises the need to see beyond the immediate, the 
superficial, and to continue to listen to people at all levels of the 
organisation  Leadership needs to exercise candour, while finding out the reasons why 
others regularly are not open and honest on an on-going basis in a work 
environment.  Self-assessment tools must be developed that seek to discover what is real   Sharing problems and embracing uncertainty and change is essential. 
͚MessagiŶg͛ iŶ aŶ effoƌt to doǁŶplaǇ ĐhalleŶges aŶd Đƌises makes people 
less trusting of leaders.  First conclusions are typically wrong, and successful outcomes do not 
mean that the process was right all along or all the time. 
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 Preventing errors does not mean a manager has fixed everything, and the 
cost of prevention may well be more damaging than fixing them.  Uncovering what is unseen and understanding its nature is central to 
successful leadership and project management.   Share and show early work and encourage on-going feedback. Defensive, 
secretive habits stop people being able to solve the problems.  Imposing limits is important in project management because it will tend to 
encourage and stimulate a creative response. Discomfort and extreme 
problems can help find solutions and make people think differently.  
 
The aďoǀe ĐheĐklists, Đulled fƌoŵ Piǆaƌ͛s eǀideŶĐe aŶd Catŵull͛s ƌefleĐtioŶs 
[ϭϲ] shiŶe a light oŶ a ƌaŶge of issues aŶd ĐhalleŶges ƌaised iŶ this thesis͛s case 
studies.  In particular the second grouping of cognitive principals become both 
interesting and iŶfoƌŵatiǀe ǁheŶ plaĐed Ŷeǆt to Makƌidakis͛ ǁoƌk ;aŶd 
specifically his own check lists, see Tables 2 and 6 on Common Biases and 
Proposed Ways of Avoiding or Reducing Their Negative Impact) [1]. They share 
a significant level of common themes, principles and action points in relation 
to the way leaders and managers behave. As we come to the final section of 
this thesis below, this interconnection between Makridakis͛s eleǀeŶ pƌoposals 
to counter bias, and Catmull͛s oǁŶ peƌĐeptioŶs offeƌ us a Ŷeǁ leǀel of 
understanding of the positive role cognitive bias can play in the field of 
management strategy. The clearly evidenced cross-over between theory and 
practice serves as a bedrock for both this studǇ͛s fiŶdiŶgs aŶd its wider 
implications for leaders in general. These themes are further discussed in the 
following final section. 
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SECTION 6:  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION - Findings and their wider 
implications beyond the film industry 
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Over the past three decades, strategic management studies have 
predominantly focused on market power and competition among 
organizations. Although such studies provides us significant insights about the 
study of mental role models and cognitive bias in project management is still 
highly underdeveloped. In this research, I have integrated theoretical 
understandings of the Cognitive School of Strategy to the study of project 
management in the film industry.  
My recurring focus on Makridakis and his eleven proposals [1] to counter bias 
ǁas iŶ aŶtiĐipatioŶ, ƌatheƌ thaŶ iŶ eǆpeĐtatioŶ, that theǇ ŵight ͚Đoŵe to life͛ if 
I could secure detailed industry information, and thus test this theoretical 
perspective over a range of cases. 
By relying on different case studies, this thesis exhaustively explored the 
problems Renaissance Films encountered in the early 2000s, and directly 
linked the recurring project management problems and faulty decision-making 
process to a series of cognitive bias traits. However, experience if applied 
mindfully can count and play a central role in the capture of value. For 
example, as we have seen in the case study of The King’s Speech ;ϮϬϭϬͿ, (one 
of the case studies in Section 4), the project leader amply demonstrated a 
heightened level of project management skills that were at least in part
24
 
derived from his knowledge-based grounding at Renaissance Films. Bearing 
witness to cognitive folly also offered this particular producer an opportunity 
to leaƌŶ aŶd theŶ ŵoǀe oŶ. IŶdeed, giǀeŶ ‘eŶaissaŶĐe͛s Đollapse aŶd 
subsequent write-off of about $40 million dollars worth of production and 
overhead investment, that the company can be viewed as a knowledge-based 
                                                             
24 CaŶŶiŶg is oŶ ƌeĐoƌd as saǇiŶg that ͞ǁithout his tiŵe at ‘eŶaissaŶĐe, The King’s Speech 
ǁould Ŷot haǀe happeŶed.͟ ‘ef: authoƌ͛s iŶteƌǀieǁ, OĐt ϮϬϭϯ. 
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ƌesouƌĐe of ĐoŶsideƌaďle ǀalue ƌatheƌ thaŶ just aŶotheƌ ͚optiŵistiĐ͛ failuƌe that 
has left no footprint.       
Conjecturing about the relative value of cognitive bias to management strategy 
is an inherently limited line of enquiry unless the researcher also considers and 
analyses the wider industry context (Section 3). The cultural and industrial 
environment plays a key role here, as it shapes both the pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageƌ͛s 
perceptions but also, critically, the film business environment in which the 
project manager operates [41]. We have seen that the film industry is an 
uncertain, extremely volatile and high-risk environment in which project 
managers are confronted with a host of concurrent challenges [6, 7, 8, 11]. 
Survival is a significant challenge and to the majority, success is out of reach.   
To ǁhat eǆteŶt the eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal ĐoŶteǆt doŵiŶated ‘eŶaissaŶĐe Filŵs͛ 
failure rate is hard to gauge. Random elements such as luck, accidents of 
timing and coincidence also play a role in determining outcomes [7, 11], but 
any associated analysis would lack tangible insights given the ambiguous 
nature of such findings [8]. The competitive pressures to attract, package and 
eǆploit ͚Đƌeatiǀe iŶputs͛ ;i.e. sĐƌeeŶplaǇs, directors, actors, etc.) [39] isare 
omnipresent for all film producers, yet the evidence demonstrates that an 
impressive talent pool did want to work with Renaissance Films, and many of 
them signed on between 2000-2005, albeit certain talent was well 
remunerated in the process. A high level of collaborative relationships clearly 
existed, but despite this network, the company failed to capture value. The 
value, however, of qualitative academic research ǁoƌk is ƌooted iŶ ͞its aďilitǇ 
to capture the real-life context within which events take place and to capture 
the esseŶĐe of eǀeŶts as theǇ uŶfold͟ [ϲϱ].  A stoƌǇ ĐaŶ ďe told that shoǁs a 
pathway emerging. On reflection, what can be drawn from the Renaissance 
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͚ƌeal-life͛ Đase studies is that aŵid the Đhaos of pƌoduĐtioŶ, the ŵaŶageŵeŶt, 
in-house pƌoduĐeƌs aŶd the Boaƌd͛s ďehaǀiouƌ tƌaits, ͚haďits͛ aŶd deĐisioŶ-
ŵakiŶg pƌoĐesses [ϯϳ] heaǀilǇ iŶflueŶĐed the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s aĐĐeleƌated doǁŶfall. 
The different cases also shoǁ us ;ƌatheƌ thaŶ just ͚tell͛Ϳ aďout poteŶtial 
negative impact of cognitive bias, a factor that remained unacknowledged and 
uŶseeŶ ďǇ the ŵaŶageƌs aŶd the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s oǀeƌƌidiŶg Đultuƌe. MǇ thesis has 
evidenced how it played a key role in determining the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s Đƌeatiǀe aŶd 
commercial fate.  
This brings us to another case, in which we discuss the Pixar model and the 
ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s eŶshƌiŶed set of Đƌeatiǀe ŵaŶageŵeŶt pƌiŶĐiples as ƌeǀieǁed iŶ 
“eĐtioŶ ϱ. Piǆaƌ is haƌdlǇ a ͚flash iŶ the paŶ͛ giǀeŶ its three decades worth of 
business and enduring slate of films produced. The evidence is abundant that 
Catmull (and Lasetter [16]) have placed great weight on the shoulders of 
cognitive theory, the role and nature of bias and how to best manage its 
impact on the ǁoƌkplaĐe aŶd at the ĐeŶtƌe of the ĐoŵpaŶǇ͛s Đoƌe aĐtiǀitǇ: 
blockbuster-level project management. From the case, we learnt that Catmull, 
ďǇ his oǁŶ adŵissioŶ, paid supeƌfiĐial atteŶtioŶ toǁaƌds ĐogŶitiǀe ďias͛s 
existence for the first five years of Pixar͛s opeƌatioŶs. It took a seƌies of Đƌises 
ďetǁeeŶ ToǇ “toƌǇ aŶd ToǇ “toƌǇ Ϯ foƌ hiŵ to ͚sǁitĐh geaƌs,͛ [Ϯ] aŶd paǇ a high 
leǀel of ĐogŶitiǀe atteŶtioŶ to ǁhat ǁas ͚hiddeŶ͛ fƌoŵ sight.  
There exists compelling evidence to indicate that the leader has never let up 
for the past 25 years. Rather than developing his ability to keep his eye on the 
ďall, oŶe suspeĐts that he has ĐoŶsisteŶtlǇ hoŶed his ;aŶd his teaŵ͛sͿ aďilitǇ to 
manage change by predicting the second bounce of the ball, a skill that market 
traders in every market would like to have. However, rather than keeping 
cognition-driven trade insights to himself and the Pixar brand, this example 
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demonstrates that the project leader was successful by sharing his insights 
with other team members at Disney. His creative management tool kit, 
including the application of the non-hierarchical ͚Braintrust͛ system, has 
helped ďƌiŶg DisŶeǇ͛s aŶiŵatioŶ studio out of a tƌough, aŶd ďƌought it iŶto the 
creative and commercial limelight (Tangled, Frozen) with record-breaking 
results. Following the publication of Creativity, Inc. managers, academic 
researchers and film industry practitioners have been offered a transparent 
insight into his application of cognitive theory into workplace practice. Even 
prior to this work, leading managers had started to take notice. On his 
appoiŶtŵeŶt as CEO of the UK͛s ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ďƌoadĐasteƌ IŶdepeŶdeŶt 
Television (ITV), Adam Crozier went on record about his interest and 
adherence to the Pixar creative management model. ITV has risen from a 
commercial slump five years ago to a globally recognised creative and 
commercial success story, although it seems unlikely that Catmull would claim 
credit.    
Catŵull͛s puďliĐ ĐaŶdouƌ also ĐoŶtƌiďutes soŵethiŶg to ƌeĐeŶt disĐussioŶs iŶ 
the field of managemeŶt stƌategǇ. Foƌ eǆaŵple, to Poƌteƌ͛s ǀieǁ oŶ 
competitive forces and how to sustain advantage [40], alongside the market 
power-orientations of the resource-based view [5]. Both stress that the nature 
of competition requires managers to protect their assets, yet Catmull has 
written a road map that appears to enable his approach to be identified and 
potentially imitated by his immediate competitors. This paradox suggests that 
further discussion and research is required to delve into the exact nature of 
what Pixar has applied and built, and whether the essence of its value is 
protected by fundamental knowledge barriers [5].  
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Generalizing in a manner beyond the immediate setting of this thesis, an 
eǆaŵiŶatioŶ of Piǆaƌ ͚iŵitatoƌs͛ suĐh as Cƌozieƌ͛s ITV eǆpeƌiŵeŶt would be of 
significant interest to the Cognitive School of Strategy, but also to knowledge-
based resource researchers. This raises fundamental questions: What are and 
how can we best identify the key factors that limit knowledge-transference? 
Why and in what ways are successful company cultures difficult (or even 
impossible) to translate and build upon by third party imitators and 
borrowers? What reflexive role does cognitive strategy play in shaping an 
oƌgaŶizatioŶ͛s Đultuƌe aŶd its Đoƌe ǀalues that ƌeŶders it unique and exclusive, 
and why? Is there a place for corporate opportunism whereby certain cognitive 
management skills and principles can be implemented, but others excluded, 
and on what basis are those choices made?  Can creative management skills be 
taught, oƌ do theǇ Ŷeed to ďe deǀeloped ͚oŶ the joď͛?      
Further related research areas in the area of cognitive bias might relate to 
other cultural industries such as the music industry. For example, the 
implications of my contribution to the field of cognitive strategy, which places 
bias at the centre of strategy formation, (rather than marginalised to the side 
or completely dismissed), can be very relevant to the music industry, because 
the value chain model in the music industry is undergoing fast and significant 
restructuring [15]. Mental models of the music value chain that have long 
formed in the minds of incumbents are now being successfully challenged by 
the aƌƌiǀal of digital eŶtƌepƌeŶeuƌs ǁho aƌe ŶaǀigatiŶg ͚aƌouŶd͛ the ŵodel 
rather than assuming they need to manage each of the assumed links [Ibid]. It 
has been argued that the ability of the major music labels to control the supply 
chain for music has prevented artists from distributing their own material 
independently. However, recent developments, such as the emergence of 
Internet, live shows and piracy have changed the playing field over the past 
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decade with intriguing results and affected other incumbents and the new 
project-entrepreneur-cum-artists. My findings can be applied to the music 
industry, and improve understandings of mental models and the role of 
cognitive bias in the music industry. 
 
Similarly themed issues are present to be seen in other creative industries, 
suĐh as teleǀisioŶ dƌaŵa pƌoduĐtioŶ. IŶ paƌtiĐulaƌ, the U“ ͚shoǁ-runner͛ 
project management model has given rise to some of the most critically and 
ĐoŵŵeƌĐiallǇ suĐĐessful TV dƌaŵa of ƌeĐeŶt Ǉeaƌs. IŶ ǁhat ǁaǇs ŵight Piǆaƌ͛s 
project management approach and cognition-driven principles, given the 
complexity of producing computer-animated stories over extensive time 
peƌiods, ďe of use to the U“ ͚shoǁ-ƌuŶŶeƌ͛ pƌojeĐt ŵaŶageŵeŶt ŵodel?  Hoǁ 
can it be transformed to a UK television model? Television studies would be 
served by considering both the wider environment but specifically the selective 
use of, aŶd eǆpeƌiŵeŶtatioŶ ǁith, the ͚haďits͛, ďias aŶd ĐoŶǀeŶtioŶs deǀeloped 
oǀeƌ ŵaŶǇ Ǉeaƌs ǁithiŶ the U“ ŵodel. What ͚haďits͛ ǁoƌk aŶd ǁhǇ? IŶ ǁhat 
ways are they cognitively driven, and which are handicaps and why? How 
could they be mitigated? How can they best be replicated and capture value? 
And finally, what specific Pixar values and tools might be of critical value to a 
new UK approach to long-form television writing and drama production?  
As I have demonstrated for the film industry, cognitive management strategy 
offers a useful framework to study complex and opaque industries. Cognitive 
management strategy in cultural industries is still highly underdeveloped, and 
because of the turbulent environment of cultural industries, I would be 
interested to develop this perspective to other creative business 
environments, such as television, video, music or literature industries. One way 
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of securing its place in the debate and making a meaningful contribution is to 
explore case sites and industries that opeƌate iŶ ĐoŶsideƌaďlǇ less ͚uŶĐeƌtaiŶ͛ 
environments. More generic yet creatively demanding industries, such as 
advertising, marketing and public relations could make for intriguing case sites. 
The deep-rooted behavioural aspects central to their work sites renders them 
ripe for cognitive research and analysis.  
The extent to which the Pixar experience might simply complement existing 
research rather than move the debate about cognitive bias forward is 
important to consider. My view is that by directly linking Makridakis and the 
͚oďjeĐtiǀe͛ CogŶitiǀe “Đhool of “tƌategǇ ǁith the Piǆaƌ ďehaǀiouƌal appƌoaĐh, 
and synthesising their potential solutions, there a case to be made that the 
evidence not only contradicts much of the literature to date, but also that its 
findings could bring theoretical insights of the Cognitive School of Strategy into 
new directions. 
“igŶifiĐaŶt eleŵeŶts of this thesis͛s liteƌatuƌe ƌeǀieǁ poiŶted to ĐogŶitiǀe ďias 
as a factor inherently unavoidable, and the implication is that cited exceptions 
simply support the assumed rule. That cognitive bias exists is not at question. 
The value behind the theory is to identify management methods that help to 
addƌess aŶd oǀeƌĐoŵe ďias. BǇ ĐoŵďiŶiŶg Makƌidakis͛s theoƌetiĐal iŶsights aŶd 
the Pixar value system, I propose the following tentative headline 
requirements: 
a) An awareness and understanding of the concept of cognitive bias. This 
would be aimed at helping project managers and industry leaders identify the 
value gained through acknowledgement and mapping both behaviour and 
action points as a starting point.  
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b) A flat hierarchy that stimulates open communication (as this helps in the 
sharing of information and the ability for managers to see without bias). 
c) A commitment to analysing and capturing the lessons from previous 
mistakes.  
Before expanding and codifying such a tool, considerably more research is 
required on patterns, cultures, companies and project management if we are 
to find more exceptions that can support this evolving field.  
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